Solving the non-convexity problem in some shopping-time and human-capital models

Several works in the shopping-time and in the human-capital literature, due to the nonconcavity of the underlying Hamiltonian, use Örst-order conditions in dynamic optimization to characterize necessity, but not su¢ ciency, in intertemporal problems. In this work I choose one paper in each one of these two areas and show that optimality can be characterized by means of a simple aplication of Arrowís (1968) su¢ ciency theorem.

Time-series properties and empirical evidence of growth and infraestructure: revised version

After more than forty years studying growth, there are two classes of growth models that have emerged: exogenous and endogenous growth models. Since both try to mimic the same set of long-run stylized facts, they are observationally equivalent in some respects. Our goals in this paper are twofold First, we discuss the time-series properties of growth models in a way that is useful for assessing their fit to the data. Second, we investigate whether these two models successfully conforms to U.S. post-war data. We use cointegration techniques to estimate and test long-run capital elasticities, exogeneity tests to investigate the exogeneity status of TFP, and Granger-causality tests to examine temporal precedence of TFP with respect to infrastructure expenditures. The empirical evidence is robust in confirming the existence of a unity long-run capital elasticity. The analysis of TFP reveals that it is not weakly exogenous in the exogenous growth model Granger-causality test results show unequivocally that there is no evidence that TFP for both models precede infrastructure expenditures not being preceded by it. On the contrary, we find some evidence that infras- tructure investment precedes TFP. Our estimated impact of infrastructure on TFP lay rougbly in the interval (0.19, 0.27).

New evidence on trade liberalization and productivity growth

Although the subject of a large number of studies, the debate on the links between trade reform and productivity growth is still unresolved and most studies at the micro level have not been able to establish a relationship between the two phenomena. Brazil provides a natural experiment to study this issue that is seldom available: it was one of the closest economies in the world until 1988, when trade reform was launched, and intra-industry data are available on an annual basis before, during and after liberalization. Using a panel of industry sectors this paper tests and measures the impact of trade reform on productivity growth. Results confirm the association between the former and the latter and show that the magnitude of the impact of tariff reduction on the growth rates of TFP and output per worker was substantial. Our data reveal large and widespread productivity improvement, so that the estimations in this paper are an indication that liberalization had an important effect on industrial performance in the country. Cross-sectional differences in protection are also investigated.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

An empirical comparison of forward-rate and spot-rate models for valuing interest-rate options

Our main goal is to investigate the question of which interest-rate options valuation models are better suited to support the management of interest-rate risk. We use the German market to test seven spot-rate and forward-rate models with one and two factors for interest-rate warrants for the period from 1990 to 1993. We identify a one-factor forward-rate model and two spot-rate models with two faetors that are not significant1y outperformed by any of the other four models. Further rankings are possible if additional cri teria are applied.

Financial globalization and economic growth

Capital mobility leads to a speed of convergence smaller in an open economy than in a closed economy. This is related to the presence of two capitals, produced with specific technologies, and where one of the capitals is nontradable, like infrastructures or human capital. Suppose, for example, that the economy is relatively less abundant in human capital, leading to a decrease of the remuneration of this capital during the transition. In a closed economy, the remuneration of physical capital will be increasing during the transition. In the open economy, the alternative investment yields the international interest rate, corresponding to the steady state net remuneration of physical capital in the closed economy. The nonarbitrage condition shows a larger difference in the remuneration of the two capitals in the closed economy. It leads to a higher accumulation of human capital and thus to a faster speed of convergence in the closed economy. This result stands in sharp contrast with that of the one-sector neoclassical growth model, where the speed of convergence is smaller in the closed economy.

A note on policy, the composition of public expenditures and economic growth

In this article we study the growth and welfare effects of fiscal and monetary policies in economies where public investment is part of the productive process we present four different models that share the same technology with public infrastructure as a separate argument of the production function. We show that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization we show that the optimal tax rate is greater than the rate that maximizes growth and the optimal rate of money creation is below the growth maximizing rate. With public infrastructure in the production function we no longer obtain superneutrality in the Sidrausky model.

The Capm and Fama-French models in Brazil: a comparative study

This paper confronts the Capital Asset Pricing Model - CAPM - and the 3-Factor Fama-French - FF - model using both Brazilian and US stock market data for the same Sample period (1999-2007). The US data will serve only as a benchmark for comparative purposes. We use two competing econometric methods, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) by (Hansen, 1982) and the Iterative Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (ITNLSUR) by Burmeister and McElroy (1988). Both methods nest other options based on the procedure by Fama-MacBeth (1973). The estimations show that the FF model fits the Brazilian data better than CAPM, however it is imprecise compared with the US analog. We argue that this is a consequence of an absence of clear-cut anomalies in Brazilian data, specially those related to firm size. The tests on the efficiency of the models - nullity of intercepts and fitting of the cross-sectional regressions - presented mixed conclusions. The tests on intercept failed to rejected the CAPM when Brazilian value-premium-wise portfolios were used, contrasting with US data, a very well documented conclusion. The ITNLSUR has estimated an economically reasonable and statistically significant market risk premium for Brazil around 6.5% per year without resorting to any particular data set aggregation. However, we could not find the same for the US data during identical period or even using a larger data set. Este estudo procura contribuir com a literatura empírica brasileira de modelos de apreçamento de ativos. Dois dos principais modelos de apreçamento são Infrontados, os modelos Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)e de 3 fatores de Fama-French. São aplicadas ferramentas econométricas pouco exploradas na literatura nacional na estimação de equações de apreçamento: os métodos de GMM e ITNLSUR. Comparam-se as estimativas com as obtidas de dados americanos para o mesmo período e conclui-se que no Brasil o sucesso do modelo de Fama e French é limitado. Como subproduto da análise, (i) testa-se a presença das chamadas anomalias nos retornos, e (ii) calcula-se o prêmio de risco implícito nos retornos das ações. Os dados revelam a presença de um prêmio de valor, porém não de um prêmio de tamanho. Utilizando o método de ITNLSUR, o prêmio de risco de mercado é positivo e significativo, ao redor de 6,5% ao ano.

Uncertainty of aid inflows and the growth relationship

This paper contributes to the literature on aid and economic growth. We posit that it is not the levei of aid flows per se but the stability of such flows that determines the impact of aid on economic growth. Three measures of aid instability are employed. One is a simple deviation from trend, and measures overall instability. The other measures are based on auto-regressive estimates to capture deviations from an expected trend. These measures are intended to proxy for uncertainty in aid receipts. We posit that such uncertainty will influence the relationship between aid and investment and how recipient governments respond to aid, and will therefore affect how aid impacts on growth. We estimate a standard cross-country growth regression including the leveI of aid, and find aid to be insignificant (in line with other results in the literature). We then introduce measures of instability. Aid remains insignificant when we account for overall instability. However, when we account for uncertainty (which is negative and significant), we find that aid has a significant positive effect on growth. We conduct stability tests that show that the significance of aid is largely due to its effect on the volume of investment. The finding that uncertainty of aid receipts reduces the effectiveness of aid is robust. When we control for this, aid appears to have a significant positive influence on growth. When the regression is estimated for the sub-sample of African countries these findings hold, although the effectiveness of aid appears weaker than for the full sample.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Inequality and economic growth in Latin

Latin America is the region that bears the highest rates of inequality in the world. Deininger and Squire (1996) showed that Latin American countries achieved only minor reductions in inequality between 1960 and 1990. On the other hand, East Asian countries, recurrently cited in recent literature on this issue, have significantly narrowed the gap in income inequality, while achieving sustained economic growth. These facts have triggered a renewed discussion on the relationship between income inequality and economic growth. According to the above literature, income inequality could have an adverse effect on countries’ growth rates. The main authors who spouse this line of thinking are Persson and Tebellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti (1996), Bénabou (1996), and Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998). More recently, however, articles were published that questioned the evidence presented previously. Representatives of this new point of view, namely Li and Zou (1998), Barro (1999), Deininger and Olinto (2000) and Forbes (2000), believe that the relation between these variables can be positive, i.e., income inequality can indeed foster economic growth. Using this literature as a starting point, this article seeks to evaluate the relation between income inequality and economic growth in Latin America, based on a 13-country panel, from 1970 to 1995. After briefly reviewing the above articles, this study estimates the per capita GDP and growth rate equations, based on the neoclassical approach for economic growth. It also estimates the Kuznets curve for this sample of countries. Econometric results are in line with recent work conducted in this area – particularly Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) – and confirm the positive relation between inequality and growth, and also support Kuznets hypothesis.