Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Migração de universitários no sul de Minas: brain-drain ou indústria de educação?

O Sul de Minas Gerais, região agrícola de colonização antiga, apresentando uma vocação histórica para produzir instrução e criar escolas, parece ter encontrado na expansão do seu ensino superior uma forma de superar a estagnação de sua economia, enquanto não era beneficiada pela ação governamental. De fato, a presença de escolas superiores na região cria todo um sistema social e econômico que se desenvolve a partir da vida escolar. O Sistema de ensino, em vista do seu dinamismo, tornou-se responsável por um fluxo de atração de estudantes e exportação de graduados, com características de uma indústria que produz e exporta educação. Na verdade, o sistema de ensino superior do Sul de Minas, na medida em que atrai alunos e recursos para sua manutenção e operação de suas escolas e exporta graduados, constitui-se numa atividade produtiva que gera renda, empregos e outros benefícios sócio-econômicos para a região. Paralelamente, o sistema de ensino caracteriza-se, como importante instrumento de "brain-drain", figurando, portanto, como fator de descapitalização regional.

Transformation of brain drain of brain gain: incentives to attract talented workforce

The key for the future of any country, firm or group lies in the talent, skills, experience, knowledge and capabilities of its people. Migration of human capital resource on an international level depicts the impact on the developing country having its highly educated individuals migrating to developed countries known as “Brain Drain.” Therefore, evaluation of short-term and long-term talent needs and impacts on any country is critical. This paper aims to complement the existing theoretical brain drain and brain gain literature, focusing on the interaction between investment in education, training, healthcare and government to attract highly talented individuals to a developing a country. The migration study is inclusive of the analysis of the highly talented resources that have committed to or are planning to resettle in their developing native countries after investing in themselves through education. The motivational factors of these highly talented individuals are evaluated to determine key needs and drives attracting these individuals back to China from a developed country (aka. reserve migration).