Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Generalists versus specialists in organizations

In this paper, we discuss the trade-o¤ between specialization and coordination in an organizational design problem. Most papers on the assignment of heterogeneous managers to di¤erent hierarchic levels emphasize the role of talent: better managers should be on top of hierarchies. However, this requires talent to be measured on an one-dimensional scale. In this paper, we explore the implications of allowing talent to have two dimensions: breadth and depth. Specialists have deep knowledge of few areas while generalists have narrow knowledge of many areas. When perfect communication is impossible, hierarchies arise in which generalists are at the top and specialists are at the bottom. We propose a model of imperfect communication and discuss its implications for organizational design, the optimal degree of centralization and the depth of hierarchies. We show that our model also implies plausible organizational structures, like balanced hierarchies and pyramidal structures.

Decision rules and information provision : monitoring vs manipulation

We analyze the contractual design problem of a principal who delegates decision-making and information provision. The principal faces two tasks: he has to decide the level of discretion to be granted to the decision-maker and to establish who is in charge of supplying the information. We show that these two choices are intrinsically related. When the decision-maker is granted high discretion, information provision is optimally delegated to the parties directly affected by the decision. Conversely, when the decision-maker enjoys little discretion, it is more desirable to rely on a third impartial agent. The paper helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Coordination in brazilian pharmaceutical supply chains

Supply chain coordination (SCC) can be a challenge for many organizations as different firms in the same chain has different expectations and interdependencies (Arshinder & Deshmukh, 2008). Lack of SCC can result in the bullwhip effect and poor performance for a firm and its partners. By investigating the phenomenon in the Brazilian pharmaceutical supply chain using a qualitative research, this paper aims to understand the main issues that avoid a better integrated chain. Results of 21 interviews suggested that the lack of coordination in this environment was influenced by the network design and the history of the sector in Brazil, as well as scarce resources

Organizational design as an enabler for innovation: evidence from a German Mechanical Engineering Company

Over the past two decades there has been a profusion of empirical studies of organizational design and its relationship to efficiency, productivity and flexibility of an organization. In parallel, there has been a wide range of studies about innovation management in different kind of industries and firms. However, with some exceptions, the organizational and innovation management bodies of literature tend to examine the issues of organizational design and innovation management individually, mainly in the context of large firms operating at the technological frontier. There seems to be a scarcity of empirical studies that bring together organizational design and innovation and examine them empirically and over time in the context of small and medium sized enterprises. This dissertation seeks to provide a small contribution in that direction. This dissertation examines the dynamic relationship between organizational design and innovation. This relationship is examined on the basis of a single-case design in a medium sized mechanical engineering company in Germany. The covered time period ranges from 1958 until 2009, although the actual focus falls on the recent past. This dissertation draws on first-hand qualitative empirical evidence gathered through extensive field work. The main findings are: 1. There is always a bundle of organizational dimensions which impacts innovation. These main organizational design dimensions are: (1) Strategy & Leadership, (2) Resources & Capabilities, (3) Structure, (4) Culture, (5) Networks & Partnerships, (6) Processes and (7) Knowledge Management. However, the importance of the different organizational design dimensions changes over time. While for example for the production of simple, standardized parts, a simple organizational design was appropriate, the company needed to have a more advanced organizational design in order to be able to produce customized, complex parts with high quality. Hence the technological maturity of a company is related to its organizational maturity. 2. The introduction of innovations of the analyzed company were highly dependent on organizational conditions which enabled their introduction. The results of the long term case study show, that some innovations would not have been introduced successfully if the organizational elements like for example training and qualification, the build of network and partnerships or the acquisition of appropriate resources and capabilities, were not in place. Hence it can be concluded, that organizational design is an enabling factor for innovation. These findings contribute to advance our understanding of the complex relationship between organizational design and innovation. This highlights the growing importance of a comprehensive, innovation stimulating organizational design of companies. The results suggest to managers that innovation is not only dependent on a single organizational factor but on the appropriate, comprehensive design of the organization. Hence manager should consider to review regularly the design of their organizations in order to maintain a innovation stimulating environment.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.