On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

Earnings dynamics and inequality in Venezuela: 1995-1997

In this paper, we decompose the variance of logarithmic monthly earnings of prime age males into its permanent and transitory components, using a five-wave rotating panel from the Venezuelan “Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo” from 1995 to 1997. As far as we know, this is the first time a variance components model is estimated for a developing country. We test several specifications and find that an error component model with individual random effects and first order serially correlated errors fits the data well. In the simplest model, around 22% of earnings variance is explained by the variance of permanent component, 77% by purely stochastic variation and the remaining 1% by serial correlation. These results contrast with studies from industrial countries where the permanent component is predominant. The permanent component is usually interpreted as the results of productivity characteristics of individuals whereas the transitory component is due to stochastic perturbations such as job and/or price instability, among others. Our findings may be due to the timing of the panel when occurred precisely during macroeconomic turmoil resulting from a severe financial crisis. The findings suggest that earnings instability is an important source of inequality in a region characterized by high inequality and macroeconomic instability.

A systematic component of the jump-risk premium in an AJD model

We develop an affine jump diffusion (AJD) model with the jump-risk premium being determined by both idiosyncratic and systematic sources of risk. While we maintain the classical affine setting of the model, we add a finite set of new state variables that affect the paths of the primitive, under both the actual and the risk-neutral measure, by being related to the primitive's jump process. Those new variables are assumed to be commom to all the primitives. We present simulations to ensure that the model generates the volatility smile and compute the "discounted conditional characteristic function'' transform that permits the pricing of a wide range of derivatives.

Redistribution with ex-ante unobserved choice

Introducing dynamics to Mirrlees' (1971) optimal taxation model creates a whole new set of issues that are only starting to be investigated in the literature. When choices are made before one's realizing her productivity incentive constraints ought to be defined as a function of more complex strategies than in the static case. 80 far, all work has assumed that these choices are observable and can be contracted upon by the government. Here we investigate choices that : i) are not observed, andj ii) affect preferences conditional Oil the realization of types. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration is incorporated we show how these two characteristics make it necessary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and it is shown that they bear some resemblance to classic optimal taxation results. We are able to show that in the most 'natural' cases return on capital ought to be taxed . However, we also show that the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general.