Why did democracy become the preferred political regime only in the twentieth century?

A Democracia Tornou-Se a Forma Preferida de Governo Apenas no Século Vinte. a Busca por Motivos Racionais para Entendermos a Razão não é Suficiente. o Autor Procura por um Fato Histórico Novo que Tenha Levado a Essa Mudança de Preferência, Baseado Sucessivamente na Revolução Capitalista e na Perda Gradual do Medo da Expropriação Pela Burguesia. a Revolução Capitalista que Mudou o Modo de Apropriação do Excedente, da Violência para o Mercado, é a Primeira Condição Necessária. Representa Também a Transição do Estado Absoluto para o Estado Liberal. a Segunda Condição é o Desaparecimento do Medo da Expropriação, Permitindo a Transição do Regime Liberal para o Regime Liberal-Democrático. Depois de Estabelecer Estas Duas Condições, ou Estes Dois Fatos Históricos Novos, o Regime Democrático Tornou-Se Rational Choice para Todas as Classes. para os Capitalistas, Democracia é Agora a Forma de Governo que Melhor Assegura o Direito À Propriedade e Aos Contratos. para os Trabalhadores, é a Forma de Governo que Melhor Assegura o Aumento de Salários com Lucros

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Distributive politics in Latin América: the impact of democracy, eletions and globalization on the welfare state

A tese busca examinar dois desenvolvimentos de grandes conseqüências na América Latina nas últimas três décadas do século XX. Ela procura testar as teorias sobre políticas distributivas examinando os efeitos da democracia e da globalização no estado de bem-estar na América Latina utilizando dados de séries temporais para 15 países entre 1973 e 2000.

Democracy and capitalist revolution

Democracy became the preferred and consolidated form of government only in the twentieth century. It is not sufficient to explain this change solely by reference to rational motives, nor by detecting processes and leadership. A historical approach is required. The new historical fact that led to the change of preference from aristocratic rule to democracy is the capitalist revolution, which changed the manner of appropriating the economic surplus from violence to the market. This is the first necessary condition for democracy. The disappearance of the fear of expropriation, the rise of middle classes and the pressures of the poor or of the workers are the second, third and fourth new historical facts that opened the way for the transition from the liberal to the liberal-democratic regime. After these four conditions were fulfilled, the elites ceased to fear that they would be expropriated if universal suffrage was granted. Eventually, after the transition, the democratic regime became the rational choice for all classes. The theory presented here does not predict transitions, since countries often turn democratic without fully realized historical conditions, but it predicts democratic consolidation, since no country that has completed its capitalist revolution falls back into authoritarianism.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Democracy and growth in pre-industrial countries

This paper distinguishes three types of countries (rich, middle-income, and pre-industrial) and focus on the latter, which, in contrast to the other two, didn’t complete their industrial and capitalist revolutions. Can pre-industrial countries be governed well and embody the principles of consolidated democracies? Today these countries are under pressure from the imperial West to eschew institutions and developmental strategies that, in the past, allowed rich and middle-income countries to industrialize. At the same time, they are pressured by these same Western parties (and by its own people) to be democratic, even though their societies are not mature enough to fulfill that. In fact, no country completed its industrial and capitalist revolution within the framework of even a minimal democracy, suggesting that such demands are unfair. Added to this, pre-industrial countries are extremely difficult to govern because they usually don’t have a strong nation and capable states. This double pressure to renounce development strategies that have worked for the West while being required to become a democracy represents a major obstacle to their development.