Limited memory and the essentiality of money

This paper investigates the relationship between memory and the essentiality of money. We consider a random matching economy with a large finite population in which commitment is not possible and memory is limited in the sense that only a fraction m E(0; 1) of the population has publicly observable histories. We show that no matter how limited memory is, there exists a social norm that achieves the first best regardless of the population size. In other words, money can fail to be essential irrespective of the amount of memory in the economy. This suggests that the emphasis on limited memory as a fundamental friction for money to be essential deserves a deeper examination.

Perícia e investigação criminal: uma proposta de melhoria do modelo organizacional visando a otimização de resultados

O presente estudo trata da discussão de um novo modelo organizacional para a Perícia Criminal no qual seja possível a um só tempo, uma atuação integrada, harmônica e independente em relação à Investigação Policial, de modo a contribuir para alterar o modelo atual em que a Perícia Criminal atua apenas de forma limitada e pontual, para um modelo que permita um paralelismo entre esta e aquela, ressaltando a importância da aplicação da criminalística como ferramenta de excelência na investigação criminal e no combate à impunidade nos procedimentos investigatórios. Inicialmente, são apresentados o tema estudado seus objetivos, delimitação e relevância. Em seguida, é realizado um panorama de trabalhos anteriores relevantes para o tema aqui abordado, incluindo uma sintética exposição dos conceitos basilares da Criminalística e suas interrelações no Sistema de Justiça Criminal de modo a demonstrar o seu potencial no procedimento investigatório. É apresentada então a metodologia de pesquisa utilizada, para, em seguida, discutir-se a análise dos processos de investigação policial e perícia criminal e os resultados da pesquisa exploratória e sua análise, buscando-se identificar os problemas e propor mecanismos de melhoria do modelo organizacional. São apresentados também casos que envolvam áreas diversas do conhecimento pericial, em que se chegou a resultados efetivos graças à aplicação do modelo proposto. Ao final espera-se demonstrar que a implementação de um modelo organizacional em que haja paralelismo, integração e independência dos processos de investigação de campo e perícia técnica possibilitará uma otimização no desenvolvimento e no resultado da investigação criminal, o que contribuirá para uma maior eficiência do sistema de persecução penal e justiça criminal.

Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default: a theoretical framework

We study the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts that would leave them otherwise worse off. We specialize and extend the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) to make it comparable to standard studies of asset pricillg. We completely charactize efficient allocations for several special cases. We illtroduce a competitive equilibrium with complete markets alld with elldogellous solvency constraints. These solvellcy constraints are such as to prevent default -at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show a version of the classical welfare theorems for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, alld compare it with the one for economies without participation constraints : interest rates are lower and risk premia can be bigger depending on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Quantitative examples show that for reasonable parameter values the relevant marginal rates of substitution fali within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.

Limited attention and investor disagreement: a nowcasting approach

When disagreement in economic models occurs due to different interpretations of public signals, the level of ``marketwide disagreement'' not necessarily decreases upon the arrival of a public signal. We propose an empirical assessment of this phenomenon. By using a measure of attention based on Google Trends, we show that an increase in the attention allocated by the market to a company is associated to a significant increase in disagreement about it.

The corporate financial effects of corporate social responsibility, as executed by, and impacted upon, Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is being implemented in the corporate world at an ever increasing rate, benefitting societies around the world. Several theories have been proposed that contend that the corporations who are implementing CSR programs also benefit financially, making the relationship a symbiotic one. This paper analyzes the financial health of Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh, (PBL) over a period of a decade in order to determine if PBL has indeed benefited financially from implementing its CSR program. The analysis focuses on examining PBL’s internal and external financial indicators over an extended period of time to determine what the net effect, if any, that the CSR program has had on them. This analysis concludes that the evidence does not support the claim of a causal relationship between CSR spending and positive effects upon PBL, as measured by PBL’s financial indicators.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.