Limited memory and the essentiality of money

This paper investigates the relationship between memory and the essentiality of money. We consider a random matching economy with a large finite population in which commitment is not possible and memory is limited in the sense that only a fraction m E(0; 1) of the population has publicly observable histories. We show that no matter how limited memory is, there exists a social norm that achieves the first best regardless of the population size. In other words, money can fail to be essential irrespective of the amount of memory in the economy. This suggests that the emphasis on limited memory as a fundamental friction for money to be essential deserves a deeper examination.

Money versus memory

A well–established fact in monetary theory is that a key ingredient for the essentiality of money is its role as a form of memory. In this paper we study a notion of memory that includes information about an agent’s past actions and trading opportunities but, in contrast to Kocherlakota (1998), does not include information about the past actions and trading opportunities of an agent’s past partners. We first show that the first–best can be achieved with memory even if it only includes information about an agent’s very recent past. Thus, money can fail to be essential even if memory is minimal. We then establish, more interestingly, that if information about trading opportunities is not part of an agent’s record, then money can be better than memory. This shows that the societal benefit of money lies not only on being a record of past actions, but also on being a record of past trading opportunities, a fact that has been overlooked by the monetary literature.

Understanding the critical distance in sparse distributed memory

Modelos de tomada de decisão necessitam refletir os aspectos da psi- cologia humana. Com este objetivo, este trabalho é baseado na Sparse Distributed Memory (SDM), um modelo psicologicamente e neuro- cientificamente plausível da memória humana, publicado por Pentti Kanerva, em 1988. O modelo de Kanerva possui um ponto crítico: um item de memória aquém deste ponto é rapidamente encontrado, e items além do ponto crítico não o são. Kanerva calculou este ponto para um caso especial com um seleto conjunto de parâmetros (fixos). Neste trabalho estendemos o conhecimento deste ponto crítico, através de simulações computacionais, e analisamos o comportamento desta “Critical Distance” sob diferentes cenários: em diferentes dimensões; em diferentes números de items armazenados na memória; e em diferentes números de armazenamento do item. Também é derivada uma função que, quando minimizada, determina o valor da “Critical Distance” de acordo com o estado da memória. Um objetivo secundário do trabalho é apresentar a SDM de forma simples e intuitiva para que pesquisadores de outras áreas possam imaginar como ela pode ajudá-los a entender e a resolver seus problemas.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.