A Defesa Judicial do Estado Brasileiro nas Varas Federais

There is no information whatsoever of a society in which there are no demands among private people and companies, among individuals and institutions, varying only the tenor and the intensity of the issues. It would be ideal if conflicts could be solved in common aggreement. The selfcomposition, yet, does not often occurr; leaving the remaining issues for a third part, i.e., the State. Up to the English and French Revolutions, political power was exercised by limitless governors and the State did not submit to the law. After those revolutions, rules are agregated to curb Absolutism and organize the State, which starts to acccomplish its duties under the law, i.e., a Law State. As a result, today, the individual can sue the State to make the State perform or not any undesirable action. In this dissertation, one traces back from the very beginning the role of the institutions in charge of defending the State in courts of law. The judicial defense of the Brazilian State in a court of law, since 1608 to the 1988 Constitution, was a role of the Public Ministry, along with other institutional functions, including prosecution. As a consequence of this ambivalence, the results of the State defense came even to be contradictory. The promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution adjusted this historical dualism. The 1988 Constituent embodied significant change to the concept and operationalization of a State Advocacy, confering to a new institution , which was called 'Advocacia Geral da União' or 'General Advocacy of the Union' (article 131), the judicial and extrajudicial representation of the Union. The final object of the reflections of this study is centred on the analysis of the activities of the 'General Advocacy of the Union', in its first years of functioning, in other words, from 1993 to 1999

Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veriable and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Participação ou formalismo? O impacto das audiências públicas no Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro

Este trabalho objetiva demonstrar a impossibilidade estrutural de democratização do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) a partir da participação social nas audiências públicas jurisdicionais. Para tanto, o trabalho divide-se em três partes. Na primeira, são abordados dois fenômenos macrossociais, a crise do Estado de bem estar e a globalização econômica, com a finalidade de resgatar as principais interpretações sobre a emergência do Judiciário e identificar os projetos normativos de reforma originados. Dentre eles, destaca-se a perspectiva de Vianna e Burgos (2002), pois seu conteúdo é verificado nos discursos oficiais que interpretam as audiências públicas como instrumentos democratizantes do STF. No segundo capítulo, pretende-se questionar a possibilidade de democratização participativa do STF a partir da teoria política de Poulantzas (2000). Para esta matriz conceitual, o direito, na formação social capitalista, organiza interesses e unifica o consentimento de forma a moldar o corpo social de acordo com as prioridades das classes posicionadas no bloco do poder dominante. Prevê a concessão de direitos e sua retirada conforme os movimentos políticos das classes, que estão em contínua disputa no interior de um Estado de características materiais e permeado por fissuras. Nesse sentido, as audiências públicas, são interpretadas como procedimentos que sofisticam o formalismo tradicional dos tribunais, ocultando o exercício do controle por mecanismos que aparentemente concederiam espaço para participação popular e igualariam as oportunidades de intervenção de agentes de diferentes grupos sociais. Estas características sugerem a impossibilidade de democratização de suas estruturas. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, o estudo de caso das cinco audiências realizadas evidencia a reprodução da disposição litigiosa do processo jurídico nestes eventos, uma vez que os ministros pouco participam, dispõem os participantes em lados opostos como se estivessem exercendo o contraditório e somente utilizam os pronunciamentos das audiências em seus votos para reforçar argumentos de seu interesse. De acordo com as informações sistematizadas, o presente estudo sugere que as audiências públicas não provocam impactos democratizantes nas estruturas do STF. Ao contrário, sofisticam os procedimentos existentes para reproduzir o tradicional papel de controle dos aparelhos judiciais no interior do capitalismo.

Decision rules and information provision : monitoring vs manipulation

We analyze the contractual design problem of a principal who delegates decision-making and information provision. The principal faces two tasks: he has to decide the level of discretion to be granted to the decision-maker and to establish who is in charge of supplying the information. We show that these two choices are intrinsically related. When the decision-maker is granted high discretion, information provision is optimally delegated to the parties directly affected by the decision. Conversely, when the decision-maker enjoys little discretion, it is more desirable to rely on a third impartial agent. The paper helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.