Wage inequality and trade liberalization : evidence from Argentina

Wage inequality has increased substantially in Argentina during the nineties. At the same time during this decade Argentina has gone through a rapid and deep process of trade liberalization. In this paper we try to associate both phenomena. In particular, we attempt to answer the following question: Did trade liberalization play any role in shaping the argentine wage structure during the period studied? Specifically, we test whether those sectors where import penetration deepened are also the sectors where, ceteris paribus, a higher increase in wage inequality has taken place. We fmd evidence that supports this hypothesis.

Endogenous wage compression and aggregation boundaries in a model of hierarchical human capital

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Escolariedade, salários e empregabilidade: implicações no mercado de empregos do Rio de Janeiro

The high degree of flexibility has been pointed as one of the outstanding characteristics of the Brazilian job market. Employability is being a frequent discussion issue among the professionals of the human resources area. The Human Capital Theory and the contemporary discussion concerning Employability argue the relationship of the educational practice and of the production practice in a capitalist economical-social structure as a whole. The education consequences in the individuals' life are reflected in several ways, direct and indirectly. Our objective is to evaluate, with statistics methods, and in that universe of consequences, the explanatory events of the relationships between education-wage and education¿job. The main reason of this work is to evaluate the relationship between education, wage and Employability from a structural model perspective, seeking to compare and to contrast two effective theories: the one from the human capital and other from the Employability. To make this analysis, a database of individuals that are working at the formal work market in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area, had been used. The results showed the education importance on the wage level, as well as, on the Employability factor, whose values and highest taxes correspond to the individuals graduated on the university.

Macroeconomic policy and poverty in Brazil

O Brasil é um país onde os 50% mais pobres se apropriam aproximadamente de 10% da renda agregada, e os 10% mais ricos detêm quase 50% deste mesmo. O colorário desse alto grau de desigualdade é que se uma pessoa está somente preocupada em maximizar o nível de GPD, a função de bem–estar social implícita adotada devota parte do seu peso ao bem-estar de 10% da população. Em outras palavras, a concentração brasileira de renda cria uma anomalia dentro da perspectiva de agente representativo implícito na análise macroeconômica aonde as pessoas valem aquilo que ganham. A análise da pobreza inverte esse peso estrutural da população, estipulando zero de peso para o segmento não pobre da sociedade e atribuindo pesos aos indivíduos que aumentam com suas necessidades insatisfeitas. Esse projeto estuda as conexões entre a evolução macroeconômica Brasileira recente e da pobreza. A análise é dividida em duas partes: A primeira parte descreve a evolução da pobreza brasileira e seus principais determinantes macroeconômicos durante os últimos 15 anos. A segunda parte tira proveito das mudanças da pobreza e desigualdades medidas durante o período 1993-96 para estudar seus principais determinantes macroeconômicos. Dado a maior importância do Plano Real, uma especial atenção foi dada a análise dos impactos da desinflação no nível e na distribuição de renda e a possível sinergia entre essas duas dimensões de determinação da pobreza. A terceira parte do projeto decompõe as mudanças dos diversos índices de pobreza através dos diferentes grupos dado pelas características dos chefes de família (i.e.; sexo, anos de estudo, raça, classe trabalhadora, setores de atividades, região, densidade populacional). Depois essa decomposição é avançada um passo desatrelando as mudanças nessa diferentes células de pobreza em termos de suas respectivas mudanças em termos de desigualdade da renda per capita. Esse perfil de pobreza ajuda a mapear as diferentes fontes de mudança da pobreza na análise histórica e fornece consistência interna para os exercícios de análises contra-factuais.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Financial guarantees in Brazilian life insurance and pension plans

Recently regulated Brazilian life and pension products offer a benefit structure composed of minimum guaranteed annual rate, in°ation adjustment according to a price index and participation on an investment fund performance. We present a valuation model for these products. We establish a fair condition relationship between minimum guarantees and participation rates, and explore its behavior over a space of maturities, interest rates, and also fund and price index volatilities and correlation. Besides consistency to reference models, we found that the effect of the fund volatility is conditioned to the price index volatility level and the correlation between them.