Essays on decision sciences: exploring cognition, information processing, and complexity

This thesis provides three original contributions to the field of Decision Sciences. The first contribution explores the field of heuristics and biases. New variations of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT--a test to measure "the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind"), are provided. The original CRT (S. Frederick [2005] Journal of Economic Perspectives, v. 19:4, pp.24-42) has items in which the response is immediate--and erroneous. It is shown that by merely varying the numerical parameters of the problems, large deviations in response are found. Not only the final results are affected by the proposed variations, but so is processing fluency. It seems that numbers' magnitudes serve as a cue to activate system-2 type reasoning. The second contribution explores Managerial Algorithmics Theory (M. Moldoveanu [2009] Strategic Management Journal, v. 30, pp. 737-763); an ambitious research program that states that managers display cognitive choices with a "preference towards solving problems of low computational complexity". An empirical test of this hypothesis is conducted, with results showing that this premise is not supported. A number of problems are designed with the intent of testing the predictions from managerial algorithmics against the predictions of cognitive psychology. The results demonstrate (once again) that framing effects profoundly affect choice, and (an original insight) that managers are unable to distinguish computational complexity problem classes. The third contribution explores a new approach to a computationally complex problem in marketing: the shelf space allocation problem (M-H Yang [2001] European Journal of Operational Research, v. 131, pp.107--118). A new representation for a genetic algorithm is developed, and computational experiments demonstrate its feasibility as a practical solution method. These studies lie at the interface of psychology and economics (with bounded rationality and the heuristics and biases programme), psychology, strategy, and computational complexity, and heuristics for computationally hard problems in management science.

The macroeconomics of price adjustments under information frictions and menu costs

Esta tese se dedica ao estudo de modelos de fixação de preços e suas implicações macroeconômicas. Nos primeiros dois capítulos analiso modelos em que as decisões das firmas sobre seus preços praticados levam em conta custos de menu e de informação. No Capítulo 1 eu estimo tais modelos empregando estatísticas de variações de preços dos Estados Unidos, e concluo que: os custos de informação são significativamente maiores que os custos de menu; os dados claramente favorecem o modelo em que informações sobre condições agregadas são custosas enquanto que as idiossincráticas têm custo zero. No Capítulo 2 investigo as consequências de choques monetários e anúncios de desinflação usando os modelos previamente estimados. Mostro que o grau de não-neutralidade monetária é maior no modelo em que parte da informação é grátis. O Capítulo 3 é um artigo em conjunto com Carlos Carvalho (PUC-Rio) e Antonella Tutino (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas). No artigo examinamos um modelo de fixação de preços em que firmas estão sujeitas a uma restrição de fluxo de informação do tipo Shannon. Calibramos o modelo e estudamos funções impulso-resposta a choques idiossincráticos e agregados. Mostramos que as firmas vão preferir processar informações agregadas e idiossincráticas conjuntamente ao invés de investigá-las separadamente. Este tipo de processamento gera ajustes de preços mais frequentes, diminuindo a persistência de efeitos reais causados por choques monetários.

The promised LAN: the transformative power of information and communications technology in developing countries

Este tese analise as implicações dos investimentos em tecnologia de informação e comunicação (ICT) em países ainda em desenvolvimento, especialmente em termos de educação, para estimular a implementação de uma infra-estrutura mais moderna em vez da continuação do uso de métodos tradicionais. Hoje, como o interesse e os investimentos em ICT estão crescendo rapidamente, os módulos e as idéias que existem para medir o estado de ICT são velhos e inexatos, e não podem ser aplicados às culturas de países em desenvolvimento. Políticos e investidores têm que considerar estes problemas quando estão pensando em investimentos ou socorros para programas em ICT no futuro, e investigadores e professores precisam entender os fatores importantes no desenvolvimento para os ICTs e a educação antes de começar estudos nestes países. Este tese conclue que investimentos em tecnologias móbeis e sem fios ajudarem organizações e governos ultrapassar a infra-estrutura tradicional, estreitando a divisão digital e dando o resulto de educação melhor, alfabetização maior, e soluções sustentáveis pelo desenvolvimento nas comunidades pobres no mundo de países em desenvolvimento.

Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutional constraints matter?

This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.

Payoff interdependence and information externalities

This paper studies entry under information and payoff externalities. We consider a sequential investment game with uncertain payoffs where each firm is endowed with a private signal about profitability. It is shown that both over- and under-investment characterize the equilibria and that under-investment only occurs when investments are complements. Further we find that a reverse informational externality is present.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

Does mixed frequency vector error correction model add relevant information to exchange misalignment calculus? Evidence for United States

Real exchange rate is an important macroeconomic price in the economy and a ects economic activity, interest rates, domestic prices, trade and investiments ows among other variables. Methodologies have been developed in empirical exchange rate misalignment studies to evaluate whether a real e ective exchange is overvalued or undervalued. There is a vast body of literature on the determinants of long-term real exchange rates and on empirical strategies to implement the equilibrium norms obtained from theoretical models. This study seeks to contribute to this literature by showing that it is possible to calculate the misalignment from a mixed ointegrated vector error correction framework. An empirical exercise using United States' real exchange rate data is performed. The results suggest that the model with mixed frequency data is preferred to the models with same frequency variables

Stage level measurement of information and communication technology in organizations

Na moderna Economia do Conhecimento, na Era do Big Data, entender corretamente o uso e a gestão da Tecnologia de Informação e Comunicação (TIC) tendo como base o campo acadêmico de estudos de Sistemas de Informação (SI), torna-se cada vez mais relevante e estratégico para as organizações que pretendem: permanecer em atividade, estar aptas para atender novas demandas (internas e externas) e enfrentar as complexas mudanças na competição de mercado. Esta pesquisa utiliza a teoria dos estágios de crescimento, fundamentada pelos estudos de Richard L. Nolan nos anos 70. A literatura acadêmica relacionada com modelos de estágios de crescimento e o contexto do campo de estudo de SI, fornecem as bases conceituais deste estudo. A pesquisa identifica um modelo com seus construtos relacionados aos estágios de crescimento das iniciativas da TIC/SI organizacional, partindo das variáveis de benchmark de segundo nível de Nolan, e propõe sua operacionalização com a criação e desenvolvimento de uma escala. De caráter exploratório e descritivo, a pesquisa traz contribuição teórica ao paradigma da teoria dos estágios de crescimento, adicionando um novo processo de crescimento em sua estrutura conceitual. Como resultado, é disponibilizado além de um instrumento de escala bilíngue (português e inglês), recomendações e regras para aplicação de um instrumento de pesquisa do tipo survey, na continuidade deste estudo. Como implicação geral desta pesquisa, é esperado que seu uso e aplicação ao mensurar a avaliação do nível de estágio da TIC/SI em organizações, possam auxiliar dois perfis de indivíduos: acadêmicos que estudam essa temática, assim como, profissionais que buscam respostas de suas ações práticas nas organizações onde trabalham.

Do insiders get abnormal returns? : event studies on the trades of insiders of the firms with differentiated corporate governance of the São Paulo stock exchange

The subject insider trading is controversial. This paper presents series of event studies carried through on the trades with stocks of the firm carried by insiders with the objective to detect abnormal returns, based on the access to privileged information. The sample is composed by trades performed by insiders of the companies with stocks negotiated in the São Paulo Stock Exchange, that are classified as firms with differentiated corporate governance. Indication that trades performed by insiders resulted in abnormal returns compared to the statistically significant expected ones, as in the purchases of common shares; or for selling of preferred stocks.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.