Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

Asymptotic efficiency in an instrumental variable model

Esta dissertação se propõe ao estudo de inferência usando estimação por método generalizado dos momentos (GMM) baseado no uso de instrumentos. A motivação para o estudo está no fato de que sob identificação fraca dos parâmetros, a inferência tradicional pode levar a resultados enganosos. Dessa forma, é feita uma revisão dos mais usuais testes para superar tal problema e uma apresentação dos arcabouços propostos por Moreira (2002) e Moreira & Moreira (2013), e Kleibergen (2005). Com isso, o trabalho concilia as estatísticas utilizadas por eles para realizar inferência e reescreve o teste score proposto em Kleibergen (2005) utilizando as estatísticas de Moreira & Moreira (2013), e é obtido usando a teoria assintótica em Newey & McFadden (1984) a estatística do teste score ótimo. Além disso, mostra-se a equivalência entre a abordagem por GMM e a que usa sistema de equações e verossimilhança para abordar o problema de identificação fraca.