Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism
Data(s) |
25/11/2014
25/11/2014
22/07/2004
|
---|---|
Resumo |
Recent research has underlined the efficiency of the GATT/WTO rules from the standpoint of politically motivated governments, emphasizing that the current multilateral rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inef- ficient. Global free trade, in particular, is generally unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, provided that governments have distributive motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare superior equilibrium. The reason is that, as members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another, they are induced to reduce their multilateral tariffs as well. Once we account for these endogenous changes–and only then–we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. We also find, however, that members are likely to gain "too much" from regional integration, thereby harming outsiders. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
en_US |
Publicador |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
Relação |
Seminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE |
Direitos |
Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis. |
Palavras-Chave | #Regionalism #Multilateral cooperation #Trade agreements #Economic efficiency #Tratados comerciais #Politica comercial #Integração econômica |
Tipo |
Working Paper |