A restatement of the welafare costs of inflation. The wast of scarce resources in the manufacturing , banking and household sectors

Lucas (2000) estimates that the US welfare costs of inflation are around 1% of GDP. This measurement is consistent with a speci…c distorting channel in terms of the Bailey triangle under the demand for monetary base schedule (outside money): the displacement of resources from the production of consumption goods to the household transaction time à la Baumol. Here, we consider also several new types of distortions in the manufacturing and banking industries. Our new evidences show that both banks and firms demand special occupational employments to avoid the inflation tax. We de…ne the concept of ”the foat labor”: The occupational employments that are aflected by the in‡ation rates. More administrative workers are hired relatively to the bluecollar workers for producing consumption goods. This new phenomenon makes the manufacturing industry more roundabout. To take into account this new stylized fact and others, we redo at same time both ”The model 5: A Banking Sector -2” formulated by Lucas (1993) and ”The Competitive Banking System” proposed by Yoshino (1993). This modelling allows us to characterize better the new types of misallocations. We …nd that the maximum value of the resources wasted by the US economy happened in the years 1980-81, after the 2nd oil shock. In these years, we estimate the excess resources that are allocated for every speci…c distorting channel: i) The US commercial banks spent additional resources of around 2% of GDP; ii) For the purpose of the firm foating time were used between 2.4% and 4.1% of GDP); and iii) For the household transaction time were allocated between 3.1% and 4.5 % of GDP. The Bailey triangle under the demand for the monetary base schedule represented around 1% of GDP, which is consistent with Lucas (2000). We estimate that the US total welfare costs of in‡ation were around 10% of GDP in terms of the consumption goods foregone. The big di¤erence between our results and Lucas (2000) are mainly due to the Harberger triangle in the market for loans (inside money) which makes part of the household transaction time, of the …rm ‡oat labor and of the distortion in the banking industry. This triangle arises due to the widening interest rates spread in the presence of a distorting inflation tax and under a fractionally reserve system. The Harberger triangle can represent 80% of the total welfare costs of inflation while the remaining percentage is split almost equally between the Bailey triangle and the resources used for the bank services. Finally, we formulate several theorems in terms of the optimal nonneutral monetary policy so as to compare with the classical monetary theory.

Household borrowing constraints and monetary policy in emerging economies

Credit markets in emerging economies can be distinguished from those in advanced economies in many respects, including the collateral required for households to borrow. This work proposes a DSGE framework to analyze one peculiarity that characterizes the credit markets of some emerging markets: payroll-deducted personal loans. We add the possibility for households to contract long-term debt and compare two different types of credit constraints with one another, one based on housing and the other based on future income. We estimate the model for Brazil using a Bayesian technique. The model is able to solve a puzzle of the Brazilian economy: responses to monetary shocks at first appear to be strong but dissipate quickly. This occurs because income – and the amount available for loans – responds more rapidly to monetary shocks than housing prices. To smooth consumption, agents (borrowers) compensate for lower income and for borrowing by working more hours to repay loans and erase debt in a shorter time. Therefore, in addition to the income and substitution effects, workers consider the effects on their credit constraints when deciding how much labor to supply, which becomes an additional channel through which financial frictions affect the economy.

The polictical economy informed lobbies

We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

Consumption smoothing in Latin America: an empirical assessment of present value models

The study aims to assess the empirical adherence of the permanent income theory and the consumption smoothing view in Latin America. Two present value models are considered, one describing household behavior and the other open economy macroeconomics. Following the methodology developed in Campbell and Schiller (1987), Bivariate Vector Autoregressions are estimated for the saving ratio and the real growth rate of income concerning the household behavior model and for the current account and the change in national cash ‡ow regarding the open economy model. The countries in the sample are considered separately in the estimation process (individual system estimation) as well as jointly (joint system estimation). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SURE) estimates of the coe¢cients are generated. Wald Tests are then conducted to verify if the VAR coe¢cient estimates are in conformity with those predicted by the theory. While the empirical results are sensitive to the estimation method and discount factors used, there is only weak evidence in favor of the permanent income theory and consumption smoothing view in the group of countries analyzed.

Social welfare analysis in a simple financial economy with risk regulation

In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy : macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

An intra-household approach to the welfare costs of inflation

The literature on the welfare costs of in‡ation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a single-unity or for a multi-unity transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of in‡ation. Second, we derive su¢cient conditions that make the welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) robust under this alternative setting. Third, we compare our general-equilibrium measure with Bailey’s (1956) partial-equilibrium one.

The political economy of exchange rate in Brazil

This paper reviews part of the political economy literature on exchange rate policy relevant to understanding the political motivations behind the Brazilian exchange rate policy. We shall first examine the distributive role of the exchange rate, and the way it unfolds in terms of the desired political goals. We will follow by analyzing exchange policy as indicative of government effciency prior to elections. Finally, we discuss fiscal policy from the point of view of political economy, in which the exchange rate results from the macroeconomic equilibrium. Over this review, the Brazilian exchange rate policy is discussed in light of the theories presented.

An intra-household approach to the welfare costs of inflation (Revised Version, Forthcoming 2006, Estudos Econômicos)

The literature on the welfare costs of ináation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a one-person or for a many-person transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of ináation. Second, more importantly, we derive su¢ cient conditions under which welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) are robust (invariant) under the number of persons considered in the household. Third, we show that Baileyís (1956) partial-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of ináation can be obtained as a Örst-order approximation of the general-equilibrium welfare measure derived in this paper using a many-person transacting technology.

Service industries and service economy

The study analyses the role of services in modern and less-developed economies. It shows the different meanings of the value, definition and classification of service activities found in economic literature. It discusses the relation between service production growth and economic development observing the role of these activities in the dynamics of economic restructuring. Further, it also examines the differences between private and public sector service restructuring and the consequences of internationalization of services. It concludes that economic restructuring also caused by changes in the nature of goods and services has important regional effects.

The political economy of global economic disgovernance

A Desgovernança Econômica Global, Mais do que a Governança Caracteriza Hoje a Economia Mundial. Dois Fatos Substanciam Essa Afirmativa: a Crise Recorrente do Balanço de Pagamentos nos Países em Desenvolvimento, e o Enorme Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos. as Crises nos Mercados Emergentes são Essencialmente Resultantes da Estratégia que o Norte Propõe para o Sul: a Estratégia de Crescimento com Poupança Externa. Dado o Fato de que a Entrada de Capital Aumenta a Taxa de Cambio, e que os Paises não Reconheceram as Principais Oportunidades de Investimento nos Anos 1990, Tal Estratégia Levou não ao Aumento das Taxas de Acumulação de Capital e ao Crescimento, Mas ao Aumento do Déficit em Conta Corrente e À Crise do Balanço de Pagamento (Financeiro). por Outro Lado, o Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos é um Problema Sério. Aquele Já é um País Devedor, Mas os Ajustes Continuam a ser Adiados. a Probabilidade de um Soft Landing (Desfecho Satisfatório) é Pequena. as Duas Fontes de Instabilidade Estão Relacionadas Aos Déficits em Conta Corrente e À Moeda Sobrevalorizada. a Política Econômica por Trás tem um Nome: Taxa de Câmbio Populista, uma das Duas Formas de Populismo Econômico (A Outra é o Populismo Fiscal). Isto não é Surpreendente em Países em Desenvolvimento, Mas Pode ser em um País Desenvolvido, como os Estados Unidos. Ainda Assim não é Surpreendente Quando se Considera a Recessão Política e Social que a Sociedade Americana Está Vivendo Desde o Fim da Segunda Guerra