On choice of technique in the Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model

We report results on the optimal \choice of technique" in a model originally formulated by Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (henceforth, the RSS model) and further discussed by Okishio and Stiglitz. By viewing this vintage-capital model without discounting as a speci c instance of the general theory of intertemporal resource allocation associated with Brock, Gale and McKenzie, we resolve longstanding conjectures in the form of theorems on the existence and price support of optimal paths, and of conditions suÆcient for the optimality of a policy rst identi ed by Stiglitz. We dispose of the necessity of these conditions in surprisingly simple examples of economies in which (i) an optimal path is periodic, (ii) a path following Stiglitz' policy is bad, and (iii) there is optimal investment in di erent vintages at di erent times. (129 words)

On a uniform turnpike of the third kind in the Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model

On using McKenzie’s taxonomy of optimal accumulation in the longrun, we report a “uniform turnpike” theorem of the third kind in a model original to Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (RSS), and further studied by Stiglitz. Our results are presented in the undiscounted, discrete-time setting emphasized in the recent work of Khan-Mitra, and they rely on the importance of strictly concave felicity functions, or alternatively, on the value of a “marginal rate of transformation”, ξσ, from one period to the next not being unity. Our results, despite their specificity, contribute to the methodology of intertemporal optimization theory, as developed in economics by Ramsey, von Neumann and their followers.

Foreign funding to an emerging market: the Monetary Premium Theory and the Brazilian Case, 1991 - 1998

We develop a framework to explain the private capital flows between the rest of the world and an emerging economy. The model, based on the monetary premium theory, relates an endogenous supply of foreign capitals to an endogenous differential of interest rates; its estimation uses the econometric techniques initiated by Heckman. Four questions regarding the capital flows phenomenon are explored, including the statistical process that governs the events of default and the impact of the probability of default on the interest rate differential. Using the methodology, we analyse the dynamics of foreign capital movements in Brazil during the 1991- 1998 period.

Essays on monetary and banking theory

Esta tese de Doutorado é dedicada ao estudo de instabilidade financeira e dinâmica em Teoria Monet ária. E demonstrado que corridas banc árias são eliminadas sem custos no modelo padrão de teoria banc ária quando a popula ção não é pequena. É proposta uma extensão em que incerteza agregada é mais severa e o custo da estabilidade financeira é relevante. Finalmente, estabelece-se otimalidade de transições na distribui ção de moeda em economias em que oportunidades de trocas são escassas e heterogêneas. Em particular, otimalidade da inflação depende dos incentivos dinâmicos proporcionados por tais transi ções. O capí tulo 1 estabelece o resultado de estabilidade sem custos para economias grandes ao estudar os efeitos do tamanho populacional na an álise de corridas banc árias de Peck & Shell. No capí tulo 2, otimalidade de dinâmica é estudada no modelo de monet ário de Kiyotaki & Wright quando a sociedade é capaz de implementar uma polí tica inflacion ária. Apesar de adotar a abordagem de desenho de mecanismos, este capí tulo faz um paralelo com a an álise de Sargent & Wallace (1981) ao destacar efeitos de incentivos dinâmicos sobre a interação entre as polí ticas monet ária e fiscal. O cap ítulo 3 retoma o tema de estabilidade fi nanceira ao quanti car os custos envolvidos no desenho ótimo de um setor bancário à prova de corridas e ao propor uma estrutura informacional alternativa que possibilita bancos insolventes. A primeira an álise mostra que o esquema de estabilidade ótima exibe altas taxas de juros de longo prazo e a segunda que monitoramento imperfeito pode levar a corridas bancárias com insolvência.

Forecasting multivariate time series under present-value-model short- and long-run co-movement restrictions

It is well known that cointegration between the level of two variables (e.g. prices and dividends) is a necessary condition to assess the empirical validity of a present-value model (PVM) linking them. The work on cointegration,namelyon long-run co-movements, has been so prevalent that it is often over-looked that another necessary condition for the PVM to hold is that the forecast error entailed by the model is orthogonal to the past. This amounts to investigate whether short-run co-movememts steming from common cyclical feature restrictions are also present in such a system. In this paper we test for the presence of such co-movement on long- and short-term interest rates and on price and dividend for the U.S. economy. We focuss on the potential improvement in forecasting accuracies when imposing those two types of restrictions coming from economic theory.

Isolated capital cities and misgovernance: theory and evidence

Motivated by a novel stylized fact { countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance { we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less e ective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.

Contributions to the Theory of Optimal Tests

This paper considers tests which maximize the weighted average power (WAP). The focus is on determining WAP tests subject to an uncountable number of equalities and/or inequalities. The unifying theory allows us to obtain tests with correct size, similar tests, and unbiased tests, among others. A WAP test may be randomized and its characterization is not always possible. We show how to approximate the power of the optimal test by sequences of nonrandomized tests. Two alternative approximations are considered. The rst approach considers a sequence of similar tests for an increasing number of boundary conditions. This discretization allows us to implement the WAP tests in practice. The second method nds a sequence of tests which approximate the WAP test uniformly. This approximation allows us to show that WAP similar tests are admissible. The theoretical framework is readily applicable to several econometric models, including the important class of the curved-exponential family. In this paper, we consider the instrumental variable model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors (HAC-IV) and the nearly integrated regressor model. In both models, we nd WAP similar and (locally) unbiased tests which dominate other available tests.

Demand- side resistance to creative destruction in schumpeterian growth theory

The Schumpelerian model of endogeno~s growlh is generalized with lhe introduction of stochastic resislance. by agenls other Ihan producers. to lhe innovations which drive growth. This causes a queue to be formcd of innovations, alrcady discovered, bUI waiting to be adopled~ A slationary stochastic equilibrium (SSE) is obtained when the queue is stable~ It is shown that in the SSE, such resistance will always reduce lhe average growth iate hut it may increa~e wclfare in certain silualions. In an example, Ihis is when innovatiuns are small anti monopoly power great. The cont1icl hetween this welfare motive for resistance and those of rent-seeking innovalors.may well explain why growth rates differ.

A model of rural conflict : violence and land reform policy in Brazil

In the past ten years the struggle for land in Brazil has taken the shape of invasions of private land by welI organized groups of land less squatters. It is argued in this paper that these invasions and the resulting contlicts are a direct response to the land reform program which has been adopted by the govemment since 1985. which is based on the expropriation of farms and the creation of settlement projects. The set of formal and informal institutions which compromise the land reform program are used as the background for a game-theory model of rural contlicts. T estable implications are derived trom this model with particular emphasis on the etfect of policy variables on violence. These are then tested with panel data at state levei from 1988 to 1995. - It is shown that govemment policy which has the intent of reducing the amount of violence has the opposite etfect of leading to more incentives for contlicts.

Essays on banking theory and history of financial arrangements

Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

Toward a theory of international currency : a step further

We generalize the two-country, two-currency model of Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui to resolve two "shortcomings" in their approach. First, we endogenize prices and excb.ange rates. Second, we introduce monetary policy. We then use the model to address the following new questions: How does the fact that a currency circulates intemationally affect its purcb.asing power? Where does an intemational currency purcb.ase more? What are the effects on seignorage and welfare when a currency becomes intemational? How is policy affected by concems of currency substitution? How are national monetary policies connected, and what is the scope for international cooperation?

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Bias and size effects of price-comparison search engines : theory and experimental evidence

We analyze the impact on consumer prices of the size and bias of price comparison search engines. In the context of a model related to Burdett and Judd (1983) and Varian (1980), we develop and test experimentally several theoretical predictions. The experimental results confirm the model’s predictions regarding the impact of the number of firms, and the type of bias of the search engine, but reject the model’s predictions regarding changes in the size of the index. The explanatory power of an econometric model for the price distributions is significantly improved when variables accounting for risk attitudes are introduced.

Optimal growth in a two-sector model without discounting: a geometric investigation

We characterize optimal policy in a two-sector growth model with xed coeÆcients and with no discounting. The model is a specialization to a single type of machine of a general vintage capital model originally formulated by Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan, and its simplicity is not mirrored in its rich dynamics, and which seem to have been missed in earlier work. Our results are obtained by viewing the model as a specific instance of the general theory of resource allocation as initiated originally by Ramsey and von Neumann and brought to completion by McKenzie. In addition to the more recent literature on chaotic dynamics, we relate our results to the older literature on optimal growth with one state variable: speci cally, to the one-sector setting of Ramsey, Cass and Koopmans, as well as to the two-sector setting of Srinivasan and Uzawa. The analysis is purely geometric, and from a methodological point of view, our work can be seen as an argument, at least in part, for the rehabilitation of geometric methods as an engine of analysis.