Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

A new perspective on the PPP hypothesis

This paper the stastistical properties of the real exchange rates of G-5 countries for the Bretton-Woods peiod, and draw implications on the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis. In contrast to most previous studies that consider only unit root and stationary process to describe the real exchange tae, this paper also considers two in-between processes, the locally persistent process ans the fractionally integrated process, to complement past studies. Seeking to be consistent with tha ample evidence of near unit in the real exchange rate movements very well. This finding implies that: 1) the real exchange movement is more persistent than the stationary case but less persistent than the unit root case; 2) the real exchange rate is non-stationary but the PPP reversion occurs and the PPP holds in the long run; 3) the real exchange rate does not exhibit the secular dependence of the fractional integration; 4) the real exchange rate evolves over time in a way that there is persistence over a range of time, but the effect of shocks will eventually disappear over time horizon longer than order O (nd), that is, at finite time horizon; 5) shocks dissipation is fasters than predicted by the fractional integracion, and the total sum of the effects of a unit innovation is finite, implying that a full PPP reversion occurs at finite horizons. These results may explain why pasrt empirical estudies could not provide a clear- conclusion on the real exchange rate processes and the PPP hypothesis.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

Conditional alphas and realized betas

This paper proposes a two-step procedure to back out the conditional alpha of a given stock using high-frequency data. We rst estimate the realized factor loadings of the stocks, and then retrieve their conditional alphas by estimating the conditional expectation of their risk-adjusted returns. We start with the underlying continuous-time stochastic process that governs the dynamics of every stock price and then derive the conditions under which we may consistently estimate the daily factor loadings and the resulting conditional alphas. We also contribute empiri-cally to the conditional CAPM literature by examining the main drivers of the conditional alphas of the S&P 100 index constituents from January 2001 to December 2008. In addition, to con rm whether these conditional alphas indeed relate to pricing errors, we assess the performance of both cross-sectional and time-series momentum strategies based on the conditional alpha estimates. The ndings are very promising in that these strategies not only seem to perform pretty well both in absolute and relative terms, but also exhibit virtually no systematic exposure to the usual risk factors (namely, market, size, value and momentum portfolios).

Phase transition of demand explained by the heterogeneity of consumers' intrinsic preferences

In 1991 Gary S. Becker presented A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In uences on Price explaining why many successful restaurants, plays, sporting events, and other activities do not raise their prices even with persistent excess demand. The main reason for this is due to the discontinuity of stable demands, which is explained in Becker's (1991) analysis. In the present paper we construct a discrete time stochastic model of socially interacting consumers deciding for one of two establishments. With this model we show that the discontinuity of stable demands, proposed by Gary S. Becker, depends crucially on an additional factor: the dispersion of the consumers' intrinsic preferences for the establishments.