O método das opções reais aplicado na avaliação das oportunidades de investimento no setor de seguros

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo demonstrar a validade do método de análise da avaliação das oportunidades de investimentos que utiliza a Teoria das Opções Reais. De forma a demonstrar a aplicabilidade desta metodologia de avaliação, será exemplificado, com base no modelo das opções reais, uma oportunidade de investimento no setor de seguros. As opções reais fecham a brecha entre as finanças e o planejamento estratégico introduzindo um meio para incorporar o impacto da incerteza implícita nas oportunidades de investimento, e ao mesmo tempo considerando como as ações gerenciais podem limitar as possíveis perdas ou capitalizar os possíveis ganhos nos projetos de investimento. Este processo de avaliação não direciona somente os administradores a focar suas atenções nas diferentes oportunidades e alternativas estratégicas, mas fornece também uma metodologia sistemática para medir a influencia das ações contingentes sobre o próprio risco e valor do projeto. Os métodos tradicionais de avaliação dos investimentos assumem que os administradores adotem um comportamento passivo à implementação dos projetos, considerando somente o valor dos fluxos de caixa esperados dos mesmos. A partir da teoria de precificação das opções financeiras, as opções reais expandem o valor global do projeto incorporando os potenciais ganhos e limitando as possíveis perdas. O modelo de opções reais permite aos administradores alavancar o valor do acionista em um ambiente de negócios dinâmico considerando a possibilidade de uma gestão ótima das opções estratégicas e operacionais existentes. Tipicamente, o ativo subjacente é o valor bruto dos fluxos de caixa esperados do projeto, mas considerando a incerteza, o valor total do projeto deve considerar o valor implícito das opções reais presentes nas oportunidades de investimento. A flexibilidade gerencial, que permite adaptar as decisões futuras as mudanças inesperadas do mercado, representa um fonte crucial de valor agregado em um ambiente dinâmico. Muitas opções reais presentes nos projetos e que interagem entre si, podem ocorrer em paralelo ou seqüencialmente, de maneira que o valor combinado destas opções seja diferente da simples soma algébrica das opções individuais.

Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indi¤erent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the …rst object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller’s revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net e¤ect on the seller’s revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine two special cases with asymmetric players. In the …rst case, players have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline. In the second case, one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. For this example, we show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco (1997). The reason is that players with singleunit demand will generally bid less than their true valuations in the …rst period. Therefore, there are two opposing forces; the reduction in the bid of the player with multiple-demand in the last auction and less aggressive bidding in the …rst auction by the players with single-unit demand.

Rangel: ciclos longos e dualidade

For Ignácio Rangel economic development is an intrinsically contradictory movement through which technological innovation, whose dynamics explains the long cycle, is permanently in conflict with the existing capitals that it depreciates. Development in Brazil is not just defined by the opposition between the capitalist and the pre-capitalist sector; there is also an external duality that does not just express the relation between its stages of economic growth and the development of the world economy, but also tells us how its modern and its backward sector change at each stage. The duality has a double character: through the coexistence of relations of productions that correspond to two sequential historical phases, and through the existence, in the domestic and in the external “pole” of such duality, a relation of dependency toward the more advanced societies.

Sequential cost-reimbursement rules

This paper studies cost-sharing rules under dynamic adverse selection. We present a typical principal-agent model with two periods, set up in Laffont and Tirole's (1986) canonical regulation environment. At first, when the contract is signed, the firm has prior uncertainty about its efficiency parameter. In the second period, the firm learns its efficiency and chooses the level of cost-reducing effort. The optimal mechanism sequentially screens the firm's types and achieves a higher level of welfare than its static counterpart. The contract is indirectly implemented by a sequence of transfers, consisting of a fixed advance payment based on the reported cost estimate, and an ex-post compensation linear in cost performance.

Sequential auctions with continuation costs

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "when do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this modele Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this modele