Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international financial architecture. Paper prepared for Bank of England Conference on "The Role of the Official and Private Sectors in Resolving International Financial Crises", London, and for the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil. (Preliminary draft circulated for comments, please do not cite without reference to the authors).

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Solving the non-convexity problem in some shopping-time and human-capital models

Several works in the shopping-time and in the human-capital literature, due to the nonconcavity of the underlying Hamiltonian, use Örst-order conditions in dynamic optimization to characterize necessity, but not su¢ ciency, in intertemporal problems. In this work I choose one paper in each one of these two areas and show that optimality can be characterized by means of a simple aplication of Arrowís (1968) su¢ ciency theorem.

The Capm and Fama-French models in Brazil: a comparative study

This paper confronts the Capital Asset Pricing Model - CAPM - and the 3-Factor Fama-French - FF - model using both Brazilian and US stock market data for the same Sample period (1999-2007). The US data will serve only as a benchmark for comparative purposes. We use two competing econometric methods, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) by (Hansen, 1982) and the Iterative Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (ITNLSUR) by Burmeister and McElroy (1988). Both methods nest other options based on the procedure by Fama-MacBeth (1973). The estimations show that the FF model fits the Brazilian data better than CAPM, however it is imprecise compared with the US analog. We argue that this is a consequence of an absence of clear-cut anomalies in Brazilian data, specially those related to firm size. The tests on the efficiency of the models - nullity of intercepts and fitting of the cross-sectional regressions - presented mixed conclusions. The tests on intercept failed to rejected the CAPM when Brazilian value-premium-wise portfolios were used, contrasting with US data, a very well documented conclusion. The ITNLSUR has estimated an economically reasonable and statistically significant market risk premium for Brazil around 6.5% per year without resorting to any particular data set aggregation. However, we could not find the same for the US data during identical period or even using a larger data set. Este estudo procura contribuir com a literatura empírica brasileira de modelos de apreçamento de ativos. Dois dos principais modelos de apreçamento são Infrontados, os modelos Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)e de 3 fatores de Fama-French. São aplicadas ferramentas econométricas pouco exploradas na literatura nacional na estimação de equações de apreçamento: os métodos de GMM e ITNLSUR. Comparam-se as estimativas com as obtidas de dados americanos para o mesmo período e conclui-se que no Brasil o sucesso do modelo de Fama e French é limitado. Como subproduto da análise, (i) testa-se a presença das chamadas anomalias nos retornos, e (ii) calcula-se o prêmio de risco implícito nos retornos das ações. Os dados revelam a presença de um prêmio de valor, porém não de um prêmio de tamanho. Utilizando o método de ITNLSUR, o prêmio de risco de mercado é positivo e significativo, ao redor de 6,5% ao ano.

An empirical comparison of forward-rate and spot-rate models for valuing interest-rate options

Our main goal is to investigate the question of which interest-rate options valuation models are better suited to support the management of interest-rate risk. We use the German market to test seven spot-rate and forward-rate models with one and two factors for interest-rate warrants for the period from 1990 to 1993. We identify a one-factor forward-rate model and two spot-rate models with two faetors that are not significant1y outperformed by any of the other four models. Further rankings are possible if additional cri teria are applied.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

A utilização de modelos de duração para gerenciar risco de crédito

Os modelos hazard, também conhecidos por modelos de tempo até a falência ou duração, são empregados para determinar quais variáveis independentes têm maior poder explicativo na previsão de falência de empresas. Consistem em uma abordagem alternativa aos modelos binários logit e probit, e à análise discriminante. Os modelos de duração deveriam ser mais eficientes que modelos de alternativas discretas, pois levam em consideração o tempo de sobrevivência para estimar a probabilidade instantânea de falência de um conjunto de observações sobre uma variável independente. Os modelos de alternativa discreta tipicamente ignoram a informação de tempo até a falência, e fornecem apenas a estimativa de falhar em um dado intervalo de tempo. A questão discutida neste trabalho é como utilizar modelos hazard para projetar taxas de inadimplência e construir matrizes de migração condicionadas ao estado da economia. Conceitualmente, o modelo é bastante análogo às taxas históricas de inadimplência e mortalidade utilizadas na literatura de crédito. O Modelo Semiparamétrico Proporcional de Cox é testado em empresas brasileiras não pertencentes ao setor financeiro, e observa-se que a probabilidade de inadimplência diminui sensivelmente após o terceiro ano da emissão do empréstimo. Observa-se também que a média e o desvio-padrão das probabilidades de inadimplência são afetados pelos ciclos econômicos. É discutido como o Modelo Proporcional de Cox pode ser incorporado aos quatro modelos mais famosos de gestão de risco .de crédito da atualidade: CreditRisk +, KMV, CreditPortfolio View e CreditMetrics, e as melhorias resultantes dessa incorporação

Essays in macroeconomy and dynamic term-structure models

This thesis is composed of three articles with the subjects of macroeconomics and - nance. Each article corresponds to a chapter and is done in paper format. In the rst article, which was done with Axel Simonsen, we model and estimate a small open economy for the Canadian economy in a two country General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework. We show that it is important to account for the correlation between Domestic and Foreign shocks and for the Incomplete Pass-Through. In the second chapter-paper, which was done with Hedibert Freitas Lopes, we estimate a Regime-switching Macro-Finance model for the term-structure of interest rates to study the US post-World War II (WWII) joint behavior of macro-variables and the yield-curve. We show that our model tracks well the US NBER cycles, the addition of changes of regime are important to explain the Expectation Theory of the term structure, and macro-variables have increasing importance in recessions to explain the variability of the yield curve. We also present a novel sequential Monte-Carlo algorithm to learn about the parameters and the latent states of the Economy. In the third chapter, I present a Gaussian A ne Term Structure Model (ATSM) with latent jumps in order to address two questions: (1) what are the implications of incorporating jumps in an ATSM for Asian option pricing, in the particular case of the Brazilian DI Index (IDI) option, and (2) how jumps and options a ect the bond risk-premia dynamics. I show that jump risk-premia is negative in a scenario of decreasing interest rates (my sample period) and is important to explain the level of yields, and that gaussian models without jumps and with constant intensity jumps are good to price Asian options.

Conditional treatment and its effect on recidivism

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect of the 1985 ”Employment Services for Ex-Offenders” (ESEO) program on recidivism. Initially, the sample has been split randomly in a control group and a treatment group. However, the actual treatment (mainly being job related counseling) only takes place conditional on finding a job, and not having been arrested, for those selected in the treatment group. We use a multiple proportional hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity for job seach and recidivism time which incorporates the conditional treatment effect. We find that the program helps to reduce criminal activity, contrary to the result of the previous analysis of this data set. This finding is important for crime prevention policy.