Product placement in movies: a cross cultural study between Brazil and the USA

The broader objective of this study undertaking can briefly be articulated in particulate aims as follows: to measure the attitudes of consumers regarding the brand displayed by this strategy as well as to highlight recall, recognition and purchase intentions generated by product placement on consumers. In addition, check the differences and similarities between the behavior of Brazilian and American consumers caused by the influence of product placements. The study was undertaken targeting consumer audience in Brazil and the U.S. A rang3 modeling set ups were performed in order to realign study instruments and hypothesis towards the research objectives. This study gave focus on the following hypothesized models. H1: Consumers / Participants who viewed the brands / products in the movie have a higher brand / product recall compared to the consumers / participants who did not view the brands / products in the movie. H2: US Consumers / Participants are able to recognize and recall brands / products which appear in the background of the movie than Brazil. H3: Consumers / participants from USA are more accepting of product placements compared to their counterparts in Brazil. H4: There are discernible similarities in consumer / participant brand attitudes and purchase intentions in consumers / participants from USA and Brazil in spite of the fact that their country of origin is different. Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient ensured the reliability of survey instruments. The study involved the use of the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) for the hypothesis testing. This study used the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to assess both the convergent and discriminant validities instead of using the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) or the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This reinforced for the use of the regression Chi Square and T statistical tests in further. Only hypothesis H3 was rejected, the rest were not. T test provided insight findings on specific subgroup significant differences. In the SEM testing, the error variance for product placement attitudes was negative for both the groups. On this The Heywood Case came in handy to fix negative values. The researcher used both quantitative and qualitative approach where closed ended questionnaires and interviews respectively were used to collect primary data. The results were additionally provided with tabulations. It can be concluded that, product placement varies markedly in the U.S. from Brazil based on the influence a range of factors provided in the study. However, there are elements of convergence probably driven by the convergence in technology. In order, product placement to become more competitive in the promotional marketing, there will be the need for researchers to extend focus from the traditional variables and add knowledge on the conventional marketplace factors that is the sell-ability of the product placement technologies and strategies.

Local concavifiability of preferences and determinacy of equilibrium

In this paper we consider strictly convex monotone continuous complete preorderings on R+n that are locally representable by a concave utility function. By Alexandroff 's (1939) theorem, this function is twice dífferentiable almost everywhere. We show that if the bordered hessian determinant of a concave utility representation vanishes on a null set. Then demand is countably rectifiable, that is, except for a null set of bundles, it is a countable union of c1 manifolds. This property of consumer demand is enough to guarantee that the equilibrium prices of apure exchange economy will be locally unique, for almost every endowment. We give an example of an economy satisfying these conditions but not the Katzner (1968) - Debreu (1970, 1972) smoothness conditions.

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.