Firm heterogeneity and lobbying

The structure of protection across sectors is usually interpreted as the result of competition among lobbies to influence politicians, but little attention has been devoted to the importance of individual firms in this process. This paper builds a model incorporating firm heterogeneity into a lobbying setup `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in a monopolistic competitive environment. We obtain that increased sectorial dispersion cause a fall in equilibrium tariff provided that the exporter’s cutoff is above the mean of the distribution. Also, higher average productivity brings about a fall in the equilibrium tariff, whereas an increase in export costs cause an increase in the tariff. JEL Classification codes: D43, D7, F12, F13, L11

Firms?: heterogeneity, organizations, power and trade

This paper develops a theory which investigates the two-way relationship between the internaI organization of the firm and market competition.We introduce heterogenous firms with internal hierarchies in a Knlgman (1980) monopolistic competition model of trade. The model simultanously determines firms' organizational choices anel heterogeneity across firms in size and proeluctivity.Ve show that intenlational trade, market size and the toughness of competition in international markets incluce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to a reorganization of firms towards more decentralized corporate hierarchies.We show further that trade triggers produetivity growth through inter-firm reallocations towards more produetive firms in whieh CEOs have power in firms. At the same time, however trade- induced organizational changes towards fiattened corporate hierarchies lead to a softening of lnternat.ional competition which may contribute a eountervailing negative effect on seetoral productivity.

Can unobserved heterogeneity in farmer ability explain the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity?

The well-known inverse relationship between farm-size and productivity is usually explained in terms of diminishing returns with respect to land and other inputs coupled with various types of market frictions that prevent the efficient allocation of land across farms. We show that even if in the absence of diminishing returns one can provide an alternative explanation for this phenomenon using endogenous occupational choice and heterogeneity with respect to farming skills.

Phase transition of demand explained by the heterogeneity of consumers' intrinsic preferences

In 1991 Gary S. Becker presented A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In uences on Price explaining why many successful restaurants, plays, sporting events, and other activities do not raise their prices even with persistent excess demand. The main reason for this is due to the discontinuity of stable demands, which is explained in Becker's (1991) analysis. In the present paper we construct a discrete time stochastic model of socially interacting consumers deciding for one of two establishments. With this model we show that the discontinuity of stable demands, proposed by Gary S. Becker, depends crucially on an additional factor: the dispersion of the consumers' intrinsic preferences for the establishments.

Equidade educacional no Brasil: análise das oportunidades educacionais em 2001 e 2011

Esta tese tem por objetivo analisar a equidade educacional no Brasil, em 2001 e 2011. Para tanto, avaliarei as oportunidades dos alunos de terem professores mais qualificados, verificando a evolução por gênero, cor/raça e nível socioeconômico. O referencial teórico da tese divide-se em duas partes: o debate sobre equidade e a discussão sobre a importância da escola e de seus recursos e processos internos. Na primeira parte, apresento diversas perspectivas sobre equidade e proponho a divisão do campo em três linhas, além de inserir o debate num contexto mais amplo sobre justiça social. Utilizarei, nesta pesquisa, a abordagem pluralista, que entende equidade como um termo que engloba recursos, processos e resultados. Na segunda parte, trato da importância da escola para o desempenho dos alunos a partir da apresentação de pesquisas que comprovam que as escolas são peças fundamentais para o desempenho dos alunos, principalmente em países desiguais. Dentre os recursos e processos escolares, verifica-se que os professores têm o maior impacto sobre as notas – e, portanto, são capazes de trazer maior contribuição para políticas educacionais equitativas. O debate sobre a importância da escola e dos professores para o desempenho dos alunos é particularmente relevante no Brasil, onde a literatura demonstra um grande impacto das escolas e dos professores sobre os resultados escolares, atrelado a uma enorme desigualdade na distribuição dos recursos. Feita a discussão teórica, apresento o modelo elaborado para analisar a equidade no Brasil, em 2001 e 2011. Desenvolvi um modelo logístico para determinar as oportunidades de um aluno ter professores mais qualificados – classificados, neste trabalho, a partir de quatro características: diploma de ensino superior, pós-graduação, experiência em sala de aula e que faça a cobertura do currículo. São apresentadas duas especificações do modelo: simples, que contém apenas características dos alunos como variáveis independentes; e completa, que, além das características dos alunos, inclui informações sobre os estados, sobre o tipo de rede (privada ou pública) e sobre a localidade (rural ou urbana). As análises são conduzidas para o 5º e 9º ano, em 2001 e 2011, utilizando os dados do SAEB de Língua Portuguesa e Matemática. Os resultados apontam para quatro conclusões importantes: em primeiro lugar, o nível socioeconômico mostrou-se mais relevante na determinação das oportunidades educacionais em comparação à cor/raça ou gênero dos alunos; em segundo lugar, há semelhança nas tendências de desempenho do 5º e 9º anos, com a identificação de três padrões de evolução das oportunidades educacionais; em terceiro lugar, verifica-se que o impacto das características observáveis dos professores sobre a proficiência dos alunos mudou de 2001 a 2011, em decorrência das políticas de incentivo à escolarização docente; por fim, verifica-se grande heterogeneidade dentre os estados brasileiros, com os estados das regiões Sul e Sudeste garantindo maior oportunidade educacional aos alunos. Com base nestes resultados, aponto, nas considerações finais, para três pilares presentes em países mais equitativos: a definição de padrões mínimos de recursos e processos; a adoção de políticas compensatórias e a discriminação positiva na distribuição dos recursos; e, por fim, o investimento nos professores.

Life Cycle Models, Heterogeneity of Initial Assets,and Wealth Inequality

Life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this article, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data - and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets, which is estimated using a non-parametric method applied to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.