Beyond sea, sun and fun in Rio de Janeiro: understanding exchange students motivations and interests

O objetivo deste estudo é compreender o que leva estudantes de intercâmbio ao Rio de Janeiro, quais são suas motivações e interesses que influenciam na escolha dessa cidade, um destino pouco tradicional para intercâmbios, que recebe um crescente número de intercambistas de países desenvolvidos. Também apresentamos uma discussão mais ampla sobre a educação internacional do século 21, posicionando programas de intercâmbio como uma das possíveis iniciativas para a internacionalização de instituições de ensino superior. Para responder essa questão, 20 estudantes de 11 países foram entrevistados. Os resultados indicam que existe muito mais no Rio de Janeiro além do sol e das belas praias. Há uma grande variedade de interesses que explicam porque estudantes de intercâmbio escolhem esse destino. O clichê sobre sol, praia e carnaval se manifestou em diversas respostas, no entanto, nunca como principal fator. Intercambistas se interessam pela cidade por diversos motivos além das atrações turísticas, como aprender português, melhorar o currículo e estar em uma economia emergente. Recomendações para a internacionalização de instituições de educação e uma agenda de pesquisa para o desenvolvimento desse tópico são apresentadas na parte final.

Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties

Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

Strategic adoption in a two-sided market : a study of college applications in Brazil

This paper measures the importance of indirect network effects in the adoption by colleges and students of ENEM, a standardized exam for high-school students in Brazil that can be used in college application processes. We estimate network effects and find that they are economically significant. Students are more likely to take ENEM the larger the number of colleges adopting it. Similarly, colleges are more likely to adopt it the larger the number of students taking the exam. Moreover, we find evidence that colleges play strategically and that heterogeneity determines their decisions. A college is less likely to adopt ENEM the larger the number of competitors adopting it. Colleges’ characteristics such as ownership and organization affect adoption decisions. In a counterfactual exercise we compare colleges’ adoption decisions under competition and under joint colleges’ payoffs maximization. Adoption rates are significantly reduced when colleges internalize the competitive effect, i.e., the effect of their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs. On the other hand, they increase when indirect network effects - the effect of students’ response to their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs - are also internalized. Competitive adoption rates are found to exceed joint optimum rates by a small difference. These results suggest that, without considering students’ welfare, adoption rates are excessive, but close to the joint optimum.