Endogenous time-dependent rules and inflation inertia: preliminary version

When policy rules are changed, the effect of nominal rigidities should be modelled through endogenous pricing rules. We endogenize Taylor (1979) type pricing rule to examine the output effects of monetary disinflations. We derive optimal fixed-price time-dependent rules in inflationary steady states and during disinflations. We also develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through disinflation. This allows us to reevaluate the output costs of monetary disinflation, including aspects as the role of the initial leveI of inflation and the importance of the degree of credibility of the policy change.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and the costs of disinflation with imperfect credibility

This paper examines the output effects of monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules and imperfect credibility of the disinflation policy. We find that these features interact to generate an additional effect on top f the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in higher output costs of monetary disinflation.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veriable and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.

Securitização de recebíveis da agroenergia: um estudo de caso baseado em títulos do agronegócio

Desde o final da década de 90, a securitização de ativos vem se firmando no mercado brasileiro como uma importante alternativa de captação de recursos. Essa inovação financeira permite às empresa o acesso direto ao mercado de capitais, para a venda de títulos lastreados em suas carteiras de recebíveis, eliminando a intermediação bancária e permitindo reduções no custo de capital, inclusive em comparação com títulos convencionais de dívida corporativa. Os títulos de securitização são em regra emitidos por um veículo de propósito específico (FIDC ou companhia securitizadora), com o objetivo de segregar os riscos do originador/tomador em relação aos créditos securitizados (lastro da emissão). Em 2004, a Lei 11.076 criou os novos títulos do agronegócio (CDA-WA, CDCA, LCA e CRA), inspirada na legislação da securitização imobiliária (SFI - Lei 9.514/97), buscando disponibilizar ao agronegócio uma nova fonte de recursos, via emissão de títulos no mercado de capitais. Desde então, um número crescente de operações estruturadas com esses papéis pôde ser observada, demonstrando sua funcionalidade e potencial. No entanto, o volume de captações públicas mais sofisticadas fundadas na emissão de cotas de FIDCs e de CRAs ainda se apresenta muito reduzida em relação à demanda do agronegócio por financiamento, sobretudo levando-se em conta a representatividade desse setor no Brasil. O setor sucro-energético é provavelmente o segmento do agronegócio que está em melhor posição para o desenvolvimento de operações de securitização, por apresentar características como: escala, padronização dos produtos, grau de consolidação dos grupos empresariais e perspectivas de crescimento, além do forte apelo ambiental. Os papéis associados a esse segmento possuem, dessa forma, um potencial singular para superar a resistência natural de investidores às aplicações financeiras na área agrícola. Este trabalho dedica-se a investigar como o conceito de securitização pode ser aplicado em operações ligadas ao agronegócio, particularmente ao setor sucro-alcooleiro. A partir de um estudo de caso, serão analisados aspectos operacionais de uma emissão pública de CRAs, ressaltando os mecanismos e procedimentos adotados para lidar com as particularidades dos títulos oriundos do agronegócio. O estudo mostra que a estruturação desse tipo de operação apresenta algumas características e desafios diferentes das operações fundadas em outros papéis, porém a priori administráveis a partir das técnicas tradicionais de securitização e da incorporação de mecanismos suplementares de gestão de riscos.

Enriching information to prevent bank runs

Sequential service in the banking sector, as modeled by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), is a barrier to full insurance and potential source of financial fragility against which deposit insurance is infeasible (Wallace, 1988). In this paper, we pursue a different perspective, viewing the sequence of contacts as opportunities to extract information through a larger message space with commitment to richer promises. As we show, if preferences satisfy a separating property then the desired elimination of dominated strategies (Green and Lin, 2003) occurs even when shocks are correlated. In this manner the sequential service promotes stability.

Sequential cost-reimbursement rules

This paper studies cost-sharing rules under dynamic adverse selection. We present a typical principal-agent model with two periods, set up in Laffont and Tirole's (1986) canonical regulation environment. At first, when the contract is signed, the firm has prior uncertainty about its efficiency parameter. In the second period, the firm learns its efficiency and chooses the level of cost-reducing effort. The optimal mechanism sequentially screens the firm's types and achieves a higher level of welfare than its static counterpart. The contract is indirectly implemented by a sequence of transfers, consisting of a fixed advance payment based on the reported cost estimate, and an ex-post compensation linear in cost performance.

Legislar sobre educação: a interpretação das competências pelo STF

Com a sistemática das competências concorrentes trazida pela CF de 1988, e as frequentes críticas sobre o direito à educação, pesquisou-se qual o âmbito de atuação dos órgãos normativos federais, estaduais e distritais acerca desse direito. Qual é, portanto, o limite de cada ente? Para responder à pergunta, coletaram-se acórdãos do STF, órgão encarregado de interpretar a Constituição. A posição da Corte é de deferência ao texto constitucional e à LDB, consagrando o principado neles expostos, no que diz respeito à fixação das diretrizes gerais. Nessa seara, aos Estados cabe complementar esse sistema, acrescentando novas disciplinas, dispor sobre prazos para cumprimento de programas de lei federal, e criar programas com fundamento nas regras gerais da União. Os contornos dos intrincados termos previstos na competência concorrente não são delimitados. Por fim, sendo a educação um direito eminentemente prestacional, exige mais do Poder Executivo, tanto no plano normativo como no prático.

Optimal rules for monetary policy in Brazil

This paper presents optimal rules for monetary policy in Brazil derived from a backward looking expectation model consisting of a Keynesian IS function and an Augmented Phillips Curve (ISAS). The IS function displays'a high sensitivity of aggregate demand to the real interest rate and the Phillips Curve is accelerationist. The optimal monetary rules show low interest rate volatility with reaction coefficients lower than the ones suggested by Taylor (1993a,b). Reaction functions estimated through ADL and SUR models suggest that monetary policy has not been optimal and has aimed to product rather than inflation stabilization.

Optimal-state-dependent rules, credibility, and inflationary inertia

This paper examines the output losses caused by disinflation and the role of credibility in a model where pricing mIes are optimal and individual prices are rigid. Individual nominal rigidity is modeled as resulting from menu costs. The interaction between optimal pricing mIes and credibility is essential in determining the inflationary inertia. A continued period of high inflation generates an asymmetric distribution of price deviations, with more prices that are substantially lower than their desired leveIs than prices that are substantially higher than the optimal ones. When disinflation is not credible, inflationary inertia is engendered by this asymmetry: idiosyncratic shocks trigger more upward than downward adjustments. A perfect1y credible disinflation causes an immediate change of pricing rules which, by rendering the price deviation distribution less asymmetric, practically annihilates inflationary inertia. An implication of our model is that stabilization may be sucessful even when credibility is low, provided that it is preceded by a mechanism of price alignment. We also develop an analytical framework for analyzing imperfect credibility cases.

Welfare and growth effects of alternative fiscal rules for infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the interplay between fiscal rules, public investment and growth in Brazil. It is investigated if it would make sense to raise public investment and, if so, under which fiscal rule it is best to do it — whether through tax financing, debt financing, or a reduction of public consumption. We construct and simulate a competitive general equilibrium model, calibrated to Brazilian economy, in which public capital is a component of the production function and public consumption directly affects individuals’ well-being. After assessing the impacts of alternative fiscal rules, the paper concludes that the most desirable financing scheme is the reduction of public consumption, which dominates the others in terms of output and welfare gains. The model replicates the observed growth slowdown of the Brazilian economy when we increase taxes and reduce public capital formation to the levels observed after 1980 and shows that the growth impact of the expansion of tax collection in Brazil was much larger than that of public investment compression.