Conditional cash transfers, schooling and child labor : micro-simulating bolsa escola

Cash transfers targeted to poor people, but conditional on some behavior on their part, such as school attendance or regular visits to health care facilities, are being adopted in a growing number of developing countries. Even where ex-post impact evaluations have been conducted, a number of policy-relevant counterfactual questions have remained unanswered. These are questions about the potential impact of changes in program design, such as benefit levels or the choice of the means-test, on both the current welfare and the behavioral response of household members. This paper proposes a method to simulate the effects of those alternative program designs on welfare and behavior, based on microeconometrically estimated models of household behavior. In an application to Brazil’s recently introduced federal Bolsa Escola program, we find a surprisingly strong effect of the conditionality on school attendance, but a muted impact of the transfers on the reduction of current poverty and inequality levels.

Applying negotiation skills in the design of public policies: analysis of the city of São Paulo’s invoice program

The author argues that by applying problem-solving negotiation skills in the design of public policies, public administrators benefit from more effective and wide-ranging outcomes in the realization of their goals. In order to demonstrate this idea, the author analyzes how negotiation skills – such as identifying key actors and their interests, recognizing hardbargaining tactics and changing the players, knowing your best alternative, creating value and building trust – permeated and contributed to the success of the City of São Paulo’s Invoice Program (“Programa Nota Fiscal Paulistana”), a public policy aimed at combating tax evasion of service tax in the City of São Paulo.

Decision rules and information provision : monitoring vs manipulation

We analyze the contractual design problem of a principal who delegates decision-making and information provision. The principal faces two tasks: he has to decide the level of discretion to be granted to the decision-maker and to establish who is in charge of supplying the information. We show that these two choices are intrinsically related. When the decision-maker is granted high discretion, information provision is optimally delegated to the parties directly affected by the decision. Conversely, when the decision-maker enjoys little discretion, it is more desirable to rely on a third impartial agent. The paper helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.