Firm heterogeneity and lobbying

The structure of protection across sectors is usually interpreted as the result of competition among lobbies to influence politicians, but little attention has been devoted to the importance of individual firms in this process. This paper builds a model incorporating firm heterogeneity into a lobbying setup `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in a monopolistic competitive environment. We obtain that increased sectorial dispersion cause a fall in equilibrium tariff provided that the exporter’s cutoff is above the mean of the distribution. Also, higher average productivity brings about a fall in the equilibrium tariff, whereas an increase in export costs cause an increase in the tariff. JEL Classification codes: D43, D7, F12, F13, L11

Firms?: heterogeneity, organizations, power and trade

This paper develops a theory which investigates the two-way relationship between the internaI organization of the firm and market competition.We introduce heterogenous firms with internal hierarchies in a Knlgman (1980) monopolistic competition model of trade. The model simultanously determines firms' organizational choices anel heterogeneity across firms in size and proeluctivity.Ve show that intenlational trade, market size and the toughness of competition in international markets incluce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to a reorganization of firms towards more decentralized corporate hierarchies.We show further that trade triggers produetivity growth through inter-firm reallocations towards more produetive firms in whieh CEOs have power in firms. At the same time, however trade- induced organizational changes towards fiattened corporate hierarchies lead to a softening of lnternat.ional competition which may contribute a eountervailing negative effect on seetoral productivity.

Can unobserved heterogeneity in farmer ability explain the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity?

The well-known inverse relationship between farm-size and productivity is usually explained in terms of diminishing returns with respect to land and other inputs coupled with various types of market frictions that prevent the efficient allocation of land across farms. We show that even if in the absence of diminishing returns one can provide an alternative explanation for this phenomenon using endogenous occupational choice and heterogeneity with respect to farming skills.

Phase transition of demand explained by the heterogeneity of consumers' intrinsic preferences

In 1991 Gary S. Becker presented A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In uences on Price explaining why many successful restaurants, plays, sporting events, and other activities do not raise their prices even with persistent excess demand. The main reason for this is due to the discontinuity of stable demands, which is explained in Becker's (1991) analysis. In the present paper we construct a discrete time stochastic model of socially interacting consumers deciding for one of two establishments. With this model we show that the discontinuity of stable demands, proposed by Gary S. Becker, depends crucially on an additional factor: the dispersion of the consumers' intrinsic preferences for the establishments.

The rite of passage from regular to connoisseur consumer: the role of the taste transformation ritual in the specialty coffee context

Apesar de o campo da cultura de consumo ter abordado o papel do ritual no consumo, definindo e descrevendo este constructo e explicando suas dimensões, significados culturais, elementos, componentes e práticas, assim como revelando a diferenciação nas práticas dos consumidores, nenhuma pesquisa ainda identificou como os consumidores, por meio de práticas de ritual, estabelecem e manipulam suas próprias diferenciações em relação a outros consumidores durante o rito de passagem deles de uma categoria cultural de pessoa para outra. Tendo como base conceitos-chaves da teoria sobre ritual, minha pesquisa aborda o papel do ritual no consume de apreciação. Conduzindo um estudo etnográfico sobre consumo de apreciação de cafés especiais, eu realizei uma imersão no campo, visitando e observando consumidores em cafeterias independentes de destaque na América do Norte – Toronto, Montreal, Seattle e Nova York – de agosto de 2013 a julho de 2014. Eu também realizei uma imersão no contexto de cafés especiais no Brasil em Belo Horizonte e São Paulo, de agosto de 2014 a janeiro de 2015, para comparar e contrastar as culturas de consume de cafés especiais de Brasil, Estados Unidos e Canadá. Eu usei entrevistas longas, observação participante, netnografia, introspecção e análise histórica de artigos de jornais para coletar os dados, que foram interpretados utilizando a abordagem hermenêutica, comparando os consumidores em diferentes estágios durante o rito de passagem de apreciação. Para estender meu entendimento sobre o consumo de apreciação, eu também coletei dados sobre o contexto de consumo de vinho. Nesta tese, eu introduzo a ideia de ritual de transformação do gosto, teorizando sobre o processo do rito de passagem de apreciação, que converte consumidores regulares em consumidores apreciadores. Minha pesquisa revela que consumidores apreciadores são amadores em diferentes estágios do rito de passagem de apreciação. Eles se transformam pelo estabelecimento e reforço de oposições entre o consume de massa e de apreciação. O ritual de transformação do gosto envolve os seguintes elementos: (1) variação nas escolhas de produtos de alta qualidade, (2) o lugar para realizar a degustação, (3) o momento da degustação, (4) o ato de degustar, (5) investimento de tempo e dinheiro, (6) aumento do capital subcultural e social, (7) perseverança no rito de passagem. Os consumidores apreciadores participam da comunidade de consumo de apreciação. Essa comunidade heterogênea é composta por profissionais excelentes, apreciadores e consumidores regulares. As forças que direcionam a comunidade, de acordo com o que foi identificado no estudo, são a produção de capital social e subcultural, emulação do profissional e das práticas de ritual de consumo, tensões de performance entre os membros da comunidade, amizade comercial e jogo de status. Eu desenvolvo uma ampla consideração teórica que desenvolve e estende um número de conceitos em relação a ritual e consumo, gosto, comunidade heterogênea e consumidores apreciadores.

Life Cycle Models, Heterogeneity of Initial Assets,and Wealth Inequality

Life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this article, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data - and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets, which is estimated using a non-parametric method applied to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.