A qualidade do atendimento e os serviços prestados: um estudo sobre a relação de satisfação dos alunos do Curso de administração pública na Escola Superior de Ciências Sociais Unidade da Universidade do Estado do Amazonas - UEA

The theme of this dissertation is the quality in assistance and services rendered: a study on the satisfaction of the students from the Social Studies school. In a school, leader are supposed to always believe that the best form of attaining success derives from their performance in decentralizing activities, do away with barriers and help in the front line. This is the participative management. Students satisfaction is the goal. When the whole school community feels emotionally involved, success is assured, since all the educational segments are supposed to get together for achieving school success. When investment is made in the continued education of the school staff, such as the establishing a teaching of quality is sedimented. To have a school of quality in assistance and services rendered and, thereafter, to obtain favorable results, it is necessary for everyone to be aware of their roles, which is only possible through a cooperative effort on the part of the people forming the institution, with a commitment of the whole team: teaching, technical and administrative staff, as well as its external and internal clients, with values of excellence and relevance, which ought to be present in the whole of the educational effort. The four fundamental dimensions for a program of quality are: Planning to change; organizing to act; Acting to transform; Assessing to improve. In planning the institution establishes its objectives. In organizing it defines the structure for a more flexible action. In acting what has been established is implemented. In assessing it constantly improves the program of quality. To look for the students quality and satisfaction is the virtue of persistence is the doing right from the word go. To have a zeal and care in everything one does e for whom it is intended to, since to achieve the maximum in result with the least effort, reaching goal, objectives and finalities are everything the target population wishes.

Inflation persistence and flexible prices

The inability of rational expectation models with money supply rules to deliver inflation persistence following a transitory deviation of money growth from trend is due to the rapid adjustment of the price level to expected events. The observation of persistent inflation in macroeconomic data leads many economists to believe that prices adjust sluggishly and/or expectations must not be rational. Inflation persistence in U.S. data can be characterized by a vector autocorrelation function relating inflation and deviations of output from trend. In the vector autocorrelation function both inflation and output are highly persistent and there are significant positive dynamic cross-correlations relating inflation and output. This paper shows that a flexible-price general equilibrium business cycle model with money and a central bank using a Taylor rule can account for these patterns. There are no sticky prices and no liquidity effects. Agents decisions in a period are taken only after all shocks are observed. The monetary policy rule transforms output persistence into inflation persistence and creates positive cross-correlations between inflation and output.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.