Testing the optimality of aggregate consumption decisions: is there rule-of-thumb behavior?

Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all. This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets. Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.

Testing consumption optimality using aggregate data

The objective of this paper is to test for optimality of consumption decisions at the aggregate level (representative consumer) taking into account popular deviations from the canonical CRRA utility model rule of thumb and habit. First, we show that rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption is observational equivalent to behavior obtained by the optimizing model of King, Plosser and Rebelo (Journal of Monetary Economics, 1988), casting doubt on how reliable standard rule-of-thumb tests are. Second, although Carroll (2001) and Weber (2002) have criticized the linearization and testing of euler equations for consumption, we provide a deeper critique directly applicable to current rule-of-thumb tests. Third, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Asset-Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. Fourth, aggregation of the nonlinear euler equation forms the basis of a novel test of deviations from the canonical CRRA model of consumption in the presence of rule-of-thumb and habit behavior. We estimated 48 euler equations using GMM, with encouraging results vis-a-vis the optimality of consumption decisions. At the 5% level, we only rejected optimality twice out of 48 times. Empirical-test results show that we can still rely on the canonical CRRA model so prevalent in macroeconomics: out of 24 regressions, we found the rule-of-thumb parameter to be statistically signi cant at the 5% level only twice, and the habit ƴ parameter to be statistically signi cant on four occasions. The main message of this paper is that proper return aggregation is critical to study intertemporal substitution in a representative-agent framework. In this case, we fi nd little evidence of lack of optimality in consumption decisions, and deviations of the CRRA utility model along the lines of rule-of-thumb behavior and habit in preferences represent the exception, not the rule.

Testing consumption optimality using aggregate data

This paper tests the optimality of consumption decisions at the aggregate level taking into account popular deviations from the canonical constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function model-rule of thumb and habit. First, based on the critique in Carroll (2001) and Weber (2002) of the linearization and testing strategies using euler equations for consumption, we provide extensive empirical evidence of their inappropriateness - a drawback for standard rule- of-thumb tests. Second, we propose a novel approach to test for consumption optimality in this context: nonlinear estimation coupled with return aggregation, where rule-of-thumb behavior and habit are special cases of an all encompassing model. We estimated 48 euler equations using GMM. At the 5% level, we only rejected optimality twice out of 48 times. Moreover, out of 24 regressions, we found the rule-of-thumb parameter to be statistically significant only twice. Hence, lack of optimality in consumption decisions represent the exception, not the rule. Finally, we found the habit parameter to be statistically significant on four occasions out of 24.

Compliance to law and effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to debate the degree of effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil, through a survey measuring perceptions, attitudes and habits of Brazilians in regard to compliance to law. The survey conducted in Brazil is based on the study conducted by Tom R. Tyler in the United States, entitled Why People Obey the Law? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). The main argument of Tyler´s study is that people obey the law when they believe it’s legitimate, and not because they fear punishment. We test the same argument in Brazil, relying on five indicators: (i) behavior, which depicts the frequency with which respondents declared to have engaged in conducts in disobedience to the law; (ii) instrumentality, measuring perception of losses associated with the violation of the law, specially fear of punishment; (iii) morality, measuring perception of how much is right or wrong to engage in certain conducts in violation of the law; (iv) social control, which measures perception of social disapproval of certain types of behavior in violation of the law, and (v) legitimacy, which measures the perception of respect to the law and to some authorities. Results indicate that fear of sanctions is not the strongest drive in compliance to law, but more than legitimacy, indicators of morality and social control are the strongest in explaining why people obey the law in Brazil.

Repensando a relação entre estado, direito e desenvolvimento: os limites do paradigma rule of law e a relevância das alternativas institucionais

Assumindo a primazia da abordagem institucionalista na agenda contemporânea do desenvolvimento, este artigo procurará discutir alguns de seus limites, descritivos e normativos, no que tange, em especial, ao sistema financeiro. Particularmente, procurar-se-á sugerir que os programas de difusão do rule of law têm se constituído em um paradigma estreito do papel exercido pelo direito, segundo a qual cabe ao ambiente jurídico cumprir, apenas e tão somente, a função de garantidor dos interesses de investidores privados, entendidos como atores centrais de um modelo de financiamento baseado em transações de mercado. O texto sugere que o paradigma rule of law, como estratégia de promoção do desenvolvimento, tem dificuldade em lidar com a existência de alternativas institucionais de organização econômica e financeira, para além de um modelo de mercado baseado em atores atomizados e carentes de segurança jurídica. Um exemplo disso, que escapa do instrumental tradicional, é o modelo brasileiro de financiamento, que, apesar de ter vivenciado inúmeras reformas institucionais, dedicadas a elevar o nível de proteção de investidores, ainda concentra em um banco de desenvolvimento – o BNDES – grande parte do financiamento de longo prazo do país. O artigo assume, portanto, que, sim, o direito e as instituições, de fato, importam para o desenvolvimento, mas há uma variedade de possibilidades e funções a serem exercidas pelos arranjos institucionais e ferramentas jurídicas – muito além do que supõem os programas de rule of law. Uma bem sucedida organização institucional baseada em um banco de desenvolvimento é um exemplo disso.

A model of the rule of law

Economic development requires some limits on what those in power can do | the rule of law | but how can restraints be imposed on the powerful when there is no-one above them? This paper studies equilibrium rules allocating power and resources established by selfinterested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power. Commitment to uphold individuals' rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time-inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo, and thus want to defend it.

Políticas de conteúdo local: crescimento econômico e rule of law

As chamadas Políticas de Conteúdo Local (“PCLs”) fazem parte de um grupo de políticas desenvolvimentistas adotadas em todo o mundo com o objetivo de maximizar os benefícios sociais e econômicos decorrentes de determinadas atividades econômicas. Neste trabalho, analisaram-se, principalmente, as PCLs relativas à extração e produção de petróleo e gás. O instituto é juridicamente polêmico, uma vez que, além de ser difícil de definir, é instrumentalizado por diversos atos normativos diferentes. Tal situação agrava-se com o fato de que o desenho de cada PCL pode sugerir ou impor diversas medidas de implementação diferentes, com impactos nas diferentes áreas do Direito. Considerando este cenário, aponta-se que o principal objetivo deste trabalho é a análise de transplantes ao nosso ordenamento jurídico de PCLs bem-sucedidas em ordenamentos jurídicos estrangeiros. Para isso, demonstrou-se, em um primeiro momento, que o instituto das PCLs deve ser reinterpretado à luz da Constituição vigente. Isso porque as PCLs foram criadas em uma época em que a escola desenvolvimentista principal era a keynesiana, que foi substituída atualmente pela escola do Rule of Law. Embora nosso ordenamento jurídico tenha acompanhado essa evolução (através de Emendas Constitucionais e adoção de determinadas leis), as PCLs não acompanharam e, por isso, precisam sofrer essa releitura. Nesse sentido, extraíram-se da Lei quatro elementos principais que as PCLs devem preencher para estar em consonância com o Rule of Law: (A) Benefícios aos Consumidores Finais; (B) Sustentabilidade; (C) Transetorialidade; e (D) Ampliação do Mercado de Trabalho. Em sequência, classificaram-se as diversas PCLs mapeadas, exemplificando cada uma. Ao longo da classificação, apontaram-se três critérios que facilitam a identificação das maiores dificuldades jurídicas em cada transplante: (A) Canal; (B) Natureza; e (C) Instrumento. Por fim, quatro PCLs estrangeiras bem-sucedidas foram escolhidas para uma análise mais aprofundada: a Kazakhstan Contract Agency, no Cazaquistão, a Petro Arctic Supplier Asssociation, na Noruega, o Australian Industry Participation Plan na Austrália e o Nigerian Oil & Gas Content Industry Development Act, na Nigéria. Para cada uma, é dedicada uma análise especial. As análises são seguidas pela Conclusão.

Efeitos de gastos do governo em um modelo dinâmico estocástico de equilíbrio geral com restrições financeiras

Recentes evidências empíricas sugerem que o consumo aumenta em resposta a um aumento nos gastos do governo. Essa descoberta não pode ser facilmente reconciliada com os resultados dos modelos de otimização dos ciclos econômicos. Para testar tais evidências utilizamos uma versão simplificada do modelo novo keynesiano padrão estendido em Galí, López-Salido e Vallés (2007), para permitir a presença de consumidores Rule-of-Thumb. Mostramos como a interação desses últimos, sob a hipótese de rigidez de preços e financiamento via déficits, pode explicar as evidências existentes sobre os efeitos dos gastos do governo.

What kind of judiciary do we want?: the access to justice in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to discuss a key issue in the Democratic Rule of Law State: what are the role and main functions of the Judiciary in Brazil? Is the Judiciary mainly a public service provider, adjudicating disputes and guaranteeing individual rights? Or also as a state power, it should mainly control and guide the moral values of the society, changing the status quo and reducing social conflicts? In this sense, what are the conflicts that must be examined by the Judiciary? We will seek to answer these questions based on a discussion subsidized by courts official statistics and the results of surveys conducted with the Brazilian general population. The surveys measured how do citizens feel about their judicial system and what are the circumstances and the facts that determine the judicialization of conflicts. We work with the perceptions and attitudes of citizens relating to the Judiciary as it is today and discuss the Judiciary they want. Then, we compare how attitudes and perceptions relate to actual behavior and use of courts.