Regional trade agreements and the world trade organization

A Década de 1990 foi Marcada por uma Considerável Proliferação de Acordos Regionais de Comercio (Arcs). Esses Acordos, que em Princípio Teriam Caráter Excepcional no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio, Espalharam-Se por Várias Partes do Mundo E, Atualmente, são Raros os Casos de Países que não Participam de Pelo Menos um Acordo Preferencial. este Artigo tem como Objetivo Analisar os Acordos Preferenciais e suas Implicações no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio E, para Tanto, são Considerados os Aspectos Normativos e Econômicos Relacionados ao Tema. Além Disso, Apresenta-Se a Sistematização das Principais Questões Alusivas À Interpretação das Regras da Omc Relativas Aos Acordos Regionais de Comércio. Finalmente, com o Intuito de Fornecer Elementos Adicionais para a Avaliação do dos Acordos Preferenciais Serão Analisados os Impactos Econômicos de Alguns dos Principais Acordos para o Mercosul.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

The not so generalized effects of nonreciprocal trade agreements

This dissertation uses an empirical gravity equation approach to study the relationship between nonreciprocal trade agreements (NRTAs) and members’ trade flows. Estimations relate bilateral imports to trade policy variables using a very comprehensive dataset with over fifty years of data. Results show that meager average trade effects exist only if members are excluded from the world trading system or if they are very poor. As trade flows between NRTA members are already rising before their creation, results also suggest a strong endogeneity concerning their formation. Moreover, estimations show that uncertainty and discretion tend to critically hinder NRTA’s performance. On the other hand, reciprocal trade agreements show the opposite pattern regardless of members’ income status.Encouraging developing countries’ openness to trade through reciprocal liberalization emerges consequently as a possible policy implication.

Impacto de entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul: uma simulação com modelo de equilíbrio geral computável

O Objetivo deste Estudo é Avaliar os Impactos da Entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul Utilizando para Tanto o Modelo de Equilíbrio Geral Computável Multi-Setorial e Multi-Regional Denominado Global Trade Analysis Project (Gtap). Além da Introdução, o Estudo Está Dividido em Outras 5 Seções. na Seção 2, são Analisados os Documentos Mais Relevantes Assinados Pelos Estados-Parte, Ressaltando a Relativa Rapidez da Assinatura do Acordo de Adesão da Venezuela ao Bloco; na Seção 3, Descreve-Se o Estado Atual do Fluxo de Comércio entre Venezuela e Mercosul, Assim como as Condições de Acesso a Mercados, Ressaltando a Importância da Venezuela para o Mercosul e a Proteção Ligeiramente Maior Aplicada Pela Economia Venezuelana Quando Comparada com a do Mercosul. na Seção Seguinte, Descrevem-Se os Choques Tarifários Implementados em Três Simulações, Representativas da Adesão da Venezuela ao Mercosul, Além de Hipóteses de Fechamento do Modelo. na Seção 5, os Resultados da Simulação são Apresentados e Discutidos. Sinteticamente, Chama-Se À Atenção para o Aumento de Bem Estar nos Países Envolvidos e o Significativo Impacto Setorial, Especialmente nos Setores de Automóveis, Máquinas e Equipamentos e Têxteis e Vestuário. uma Última Seção Sumaria as Principais Conclusões do Trabalho.

Construção de consenso em negociações de acordos regionais - ARCs

The main subject of this study is the consensus analysis of negotiations of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). Generally speaking, delays and interruptions caused by controversies and impasses end up becoming strong efficiency problems which jeopardize the consensus building during any negotiation. As a justification, the target of this study is to identify processes to help obtain, efficiently, agreements in the RTAs negotiations. Its final objective was to search for theoretical tools and techniques to be applied in situations of stoppage in a sense of eliminating the difficulties or making them at least easier to deal with. Secondarily other theoretical points of view were considered with the intention of understanding how strategies and theoretical tools can contribute in each/or different scenario of the negotiation. Through the different ways of looking at it for the conduction of the negotiations, for evaluating the dimensions of the negotiations and in order to build up the consensus, the researcher was able to understand the perception and the interpretation of the subject in view. At last the conclusion was that the applicability of the chosen framework is positive in helping solve problems and controversies as well as building up the consensus during the negotiations.

Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism

Recent research has underlined the efficiency of the GATT/WTO rules from the standpoint of politically motivated governments, emphasizing that the current multilateral rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inef- ficient. Global free trade, in particular, is generally unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, provided that governments have distributive motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare superior equilibrium. The reason is that, as members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another, they are induced to reduce their multilateral tariffs as well. Once we account for these endogenous changes–and only then–we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. We also find, however, that members are likely to gain "too much" from regional integration, thereby harming outsiders.

Brazilian international and inter-state trade flows: an exploratory analysis using the gravity model

Recent efforts toward a world with freer trade, like WTO/GATT or regional Preferential Trade Agreements(PTAs), were put in doubt after McCallum's(1995) finding of a large border effect between US and Canadian provinces. Since then, there has been a great amount of research on this topic employing the gravity equation. This dissertation has two goals. The first goal is to review comprehensively the recent literature about the gravity equation, including its usages, econometric specifications, and the efforts to provide it with microeconomic foundations. The second goal is the estimation of the Brazilian border effect (or 'home-bias trade puzzle') using inter-state and international trade flow data. It is used a pooled cross-section Tobit model. The lowest border effect estimated was 15, which implies that Brazilian states trade among themselves 15 times more than they trade with foreign countries. Further research using industry disaggregated data is needed to qualify the estimated border effect with respect to which part of that effect can be attributed to actual trade costs and which part is the outcome of the endogenous location problem of the firm.

Trade and infrastructure: evidences from the Andean Community

This paper presents evidence on the key role of infrastructure in the Andean Community trade patterns. Three distinct but related gravity models of bilateral trade are used. The first model aims at identifying the importance of the Preferential Trade Agreement and adjacency on intra-regional trade, while also checking the traditional roles of economic size and distance. The second and third models also assess the evolution of the Trade Agreement and the importance of sharing a common border, but their main goal is to analyze the relevance of including infrastructure in the augmented gravity equation, testing the theoretical assumption that infrastructure endowments, by reducing trade and transport costs, reduce “distance” between bilateral partners. Indeed, if one accepts distance as a proxy for transportation costs, infrastructure development and improvement drastically modify it. Trade liberalization eliminates most of the distortions that a protectionist tariff system imposes on international business; hence transportation costs represent nowadays a considerably larger barrier to trade than in past decades. As new trade pacts are being negotiated in the Americas, borders and old agreements will lose significance; trade among countries will be nearly without restrictions, and bilateral flows will be defined in terms of costs and competitiveness. Competitiveness, however, will only be achieved by an improvement in infrastructure services at all points in the production-distribution chain.

5th BRICS Trade and Economic Research Network (TERN) meeting: the impact of mega agreements on BRICS

The BRICS TERN – BRICS Trade and Economics Research Network is a group of independent research institutes established four years ago by five think tanks from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The main objective of the network is to study different aspects of trade and economic relations amongst these five countries. The purpose of the V BRICS TERN Meeting was to analyze and debate the effects of the negotiations of the Mega Agreements, mainly those initiated by the US and the EU, already in negotiation, to each of the BRICS Trade Policies. Both Mega Agreements were examined – the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The studies included the main impacts on trade flows and on the international trade rules system, respecting the perspective of each of the countries concerned. This workshop was an initiative of the Center for Global Trade and Investments (CGTI), a think-tank on International Trade held by FGV Sao Paulo School of Economics. Its main objective is the research on trade regulation, preferential trade agreements, trade and currency, trade and global value chains, through legal analysis and economic modelling. One of its main researches, now, is on the potential economic and legal impacts of the Mega Agreements on Brazil and WTO rules. This meeting was organized in March14, 2014, in Rio de Janeiro, in a perfect timing for introducing such issues in the international agenda, in advance of the 6th BRICS Summit scheduled to be held in Brazil in July 2014.

Agreements and disputes over non-tariff measures

In trade agreements, governments can design remedies to ensure compliance (property rule) or to compensate victims (liability rule). This paper describes an economic framework to explain the pattern of remedies over non-tariff restrictions—particularly domestic subsidies and nonviolation complaints subject to liability rules. The key determinants of the contract form for any individual measure are the expected joint surplus from an agreement and the expected loss to the constrained government. The loss is higher for domestic subsidies and nonviolations because these are the policies most likely to correct domestic distortions. Governments choose property rules when expected gains from compliance are sufficiently high and expected losses to the constrained country are sufficiently low. Liability rules are preferable when dispute costs are relatively high, because inefficiencies in the compensation process reduce the number of socially inefficient disputes filed.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Dynamic Effects of MERCOSUR: an assessment for Argentina

We evaluate the potential dynamic effects of MERCOSUR on the Argentinean economy. Two approaches, already used with other regional integration agreements, are applied for measuring, respectively, medium and long-term effects. All estimations are carefully checked and have their magnitudes contrasted with other figures derived from different sources. Besides, complementary empirical assessments are done. The diverse empirical evidences found support the argument that MERCOSUR provoked growth effects in Argentina.

Relações comerciais entre Brasil e China : uma análise de bem-estar a partir de um modelo de equilíbrio geral computável

O propósito deste trabalho é examinar possíveis ganhos de bem-estar provenientes de arranjos comerciais entre Brasil e China sob a ótica de um modelo de equilíbrio geral computável, o chamado “modelo GTAP” (sigla para Global Trade Analysis Project). Com base em uma descrição extensiva das estruturas econômicas e comerciais dos países e das Vantagens Comparativas de cada um deles, é possível simular acordos preferenciais de comércio e analisar os resultados de bem-estar por meio da medida de Variação Equivalente. Outro aspecto referente ao comércio sino-brasileiro que pode ser avaliado pela medida de bem-estar é o desalinhamento cambial dos dois países e as consequências deste para as transações comerciais entre ambos. Utilizando o mesmo ferramental anteriormente citado, o trabalho busca avaliar o impacto de tal desalinhamento no bem-estar dos países, uma vez que o câmbio seja corrigido via ajuste tarifário.

Acordos preferenciais de comércio e a OMC: um estudo sobre seus mecanismos de solução de controvérsias

Este trabalho analisa os Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio (APCs) com ênfase em seus Mecanismos de Solução de Controvérsias (MSC). A partir da seleção de alguns APCs bilaterais celebrados por Estados Unidos e União Europeia com outros parceiros comerciais, o trabalho objetiva (i) explicar como funcionam os MSC previstos pelos APCs para, em seguida, (ii) testar a hipótese de que a forma como os MSC são negociados nos APCs possibilita, em alguma medida, sua coexistência com o Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). This paper analyzes Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) focusing in its Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (DRM). Bilateral agreements signed by the United States and the European Union with other countries were selected with the aim to (i) explain how the DRMs stablished by PTAs work and, aftwards, (ii) test the hypothesis that the way the DRMs are negotiated in the PTAs enables its coexistence with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization.