As organizações sociais no contexto da reforma do Estado: o caso da associação de Comunicação Educativa Roquete Pinto

Diante da incapacidade do Estado em atender às demandas que lhe são exigidas, o governo federal propôs alterações na máquina pública, através do Plano Diretor da Reforma do Aparelho do Estado, de forma a estabelecer novas formas de gestão e novos modelos para as instituições. O objetivo é possibilitar maior interação entre Estado e Sociedade e ao mesmo tempo atingir níveis maiores de eficiência. Em especial, o projeto das Organizações Sociais (OS) pode representar a primeira tentativa de fomentar uma nova espécie de parceria entre o Estado e a Sociedade. Não obstante, existem defeitos na implementação das OS, pois surgiram na prática por iniciativa do governo e não da sociedade civil; o processo de qualificação mostrou-se extremamente centralizador e a composição do Conselho de Administração fortemente comandada pelo poder público. Portanto, as OS devem ser analisadas como um processo em curso, uma possibilidade de vir ainda a se constituir em alternativa eficiente nas áreas de produção e veiculação de radiofusão educativa e cultural, de saúde, de pesquisa científica, de educação e de cultura. Para que atinja os seus objetivos, não se limitando à maior flexibilidade administrativa conquistada, terão de ser revistas e corrigidas as falhas iniciais e introduzidos mecanismos que possibilitem maior controle social da gestão pública. Esta dissertação está voltada para a experiência piloto das OS: a transformação da extinta Fundação Roquette Pinto em ACERP (Associação de Comunicação Educativa Roquette Pinto), I apontando desafios e dificuldades da mudança organizacional, os objetivos e as metas fixados no contrato de gestão e a busca da concretização da implementação de novos valores de direcionamento ao cliente com qualidade. Há críticas em relação ao processo de mudanças adotado, em especial à ausência de planejamento e à dificuldade de diálogo manifestadas pelos dirigentes da ACERP. A mudança organizacional tem importado valores culturais e buscado, a curtíssimo prazo, a modificação de traços de cultura e de comportamento predominantes na organização, provocando o êxodo dos servidores públicos.

Limited memory and the essentiality of money

This paper investigates the relationship between memory and the essentiality of money. We consider a random matching economy with a large finite population in which commitment is not possible and memory is limited in the sense that only a fraction m E(0; 1) of the population has publicly observable histories. We show that no matter how limited memory is, there exists a social norm that achieves the first best regardless of the population size. In other words, money can fail to be essential irrespective of the amount of memory in the economy. This suggests that the emphasis on limited memory as a fundamental friction for money to be essential deserves a deeper examination.

Re-framing risk transfer to assess integrative partnership opportunities: the S.A.R. approach and the AIG/BID/CNO regional surety bond facility of 2007

Identificar, compartilhar e gerenciar os riscos de contratar são preocupações que impedem o estabelicmento e a administração das Parcerias Públicos Particulares (PPP). Porem, gerentes das entidades públicas, bancos de formento, construtoras e seguradoras pesquisam e utilizam muitas técnicas para enfrentar a avaliação e gerenciamento dos riscos. A transferência de risco é uma indicação dos chamados benefícios que são inspirados pelos PPP, contudo devido às realidades contratuais e conceptuais, a entidade de cede o risco (o partido público) permanece quase sempre como o portador final do risco. Conseqüentemente, o partido público retem um interesse de resistência na gerência total destes riscos cedidos. Esta dissertação explora alguns defeitos das aproximações comuns a conceituar a gestão de risco no contexto de um PPP. Focalizando os conceitos da interdependência e da reciprocidade e usando na decisão para transferir o risco do projeto, esta dissertação molda a decisão para transferir o risco nos termos das realidades interdependentes de relacionamentos sistemáticos, alargam os conceitos técnicos do risco e da avaliação de risco, considerando o uso reflexivo das diferenças na analise de um estudo de caso. O autor explora estes conceitos em uma análise da decisão de um gerente de risco da empresa de construção civil brasileira Construtora Norberto Odebrecht (ODB) para projetar uma facilidade inovadora da ligação de garantia com Inter-American Development Bank (BID) e uma seguradora, American International Group (AIG), um negócio que ganhe o reconhecimento Trade Finance Magazine’s 2007 deal of the year. O autor mostra que por compreender a transferência de risco nos termos abordados nesta dissertação, um atore que transfere o risco pode identificar e criar mais oportunidades de estabelecer relacionamentos em longo prazo, através dos processos que a literatura atual do PPP ainda não considere. Os resultados devem fornecer contribuições para a pesquisas sobre a transferência do risco do projeto, na cooperação entre organizações e na seleção do sócio do projeto do potencial.

EDF and the Brazilian Power Sector

Electricité de France (EDF) is a leading player in the European energy market by being both the first electricity producer in Europe and the world’s leading nuclear plant operator. EDF is also the first electricity producer and supplier in France. However, Europe, EDF’s core market, is currently underperforming: the European sovereign debt crisis is lowering significantly the growth perspective of an energy market that has already reached its maturity. As a consequence, European energy companies are now looking at international markets and especially BRIC economies where economic growth potential remains high. Among them, Brazil is expected to keep its strong economic and electricity demand growth perspectives for the coming decades. Though Brazil has not been considered as a strategic priority for EDF after the Light reversal in 2006, the current economic situation has led the Group to reconsider its position toward the country. EDF’s current presence in Brazil is limited to its stake in UTE Norte Fluminense, a thermal plant, located in the state of Rio de Janeiro. This report investigates the possibility and the feasibility of EDF’s activities expansion in Brazil and what added value it could bring for the Brazilian power market. Considering that the status quo would not allow EDF to take full advantage of Brazil’s future growth, this work is identifying the various options that are currently opened to EDF: market exit, status quo, EDF alone, local partner. For that purpose, this study collects and analyses the latest energy market data as well as generation companies’ information which are necessary to give a relevant overview of the current brazilian power sector and to present EDF strategic options for the country.

Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default: a theoretical framework

We study the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts that would leave them otherwise worse off. We specialize and extend the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) to make it comparable to standard studies of asset pricillg. We completely charactize efficient allocations for several special cases. We illtroduce a competitive equilibrium with complete markets alld with elldogellous solvency constraints. These solvellcy constraints are such as to prevent default -at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show a version of the classical welfare theorems for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, alld compare it with the one for economies without participation constraints : interest rates are lower and risk premia can be bigger depending on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Quantitative examples show that for reasonable parameter values the relevant marginal rates of substitution fali within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Limited attention and investor disagreement: a nowcasting approach

When disagreement in economic models occurs due to different interpretations of public signals, the level of ``marketwide disagreement'' not necessarily decreases upon the arrival of a public signal. We propose an empirical assessment of this phenomenon. By using a measure of attention based on Google Trends, we show that an increase in the attention allocated by the market to a company is associated to a significant increase in disagreement about it.

The corporate financial effects of corporate social responsibility, as executed by, and impacted upon, Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is being implemented in the corporate world at an ever increasing rate, benefitting societies around the world. Several theories have been proposed that contend that the corporations who are implementing CSR programs also benefit financially, making the relationship a symbiotic one. This paper analyzes the financial health of Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh, (PBL) over a period of a decade in order to determine if PBL has indeed benefited financially from implementing its CSR program. The analysis focuses on examining PBL’s internal and external financial indicators over an extended period of time to determine what the net effect, if any, that the CSR program has had on them. This analysis concludes that the evidence does not support the claim of a causal relationship between CSR spending and positive effects upon PBL, as measured by PBL’s financial indicators.

Fragilidades dos mecanismos de controle das organizações sociais de saúde no município do Rio de Janeiro

Nosso problema de pesquisa neste trabalho é a avaliação do funcionamento dos principais mecanismos de controle das organizações sociais de saúde, no caso específico do Município do Rio de Janeiro. As reiteradas denúncias de irregularidades e ilegalidades pelo Tribunal de Contas do Município do Rio de Janeiro e pelo Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro levantaram dúvidas acerca da adequação dos processos de monitoramento, fiscalização e controle dessas entidades. Disto decorre nosso objetivo central de pesquisa, que é identificar as fragilidades do novo modelo de gestão por organizações sociais de saúde, no caso da cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Para isso, foram analisados: o arcabouço jurídico-normativo do modelo local, a partir de análise comparativa da legislação municipal que regulamenta seu funcionamento (Lei 5.026/09) e sua contraparte federal (Lei 9.637/98); indicadores de saúde que mensurassem o desempenho das OSS; todas as inspeções realizadas pelo TCM-RJ até o fim de 2015; e o conjunto de recomendações enviado pelo MP-ERJ para a Prefeitura após deflagração da Operação Ilha Fiscal, que acarretou a desqualificação da OS BIOTECH e a prisão de seus dirigentes, acusados de desviar mais de R$48 milhões em recursos públicos. Ao final, constatouse que as fragilidades da legislação municipal e dos decretos executivos que regulamentam a atuação das OSS no MRJ não permitem o exercício efetivo do comando da parceria, em afronta, portanto, ao dispositivo constitucional que determina que a atuação de entidades privadas no âmbito do SUS pode se dar apenas de modo complementar. Ademais, verificou-se total inadequação da estrutura de controle pela Prefeitura, cuja principal consequência foi tornar o modelo de reforma gerencialista em um modelo que incentiva o comportamento patrimonialista no âmbito da saúde pública, uma vez que o controle de meios é absolutamente negligenciado.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.