The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.

Incompatibilidade distributiva e desenvolvimento auto-sustentado

Effective macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth will only be achieved in Brazil when the country settles the distributive inconsistency that arose in the 1970s. Since then the state and the nation started to incur respectively in high domestic and foreign debt. Wages grew at much slower rate than productivity, and income concentrated in the hands of business entrepreneurs and particularly of rentiers. Sheer populist practices, or disguised combination of neo-liberal and neopopulist policies were unable to address the problem. Budget deficits and high inflation, or exchange rate overvaluation and financial crises were the typical outcome. To settle distributive inconsistency by compensating in the short term workers for their income losses is not realistic. Only a consistent growth strategy and a credible commitment to share future growth benefits, combined with active social policies oriented to the poor, will do the job.

A agenda da transformação: a grande imprensa e a hegemonia neoliberal no Brasil (a imprensa paulista e a 'nova república')

Este trabalho objetiva analisar os posicionamentos da grande imprensa diária paulista os jornais Folha de S. Paulo e O Estado de S. Paulo no tocante à disputa pela transformação da Agenda política e econômica no Brasil entre 1986 e 1989. Neste período, os fracassos dos Planos de estabilização econômica, a elaboração da nova Constituição (com implicações na relação entre Estado e mercado) e a campanha presidencial foram alvos de um intenso embate político/ideológico, no contexto de profundas mudanças internacionais, relacionadas sobretudo ao ocaso do socialismo e à hegemonia da visão neoliberal. A imprensa, em razão de sua capacidade de espraiar idéias, atua como aparelho privado de hegemonia através da formulação de imagens e da utilização da retórica, o que a torna um ator político privilegiado, pois, além do mais, formula e retransmite conteúdos fortemente ideológicos.

A agenda da transformação II: a grande imprensa e a hegemonia neoliberal no Brasil (a imprensa e o governo Collor)

Esta pesquisa analisa a difusão da hegemonia neoliberal no Brasil, nos anos 90, através da grande imprensa nacional - os periódicos Jornal do Brasil, O Globo, Folha de S. Paulo e O Estado de S. Paulo. Por tratar-se de veículo ideológico, a imprensa possui papel-chave no que tange tanto à formulação quanto à transmissão de uma dada hegemonia. No caso, esta se expressa na redefinição, em escala global, do papel do Estado e do Mercado, no sentido de orientar (e difundir) reformas em direção a este último. Concretamente, temas como privatização, abertura das economias e desproteção à força de trabalho, entre outros, constituem uma nova Agenda, em substituição ao modelo intervencionista (keynesiano e/ou desenvolvimentista) vigente entre os anos 30 e os anos 80.

A agenda da transformação: a grande imprensa e a hegemonia neoliberal no Brasil (o governo Itamar Franco - 1993-1994 - e o refluxo da agenda)

Esta pesquisa analisa a consolidação da hegemonia ultraliberal no Brasil, num período particularmente crítico: o impeachment de Collor e a efetivação de Itamar Franco na presidência entre 1993 e 1994, através da grande imprensa nacional, isto é, os periódicos Folha de S. Paulo, O Estado de S. Paulo, Jornal do Brasil e O Globo, e a revista Veja. Por tratar-se de veículo ideológico, a imprensa possui papel-chave no que tange tanto à formulação quanto à transmissão de uma dada agenda com vistas a obter a hegemonia, no caso ultraliberal. Tais órgãos lutaram decididamente para evitar que houvesse um refluxo na agenda iniciada por Collor tendo em vista as posições desenvolvimentistas do novo presidente. Concretamente, temas como, dentre outros, privatização e abertura/ internacionalização da economia nacional constituíram a nova agenda, em substituição ao modelo intervencionista (desenvolvimentista) vigente entre os anos 30 e os anos 80. Aos que se opuseram a este receituário, seja quanto à forma seja quanto ao conteúdo, foram desqualificados e estigmatizados, demonstrando o papel ideológico e não democrático dos órgãos em foco.

Estratégia, legitimidade e biocombustíveis: uma perspectiva geopolítica

A temática ambiental está cada vez mais presente, não apenas na esfera de governos, organizações internacionais e de grandes corporações, como também em pesquisas e trabalhos acadêmicos na área de Estratégia de negócios. Apesar da histórica negligência a essa temática, a literatura de gestão estratégica vem incorporando crescentemente elementos relacionados ao meio ambiente no âmbito da estratégia. Uma das formas de se obter desempenho condizente com demandas ambientais tem sido protagonizada por meio de investimentos em biocombustíveis, passando a ter implicações práticas nas estratégias de diversas organizações no mundo. O objetivo de pesquisa deste trabalho foi o de investigar por que e como o etanol foi incorporado na estratégia formal de uma organização brasileira historicamente vinculada ao setor petrolífero no Brasil. Partindo de uma perspectiva geopolítica, esta tese argumenta que a dinâmica que envolve a incorporação do etanol na estratégia dessa organização não pode ser compreendida apenas por meio de uma dimensão estritamente econômica. No decorrer da tese, é considerada a pertinência de se levar em conta ou não uma dimensão de poder para compreender o fenômeno investigado. Para a condução da pesquisa, buscou-se para mostrar a importância do conceito de legitimidade na dinâmica das estratégias relacionadas aos biocombustíveis. No decorrer da investigação, a distinção entre Norte e Sul global foi apontada como uma das facetas do processo de incorporação do meio ambiente em estratégias e políticas no nível internacional, na qual perspectivas neoliberais buscam sustentar a centralidade da dimensão econômica, tornando menos visível as assimetrias de poder entre países do Norte e Sul global. As implicações do processo de incorporação do etanol na estratégia da organização estudada também foram analisadas nos níveis organizacional e nacional, na qual foram ressaltados os conflitos de interesses existentes em cada um desses níveis. Conclui-se que a incorporação do etanol está imersa em um contexto caracterizado por disputas geopolíticas, tanto no nível nacional quanto internacional, mostra a pertinência de considerar outras dimensões de análise em investigações na área de Estratégia, como os aspectos relacionados a poder e espaço geográfico.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Essays on the credit channel of monetary policy: a case study for Brazil

The onset of the financial crisis in 2008 and the European sovereign crisis in 2010 renewed the interest of macroeconomists on the role played by credit in business cycle fluctuations. The purpose of the present work is to present empirical evidence on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Brazil with a special eye on the role played by the credit channel, using different econometric techniques. It is comprised by three articles. The first one presents a review of the literature of financial frictions, with a focus on the overlaps between credit activity and the monetary policy. It highlights how the sharp disruptions in the financial markets spurred central banks in developed and emerging nations to deploy of a broad set of non conventional tools to overcome the damage on financial intermediation. A chapter is dedicated to the challenge face by the policymaking in emerging markets and Brazil in particular in the highly integrated global capital market. This second article investigates the implications of the credit channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the case of Brazil, using a structural FAVAR (SFAVAR) approach. The term “structural” comes from the estimation strategy, which generates factors that have a clear economic interpretation. The results show that unexpected shocks in the proxies for the external finance premium and the credit volume produce large and persistent fluctuations in inflation and economic activity – accounting for more than 30% of the error forecast variance of the latter in a three-year horizon. Counterfactual simulations demonstrate that the credit channel amplified the economic contraction in Brazil during the acute phase of the global financial crisis in the last quarter of 2008, thus gave an important impulse to the recovery period that followed. In the third articles, I make use of Bayesian estimation of a classical neo-Keynesian DSGE model, incorporating the financial accelerator channel developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The results present evidences in line to those already seen in the previous article: disturbances on the external finance premium – represented here by credit spreads – trigger significant responses on the aggregate demand and inflation and monetary policy shocks are amplified by the financial accelerator mechanism. Keywords: Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, Credit Channel, Financial Accelerator, FAVAR, DSGE, Bayesian Econometrics