30 resultados para Risk Aversion
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
Building Risk-Neutral Densities (RND) from options data can provide market-implied expectations about the future behavior of a financial variable. And market expectations on financial variables may influence macroeconomic policy decisions. It can be useful also for corporate and financial institutions decision making. This paper uses the Liu et all (2007) approach to estimate the option-implied Risk-neutral densities from the Brazilian Real/US Dollar exchange rate distribution. We then compare the RND with actual exchange rates, on a monthly basis, in order to estimate the relative risk-aversion of investors and also obtain a Real-world density for the exchange rate. We are the first to calculate relative risk-aversion and the option-implied Real World Density for an emerging market currency. Our empirical application uses a sample of Brazilian Real/US Dollar options traded at BM&F-Bovespa from 1999 to 2011. The RND is estimated using a Mixture of Two Log-Normals distribution and then the real-world density is obtained by means of the Liu et al. (2007) parametric risktransformations. The relative risk aversion is calculated for the full sample. Our estimated value of the relative risk aversion parameter is around 2.7, which is in line with other articles that have estimated this parameter for the Brazilian Economy, such as Araújo (2005) and Issler and Piqueira (2000). Our out-of-sample evaluation results showed that the RND has some ability to forecast the Brazilian Real exchange rate. Abe et all (2007) found also mixed results in the out-of-sample analysis of the RND forecast ability for exchange rate options. However, when we incorporate the risk aversion into RND in order to obtain a Real-world density, the out-of-sample performance improves substantially, with satisfactory results in both Kolmogorov and Berkowitz tests. Therefore, we would suggest not using the “pure” RND, but rather taking into account risk aversion in order to forecast the Brazilian Real exchange rate.
Resumo:
This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'
Resumo:
Economic reform in China has created a small, but fast-growing private sector that has spurred rapid productivity growth. Growth of the private sector is predicated upon continued labor movements away from state-run industries and into private firms. This paper presents a theory of labor market sectoral choice demonstrating that three factors determine private sector labor supply-the difference in wages between the state and private sectors, private sector wage risk and risk aversion. Estimation of the model using survey data provides strong support for the theory. We find that the riskiness of private sector earnings has a greater effect in discouraging workers from taking jobs in private firms than the wage premi um has in attracting workers.
Resumo:
We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.
Resumo:
Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.
Resumo:
Theoretical models on moral hazard provide competing predictions on the incentive-risk relationship. These predictions are derived under the assumptions of homogeneous agents and exogenous risk. However, the existing empirical evidence does not account for risk-aversion heterogeneity and risk endogeneity. This paper uses a well-built database on tenancy contracts to address these issues. Detailed information on cropping activities is used to measure the exogenous risk. Risk-aversion heterogeneity and other self-selection problems are addressed through a portfolio schedule and a subsample of farmers who simultaneously own and sharecrop different farms. This controlled exercise finds a direct relation between incentives and exogenous risk.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.
Resumo:
Using the Pricing Equation in a panel-data framework, we construct a novel consistent estimator of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) which relies on the fact that its logarithm is the serial-correlation ìcommon featureîin every asset return of the economy. Our estimator is a simple function of asset returns, does not depend on any parametric function representing preferences, is suitable for testing di§erent preference speciÖcations or investigating intertemporal substitution puzzles, and can be a basis to construct an estimator of the risk-free rate. For post-war data, our estimator is close to unity most of the time, yielding an average annual real discount rate of 2.46%. In formal testing, we cannot reject standard preference speciÖcations used in the literature and estimates of the relative risk-aversion coe¢ cient are between 1 and 2, and statistically equal to unity. Using our SDF estimator, we found little signs of the equity-premium puzzle for the U.S.
Resumo:
Nesse trabalho estima-se, usando o método generalizado dos momentos e dados brasileiros, os parâmetros estruturais do modelo CCAPM (consumption capital asset pricing model) a partir de três classes de funções utilidade distintas: função utilidade potência (CRRA), utilidade com hábito externo, e aversão ao desapontamento (Kreps-Porteus). Estes parâmetros estruturais estão associados à aversão ao risco, à elasticidade de substituição intertemporal no consumo e à taxa de desconto intertemporal da utilidade futura. Os resultados aqui obtidos são analisados e comparados com resultados anteriores para dados brasileiros e americanos. Adicionalmente, testa-se econometricamente todos os modelos estruturais estimados a partir do teste de restrições de sobre-identificação, para investigar, da forma mais abrangente possível, se há ou não equity premium puzzle para o Brasil. Os resultados surpreendem, dado que, em raríssimas ocasiões, se rejeita as restrições implícitas nesses modelos. Logo, conclui-se que não há equity premium puzzle para o Brasil.
Resumo:
The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.
Resumo:
Este trabalho propõe maneiras alternativas para a estimação consistente de uma medida abstrata, crucial para o estudo de decisões intertemporais, o qual é central a grande parte dos estudos em macroeconomia e finanças: o Fator Estocástico de Descontos (SDF, sigla em Inglês). Pelo emprego da Equação de Apreçamento constrói-se um inédito estimador consistente do SDF que depende do fato de que seu logaritmo é comum a todos os ativos de uma economia. O estimador resultante é muito simples de se calcular, não depende de fortes hipóteses econômicas, é adequado ao teste de diversas especificações de preferência e para a investigação de paradoxos de substituição intertemporal, e pode ser usado como base para a construção de um estimador para a taxa livre de risco. Alternativas para a estratégia de identificação são aplicadas e um paralelo entre elas e estratégias de outras metodologias é traçado. Adicionando estrutura ao ambiente inicial, são apresentadas duas situações onde a distribuição assintótica pode ser derivada. Finalmente, as metodologias propostas são aplicadas a conjuntos de dados dos EUA e do Brasil. Especificações de preferência usualmente empregadas na literatura, bem como uma classe de preferências dependentes do estado, são testadas. Os resultados são particularmente interessantes para a economia americana. A aplicação de teste formais não rejeita especificações de preferências comuns na literatura e estimativas para o coeficiente relativo de aversão ao risco se encontram entre 1 e 2, e são estatisticamente indistinguíveis de 1. Adicionalmente, para a classe de preferência s dependentes do estado, trajetórias altamente dinâmicas são estimadas para a tal coeficiente, as trajetórias são confinadas ao intervalo [1,15, 2,05] e se rejeita a hipótese de uma trajetória constante.
Resumo:
We study constrained efficient aggregate risk sharing and its consequence for the behavior of macro-aggregates in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) setting. Privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be independent of i.i.d. publicly observed aggregate shocks. Yet, private allocations display memory with respect to past aggregate shocks, when idosyncratic shocks are also i.i.d.. Under a mild restriction on the nature of optimal allocations the result extends to more persistent idiosyncratic shocks, for all but the limit at which idiosyncratic risk disappears, and the model collapses to a pure heterogeneity repeated Mirrlees economy identical to Werning [2007]. When preferences are iso-elastic we show that an allocation is memoryless only if it displays a strong form of separability with respect to aggregate shocks. Separability characterizes the pure heterogeneity limit as well as the general case with log preferences. With less than full persistence and risk aversion different from unity both memory and non-separability characterize optimal allocations. Exploiting the fact that non-separability is associated with state-varying labor wedges, we apply a business cycle accounting procedure (e.g. Chari et al. [2007]) to the aggregate data generated by the model. We show that, whenever risk aversion is great than one our model produces efficient counter-cyclical labor wedges.
Resumo:
Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all. This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets. Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.
Resumo:
Tendo por base o trabalho realizado por Hyde e Sherif (2010) com dados do mercado inglês, foi desenvolvido estudo com o objetivo de avaliar a capacidade do spread de curto e longo prazo da taxa de juros de funcionar como indicador do crescimento futuro do consumo no Brasil. Tanto Hyde e Sherif (2010) como outros estudos realizados em países desenvolvidos indicaram relação positiva entre o spread de juros de curto e longo prazo e o crescimento do consumo. Entretanto, as análises empíricas realizadas neste estudo para o caso brasileiro, apresentaram resultados divergentes do esperado pela teoria, indicando relação negativa entre o spread de juros e o crescimento do consumo. Em algumas análises, os estudos não indicaram relação entre as variáveis. Foram discutidas possíveis razões para estes resultados contraintuitivos, tais como tamanho reduzido da amostra, nível da taxa de juros no Brasil e liquidez do mercado futuro de juros. Adicionalmente foram analisados os modelos teóricos C-CAPM (Consumption-based asset pricing model) e o modelo de consumo habitual desenvolvido por Campbell e Cochrane (1999) com a adaptação proposta por Wachter (2006). Os resultados encontrados no modelo C-CAPM divergiram do esperado, já que a estimativa do coeficiente relativo de aversão ao risco apresentou sinal negativo. Por outro lado, os resultados obtidos no modelo de Wachter (2006) ficaram em linha com o esperado na teoria, tanto em relação à significância dos parâmetros como aos respectivos sinais e magnitudes.
Resumo:
Using the Pricing Equation in a panel-data framework, we construct a novel consistent estimator of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) which relies on the fact that its logarithm is the "common feature" in every asset return of the economy. Our estimator is a simple function of asset returns and does not depend on any parametric function representing preferences. The techniques discussed in this paper were applied to two relevant issues in macroeconomics and finance: the first asks what type of parametric preference-representation could be validated by asset-return data, and the second asks whether or not our SDF estimator can price returns in an out-of-sample forecasting exercise. In formal testing, we cannot reject standard preference specifications used in the macro/finance literature. Estimates of the relative risk-aversion coefficient are between 1 and 2, and statistically equal to unity. We also show that our SDF proxy can price reasonably well the returns of stocks with a higher capitalization level, whereas it shows some difficulty in pricing stocks with a lower level of capitalization.