Hedge em carteiras de opções exóticas no Brasil

O objetivo do trabalho é efetuar uma análise empírica de estratégias de hedge no mercado brasileiro de derivativos. Em particular, consideramos uma carteira de opções exóticas com barreira do tipo knock-in e knock-out. Além das tradicionais estratégias de hedge estático e dinâmico, propomos também uma abordagem alternativa definida por uma estratégia híbrida de hedge. Os resultados apontam que todas as estratégias são eficazes do ponto de vista estatístico, porém a abordagem híbrida é a mais eficiente, combinando a precisão da dinâmica com os menores custos da estática.

Some losses brought out by the WTO agreement for TRIPs

The WTO established two rules concerning the international protection of the TRIPs - trade related intellectual property rights, which includes patents and copyrights. One of these rules is the non-discrimination, which has shown to be efficiency-enhancing in the context of trade tariff reductions. The other is the national-treatment commitment rule. We develop in this paper a simple framework to show that the extended version of this rule - which is nowadays being imposed to members - brings out a loss of economic efficiency and a reduction in the levels of protection of intellectual property rights worldwide. As a consequence, it tends to reduce the investments on Research and Development throughout the world. This exactly contradicts the objectives of the Agreement.

A generalization of judds method of out-steady-state comparisons in perfect foresight models

We show that Judd (1982)’s method can be applied to any finite system, contrary to what he claimed in 1987. An example shows how to employ the technic to study monetary models in presence of capital accumulation.

Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.

Social-analytics firms churn out world cup visuals

Three weeks into the world's most famous football tournament, you'd be forgiven for thinking those charts, maps and infographics you've been seeing everywhere were some kind of symptom of your World Cup fever. They are actually the result of a strategy shift by marketing teams in the social-media-measurement space, which have been investing more heavily in designers and content that can show off their products in a visual way.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.