Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Fatores relevantes na construção de processos government-to-government no Banco Central do Brasil

This dissertation seeks to recognize the factors, which are relevant to the construction of the processes Government-to-Government (G2G), and how these factors influence the success of those processes. For this research, two existing cases in Banco Central do Brasil (Bacen) were used: i) the Banco Central do Brasil (BACEN) X Senado Federal case; and the Bacen x Poder Judiciário case. The framework of this dissertation is based on the methodology of multiple study cases described by Robert Yin (2001). This work analyzed separately each of the cases and compared the results obtained in each analysis. In this way, this research aimed at analyzing the reasons that led these cases to gain such distinct outcomes, despite the existing potential benefits in each one of them. The obtained results suggest that three factors influence the success of G2G processes in a relevant way: computational safety; the culture of the organizations involved; and the capacitation of people involved. Each of these factors, according to what results showed, bring a set of considerations which should be observed by the public administrator in relation to the strategies of implementation of G2G processes.

A TV digital brasileira a serviço do processo judicial eletrônico: o ambiente da interatividade da TV digital brasileira como proposta para um modelo na gravação de audiência das varas federais criminais

Este trabalho descreve algumas das soluções atualmente adotadas pelos tribunais federais para a gravação de audiência, bem como indica a oportunidade que o ambiente de interatividade da TV Digital Brasileira oferece para uma proposta de modelo de documento eletrônico de escritório que sirva de suporte para o resultado da gravação de audiência (texto, som e imagem), bem como possa contribuir para a mudança de paradigma dos atuais sistemas processuais (softwares). O objetivo é estabelecer um padrão fundamentado em uma política pública (Governo Eletrônico Brasileiro e Sistema Brasileiro de TV Digital Terrestre), onde não existam restrições comerciais quanto ao uso das novas tecnologias de comunicação e informação no que se refere ao mínimo para se privilegiar a inclusão social sem perda de eficiência. O trabalho é formado por dois tipos de conteúdo: parte textual e parte digital. A parte textual contém o resultado de uma pesquisa realizada junto aos tribunais federais, bem como apresenta os principais pontos do Governo Eletrônico Brasileiro e do Sistema Brasileiro de TV Digital Terrestre. Ainda descreve a estrutura montada na elaboração e realização da parte digital. Por sua vez, a parte digital reúne o material utilizado para a apresentação de protótipos (vídeos e exemplos de aplicações), para demonstrar as possibilidades de interatividade da TV Digital Brasileira e dos benefícios que os jurisdicionados e os operadores do Direito alcançariam com a proposta. Palavras-

Low expectations, low demand : when should the government intervene?

Este trabalho estuda o impacto de diferentes políticas que procuram mitigar falhas de coordenação em um ambiente macroeconômico. Abordamos questões relativas ao timing dos estímulos econômicos. Quando o governo deveria começar a incentivar a economia? Deveria gastar mais para prevenir crises ou para tirar a economia da recessão quando os fundamentos estão melhorando? Como o estímulo deve alterar a complementaridade estratégica? Para responder a estas perguntas, construímos um modelo macroeconômico dinâmico com concorrência monopolística e decisões de investimento sequenciais. Aplicando resultados da literatura teórica de jogos dinâmicos com fricções, selecionamos um único equilíbrio neste modelo, nos dando um instrumental tratável para a análise de políticas. Nossos resultados sugerem que o governo não deveria viesar incentivos nem para a prevenção de crises nem para resgatar a economia quando esta já está em crise.

Understanding e-government technology transfer: evidence from the transfer of a patent management system from EPO to INPI

Drawing upon Brazilian experience, this research explores some of the key issues to be addressed in using e-government technical cooperation designed to enhance service provision of Patent Offices in developing countries. While the development of software applications is often seen merely as a technical engineering exercise, localization and adaptation are context bounded matters that are characterized by many entanglements of human and non-humans. In this work, technical, legal and policy implications of technical cooperation are also discussed in a complex and dynamic implementation environment characterized by the influence of powerful hidden agendas associated with the arena of intellectual property (IP), which are shaped by recent technological, economic and social developments in our current knowledge-based economy. This research employs two different theoretical lenses to examine the same case, which consists of transfer of a Patent Management System (PMS) from the European Patent Office (EPO) to the Brazilian Patent Office that is locally named ‘Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial’ (INPI). Fundamentally, we have opted for a multi-paper thesis comprising an introduction, three scientific articles and a concluding chapter that discusses and compares the insights obtained from each article. The first article is dedicated to present an extensive literature review on e-government and technology transfer. This review allowed the proposition on an integrative meta-model of e-government technology transfer, which is named E-government Transfer Model (ETM). Subsequently, in the second article, we present Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as a framework for understanding the processes of transferring e-government technologies from Patent Offices in developed countries to Patent Offices in developing countries. Overall, ANT is seen as having a potentially wide area of application and being a promising theoretical vehicle in IS research to carry out a social analysis of messy and heterogeneous processes that drive technical change. Drawing particularly on the works of Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law, this work applies this theory to a longitudinal study of the management information systems supporting the Brazilian Patent Office restructuration plan that involved the implementation of a European Patent Management System in Brazil. Based upon the ANT elements, we follow the actors to identify and understand patterns of group formation associated with the technical cooperation between the Brazilian Patent Office (INPI) and the European Patent Office (EPO). Therefore, this research explores the intricate relationships and interactions between human and non-human actors in their attempts to construct various network alliances, thereby demonstrating that technologies embodies compromise. Finally, the third article applies ETM model as a heuristic frame to examine the same case previously studied from an ANT perspective. We have found evidence that ETM has strong heuristic qualities that can guide practitioners who are engaged in the transfer of e-government systems from developed to developing countries. The successful implementation of e-government projects in developing countries is important to stimulate economic growth and, as a result, we need to understand the processes through which such projects are being implemented and succeed. Here, we attempt to improve understanding on the development and stabilization of a complex social-technical system in the arena of intellectual property. Our preliminary findings suggest that e-government technology transfer is an inherently political process and that successful outcomes require continuous incremental actions and improvisations to address the ongoing issues as they emerge.

Share bidding auctions, sliding scale royalty rates and the new brazilian regulatory framework for the pre-salt areas

O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.