Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Knowledge effect on firm performance in manufacturing and service firms

This thesis seeks to examine the difference between manufacturing and service firms with respect to the effects of knowledge on performance, and the influence of market turbulence in this relationship. Empirical data, resulting from a survey, was collected from more than 1,206 firms, involving several sectors. Two samples were analyzed, one with 334 manufacturing and other with 509 service firms. The findings indicate no significant difference in the importance of knowledge on performance between these sectors in the absence of market turbulence: knowledge development (KD) has a stronger effect than culture of competitiveness (CC) on firm performance. However, under market turbulence, manufacturers differ from service providers. The positive effect of KD is enhanced, while the positive effect of CC remains the same for manufacturing firms. On the other hand, the positive effect of KD is diminished, while the positive effect of CC is enhanced for service firms. This supports the argument concerning differences in the nature of manufacturing and service industries. From a managerial point of view, results confirm the importance of knowledge, irrespective of firm sector or market turbulence. However, while industrial firms should center efforts on KD, service firms must find a balance where knowledge development (e.g. norms, processes, routines) does not impair their culture of competitiveness (e.g. learning, innovation, action). The thesis contributes to existing literature by proposing that: (1) the positive effect of knowledge on performance is confirmed; (2) under turbulent markets manufacturing and service firms have different responses concerning the influence of knowledge on performance; (3) a multidimensional performance construct based on cost, profitability, and growth is an interesting way to evaluate firm sustained competitive advantage, rather than one-dimensional constructs; (4) the CC x KD interaction, found relevant for supply chains in previous studies, is not supported for firms; (5) differences in unit of analysis, e.g. from supply chains to firms, result in different effects of KD and CC on firm performance; (6) existing scales can be improved with the addition of more diverse indicators, capturing a wider range of concepts (e.g. information transfer measurement); and (7) results from previous studies are supported for Brazilian firms, contributing for theory generalization.

Do bom e do melhor: o consumo de bens de luxo por uma nova classe

A classe média brasileira apresentou um grande crescimento nos últimos anos representando 52% da população do país. Justamente devido a este fenômeno, surgiu o interesse nesta pesquisa que está focada em mulheres residentes no Rio de Janeiro. Podem ser observadas pesquisas recentes na área de marketing acerca dos hábitos de consumo desta classe, principalmente devido ao aumento do seu poder aquisitivo, porém pouco foram exploradas as particularidades dos diversos grupos dentro desta grande massa e de como se comportam em universos antes originários e característico das elites sociais, como o dos bens de luxo. A presente pesquisa tem o objetivo de contribuir para uma exploração mais detalhada acerca desta população. A fim de se observar a produção de conhecimento e o processo de construção de identidade das mulheres pesquisadas, o tema abordado foi o consumo de objetos de luxo. Três categorias se apresentam relevantes: Luxo, Luxo no Dia a Dia e Sonho de Consumo, que trazem informações distintas e complementares para melhor compreensão do grupo analisado. Apesar das teorias tradicionais de luxo apresentarem o status social, a diferenciação e o hedonismo como principais motivos do consumo destes objetos, outros aspectos relevantes foram observados quanto a este tipo de consumo, sendo a família a grande arena onde a maior parte das relações sociais e econômicas acontecem. A pesquisa também mostra o desenvolvimento de um olhar peculiar para a moda por parte do grupo estudado sendo a chave para o entendimento do que é luxo. Os resultados deste estudo mostram a riqueza das práticas e significados de consumo dentro de um mesmo grupo e a importância de um olhar qualitativo para que acadêmicos e gestores da área de marketing possam realmente entender os fenômenos de consumo das sociedades modernas, especialmente sociedades em pleno desenvolvimento social e econômico como o Brasil.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Information asymmetry and transaction costs in a cross-cultural business transaction

The intent of this paper is to provide a practitioners insight into the present and foreseeable future of problem of transaction cost economics related to culture and business etiquette that may increase the of complexity of business communication. We will also explore whether it impacts participant's mindsets regarding opportunistic or passive aggressive behavior. We will study the role of culture, ethics, information asymmetry, and legal systems regarding their importance towards the business contracts and lack of knowledge in local environments. We will make connections to contract theory strategies and objectives and recommend business practices. Furthermore, economic theory explores the role of the impossibility of the perfect contract. Historical and present day operational factors are examined for the determination of forward-looking contract law indications worldwide. This paper is intended provide a practitioners view with a global perspective of a multinational, mid-sized and small corporations giving consideration in a non-partisan and non-nationalistic view, yet examines the individual characteristics of the operational necessities and obligations of any corporation. The study will be general, yet cite specific articles to each argument and give adequate consideration to the intricacies of the global asymmetry of information. This paper defends that corporations of any kind and size should be aware of the risk of international business etiquette and cultural barriers that might jeopardize the savings you could obtain from engaging international suppliers.

Stage level measurement of information and communication technology in organizations

Na moderna Economia do Conhecimento, na Era do Big Data, entender corretamente o uso e a gestão da Tecnologia de Informação e Comunicação (TIC) tendo como base o campo acadêmico de estudos de Sistemas de Informação (SI), torna-se cada vez mais relevante e estratégico para as organizações que pretendem: permanecer em atividade, estar aptas para atender novas demandas (internas e externas) e enfrentar as complexas mudanças na competição de mercado. Esta pesquisa utiliza a teoria dos estágios de crescimento, fundamentada pelos estudos de Richard L. Nolan nos anos 70. A literatura acadêmica relacionada com modelos de estágios de crescimento e o contexto do campo de estudo de SI, fornecem as bases conceituais deste estudo. A pesquisa identifica um modelo com seus construtos relacionados aos estágios de crescimento das iniciativas da TIC/SI organizacional, partindo das variáveis de benchmark de segundo nível de Nolan, e propõe sua operacionalização com a criação e desenvolvimento de uma escala. De caráter exploratório e descritivo, a pesquisa traz contribuição teórica ao paradigma da teoria dos estágios de crescimento, adicionando um novo processo de crescimento em sua estrutura conceitual. Como resultado, é disponibilizado além de um instrumento de escala bilíngue (português e inglês), recomendações e regras para aplicação de um instrumento de pesquisa do tipo survey, na continuidade deste estudo. Como implicação geral desta pesquisa, é esperado que seu uso e aplicação ao mensurar a avaliação do nível de estágio da TIC/SI em organizações, possam auxiliar dois perfis de indivíduos: acadêmicos que estudam essa temática, assim como, profissionais que buscam respostas de suas ações práticas nas organizações onde trabalham.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.