Two Essays on the economics of Education

We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED a more effective signal.

Public investment in basic education and economic growth

The main objective of this paper was to visualize the relation between government spending on basic education and the human capital accumulation process, observing the impacts of this spending on individual investments in higher education, and on economic growth. It is used an overlapping-generations model where the government tax the adult generation and spent it in basic education of the next generations. It was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of government spending in basic education on growth crucially depends on public budget constrains. The paper explains why some countries with a lot of public investment in basic education growth at low rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of public investment in basic education without investment in higher education it may growth at low rates because the taxation can cause distortions in the agents incentives to invest in higher education.

From dakar to Brasilia: monitoring unesco´s education goals

Active participation of Brazilian civil society, coupled with the 2007 education development plan, launched by the Brazilian government provides an interesting example of the influences of the Dakar Goals. The two domestic initiatives share the same name, spirit and direction proposed in Dakar 2000. We analyse here changes in the Brazilian policies and indicators related to the Dakar Education Goals since its creation, we note: (i) an increase in enrolment over the relevant period; (ii) access to primary education was nearly universal by 2000; (iii) over-aged youth and adult students fell considerably during the period, but access did not expand; (iv) illiteracy has been falling at a rate which, if sustained, will enable us to meet the goal; (v) gender discrimination did not take place in Brazil; (vi) most pupil proficiency indicators have progressively deteriorated from what was already a low standard. In summary, quantity indicators did improve over the period while most quality indicators worsened.

Essays on structural transformation, growth and education

This thesis aims to study the impact of structural change on the trajectory of development of emerging economies. More speci cally, we seek to understand how the reallocation of labor from less productive sectors of the economy (e.g., agriculture) to more productive sectors (e.g., industry and services) contributed to the growth of labor productivity in these economies. The thesis is divided into three chapters, besides the introduction. The rst chapter studies the relationship between structural change and economic development in Latin American economies. While the process of reallocation of labor was important to the dynamics of productivity in the period of convergence of these economies, low productivity in some sectors of the economy explained most of the reduction in productivity in the most recent period. In the second chapter, I study the main determinants of growth of the Chinese economy between 1980 and 2005. I show that the increased ow of trade and strong productivity growth in the agricultural sector contributed signi -cantly to China s development in the period. In the third chapter, I study the apparent contradiction between increased levels of schooling and reduction of per capita income in African economies compared to the U.S. economy. The main conclusion is that reducing educational costs explain the retreat of the education di¤erential between African economies and the United States.

Is 'tagging' a rationale for affirmative action in education?

In this paper, we try to rationalize the existence of one of the most common affirmative action policies: educational quotas. We model a two period economy with asymmetric information and endogenous human capital formation. Individuals may be from two different groups in the population, where each group is defined by an observable and exogenous characteristic. The distribution of skills differ across groups. We introduce educational quotas into the model by letting the planner reduce the effort cost that a student from one of the groups has to endure in order to be accepted into a university. Affirmative action policies can be interpreted as a form of ``tagging" since group characteristics are used as proxies for productivity. We find that although educational quotas are usually efficient, they need not subsidize the education of the low skill group.

Human resource policies in public education: empirical evidences for Brazil

Esta tese traz três exercícios empíricos sobre questões de recursos humanos em escolas públicas brasileiras, aproveitando-se de uma ampla política implantada na rede estadual de São Paulo. Esta política aumenta os salários para os professores que trabalham em escolas urbanas pobres e sua regra de alocação, baseada em um corte arbitrário em um índice socioeconômico, permite a identificação de impactos causais. Em resumo, os três artigos apontam que políticas de subsídios são capazes de, de fato, manter professores nas escolas mais pobres e este efeito, por sua vez, melhora o desempenho acadêmico dos alunos. Além disso, concluímos também que esta política também reduz o absenteísmo dos professores. No entanto, como consequência do desenho dessa política, não há evidências de que o subsídio melhora o perfil dos professores alocados nessas escolas. O primeiro artigo avalia os impactos dessa política sobre a rotatividade dos professores. Concluímos que a compensação salarial reduziu a taxa de rotatividade em 7,2 pontos percentuais, o que significa uma queda de 15% sobre a média pré-tratamento. Em um modelo em forma reduzida, encontramos também evidências de que esta política pode impactar positivamente o desempenho dos alunos. O segundo artigo analisa os impactos sobre a aprendizagem dos alunos, com foco em três possíveis mecanismos: i) a rotatividade; ii) a qualidade dos professores; iii) o aumento do salário. As estimativas mostram que o único canal através do qual esta política compensatória afeta o desempenho dos alunos é a redução da rotatividade dos professores. Ao reduzir taxa de volume de negócios em um desvio-padrão, a política reduziu a proporção de alunos de baixo desempenho em cerca de meio desvio-padrão. O terceiro artigo avalia como a diferenciação salarial criada por esta política afeta absenteísmo dos professores. Os resultados mostram que, após controlar efeitos fixos de professores e escolas, pagar um salário mais elevado (em média 26% a mais) provoca uma queda de 8-22% nas faltas dos professores. Ausências que não levam a desconto de salário, como por licenças médicas, não respondem à diferenciação salarial e o impacto é maior para os professores que recebem maior incentivo.