O fluxo de caixa pelo método indireto como um instrumento gerencial para a avaliação qualitativa da capacidade de geração de caixa

O estudo em questão tem por objetivo atestar a eficácia do modelo do Fluxo de Caixa pelo Método Indireto em comparação ao Fluxo de Caixa Direto e à Demonstração de Origens e aplicações de Recursos, como sendo o instrumento mais recomendado para avaliar e mensurar a capacidade de geração de caixa em relação a um determinado período de tempo. O fundamento teórico foi baseado nos seguintes autores: Matarazzo (1998), Brigham e Houston (1999), Vinagre Brasil e Guimarães Brasil (1992); Sanvicente (1993), Assaf Neto (1991), Falcini (1992), Ross, Westerfild e Jaffe (1995), Hoji (2001), Brigham, Gapenski e Ehrhardt (2001), Campos (1999) e Gitman (2001). Para validar a questão central, foi elaborada uma análise dos dados relativos aos demonstrativos da Petrobrás SI A referentes aos anos de 2001 e 2000, comparando-se os resultados observados no Fluxo de Caixa Indireto com os da Demonstração de Origens e Aplicações de Recursos. A pesquisa conclui que o fluxo de caixa pelo método indireto é um instrumento útil para se avaliar qualitativamente a capacidade de geração de caixa, porém limitado às organizações de maior porte, em função da necessidade de um sistema integrado de planejamento e análise de informações gerenciais, que nem sempre é observado no universo das empresas de menor dimensão.

O novo federalismo social e o Rio: desenho de programas complementares de transferência de renda condicionada

Brazilian public policy entered in the so-called new social federalism through its conditional cash transfers. States and municipalities can operate together through the nationwide platform of the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP), complementing federal actions with local innovations. The state and the city of Rio de Janeiro have created programs named, respectively, Renda Melhor (RM) and Família Carioca (FC). These programs make use of the operational structure of the BFP, which facilitates locating beneficiaries, issuing cards, synchronizing payment dates and access passwords and introducing new conditionalities. The payment system of the two programs complements the estimated permanent household income up to the poverty line established, giving more to those who have less. Similar income complementation system was subsequently adopted in the BFP and the Chilean Ingreso Ético Familiar, which also follow the principle of estimation of income used in the FC and in the RM. Instead of using the declared income, the value of the Rio cash transfers are set using the extensive collection of information obtained from the Single Registry of Social Programs (Cadastro Único): physical configuration of housing, access to public services, education and work conditions for all family members, presence of vulnerable groups, disabilities, pregnant or lactating women, children and benefits from other official transfers such as the BFP. With this multitude of assets and limitations, the permanent income of each individual is estimated. The basic benefit is defined by the poverty gap and priority is given to the poorest. These subnational programs use international benchmarks as a neutral ground between different government levels and mandates. Their poverty line is the highest of the first millennium goal of the United Nations (UN): US$ 2 per person per day adjusted for the cost of living. The other poverty line of the UN, US$ 1.25, was implicitly adopted as the national extreme poverty line in 2011. The exchange of methodologies between federal entities has happened both ways. The FC began with the 575,000 individuals living in the city of Rio de Janeiro who were on the payroll of the BFP. Its system of impact evaluation benefited from bi-monthly standardized examinations. In the educational conditionalities, the two programs reward students' progress, a potential advantage for those who most need to advance. The municipal program requires greater school attendance than that of the BFP and the presence of students’ parents at the bimonthly meetings held on Saturdays. Students must achieve a grade of 8 or improve at least 20% in each exam to receive a bi-monthly premium of R$50. In early childhood, priority is given to the poor children in the program Single Administrative Register (CadÚnico) to enroll in kindergarten, preschools and complementary activities. The state program reaches more than one million people with a payment system similar to the municipal one. Moreover, it innovates in that it transfers awards given to high school students to savings accounts. The prize increases and is paid to the student, who can withdraw up to 30% annually. The total can reach R$3,800 per low-income student. The State and the city rewarded already education professionals according to student performance, now completing the chain of demand incentives on poor students and their parents. Increased performance is higher among beneficiaries and the presence of their guardians at meetings is twice compared to non beneficiaries; The Houston program, also focuses on aligning the incentives to teachers, parents and students. In general, the plan is to explore strategic complementarities, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The objective is to stimulate, through targets and incentives, synergies between social actors (teachers, parents, students), between areas (education, assistance, work) and different levels of government. The cited programs sum their efforts and divide labor so as to multiply interactions and make a difference in the lives of the poor.