Mudanças na Natureza do Comércio no Mundo conectado através do E-commerce

The Internet has taken the world by storm. It has eliminated the barriers of technology, and unlocked the doors to electronic commerce and the 'Virtual Economy'. It has given us a glimpse into the future of 'Business' itself, and it has created a bewildering variety of choices in our personal and professional lives. It has taken on a life of its own, and we are all frantically trying to keep up. Many overwhelmed companies are asking questions like: 'What should our Internet Strategy be?' Or 'How do we put our business on the Internet like everybody else is doing?' or 'How do we use this thing to make money without spending any?'. These questions may seem reasonable on the surface, but they miss the point because they focus on the technologies rather than the core issues of conducting day-to-day business. The Internet can indeed offer fast returns in marketing reach, speed, director consumer sales and so on, and many companies are using it to good advantage, but the highest and best use of any such technology is to support, enhance and even re-invent the fundamentals of general business practice. When the initial excitement is over, and companies gain experience and confidence with the new business models, this larger view will begin to assert itself. Companies will then start to position their 'Internet Strategies' in context of where the business world itself is going over time, and how they can prepare for what is to come. Until now, the business world has been very fragmented, its collective progress limited (in part) by the inability to communicate within and between companies. Now that the technical remedy seems to be at hand and standards are beginning to emerge, we are starting to see a trend toward consolidation, cooperation, and economic synergy. Companies are improving their internal business processes with Intranets, and Electronic Commerce initiatives have sprung up using EDI, the World Wide Web, E-Mail, secure credit card payments and other tools. Companies are using the Internet to talk to each other and to sell their goods and services to the end consumer. Like Berlin, the walls are coming down because they have to. Electronic 'Communities of Common Interest' are beginning to surface, with the goal of supporting and aligning similar industries (such as Government, Insurance, Transportation and Health care) or similar business functions (such as Purchasing, Payments, and Human Resources). As these communities grow and mature, their initial scope will broaden and their spheres of influence will expand. They will begin to overlap into other communities, creating a synergistic effect and reshaping the conduct of business. The business world will undergo a gradual evolution toward globalization, driven by economic imperatives and natural selection in the marketplace, and facilitated by Electronic Commerce and Internet technologies. The business world 'beyond 2000' will have a substantially different look and feel than that which we see today.

Planejamento estratégico e evolução do modelo de gestão da cidade do Rio de Janeiro: um estudo investigativo sob a ótica da modernização da administração pública no Brasil

O objetivo deste estudo foi analisar a evolução histórica do modelo de gestão adotado na cidade do Rio de Janeiro buscando identificar qual a situação atual praticada em 2013, caracterizando as circunstâncias que levaram a este cenário. Para tal foi realizado um estudo investigativo sobre a evolução dos modelos de gestão da cidade do Rio de Janeiro, pesquisando-se o contexto histórico, administrativo e político temporal. Buscou-se a avaliação do posicionamento governamental da cidade do Rio de Janeiro em consonância com as especificidades que marcaram os modelos de gestão adotados e a herança direta proveniente dos episódios que marcaram sua evolução histórica e da herança indireta proveniente da modernização da administração pública no Brasil, além das janelas de oportunidades advindas com os grandes eventos como a copa do mundo em 2014 e olimpíadas em 2016. A análise foi realizada à luz da teoria de criação do valor público especificamente as ideias de Mark Moore. Para tanto foram realizadas entrevistas com gestores públicos da prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, assim como foram analisados documentos de domínio público publicados na imprensa oficial e outros disponíveis na internet.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.