Estratégia em produtos culturais: estudo de caso de empresa ex-estatal do setor de telecomunicações

In the 1990, and after the process of privatizations of governmental companies in Brazil, cultural products had gained strategical importance for different types of organizations, specially for nationalized companies of the telecommunications sector. Based on the concept of market orientation, and specifically on the concept of cultural marketing, it is possible to understand the approximation between companies and cultural products restrictedly in the level of products and services. However, there has been little questioning about the concept of market orientation and the marginalization of plural and critical approaches which leaves gaps in the understanding of this approximation. Based in other areas of knowledge which understand this approximation between companies and cultural products and based in studies that present critics about the market forces it is possible to recognize the strategical corporative level of cultural products. Based in specific approaches in strategy, and defending pluralism and interdisciplinary research, it is possible to fill this gaps in the marketing literature. Specifically, in this study, are presented approaches that recognize the dimensions of power, politics and symbolism that influence strategies and are responsible for the approximation between these strategies and cultural products. Especially in Brazil, these debates are central, since in a context composed by nationalized companies many ambiguities are common. With this objective, a case study about a telecommunications sector company that has importance in the investment in cultural products is presented. From this case study, based on primary and secondary data, it is possible to comprehend the strategy in cultural products.

A Defesa Judicial do Estado Brasileiro nas Varas Federais

There is no information whatsoever of a society in which there are no demands among private people and companies, among individuals and institutions, varying only the tenor and the intensity of the issues. It would be ideal if conflicts could be solved in common aggreement. The selfcomposition, yet, does not often occurr; leaving the remaining issues for a third part, i.e., the State. Up to the English and French Revolutions, political power was exercised by limitless governors and the State did not submit to the law. After those revolutions, rules are agregated to curb Absolutism and organize the State, which starts to acccomplish its duties under the law, i.e., a Law State. As a result, today, the individual can sue the State to make the State perform or not any undesirable action. In this dissertation, one traces back from the very beginning the role of the institutions in charge of defending the State in courts of law. The judicial defense of the Brazilian State in a court of law, since 1608 to the 1988 Constitution, was a role of the Public Ministry, along with other institutional functions, including prosecution. As a consequence of this ambivalence, the results of the State defense came even to be contradictory. The promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution adjusted this historical dualism. The 1988 Constituent embodied significant change to the concept and operationalization of a State Advocacy, confering to a new institution , which was called 'Advocacia Geral da União' or 'General Advocacy of the Union' (article 131), the judicial and extrajudicial representation of the Union. The final object of the reflections of this study is centred on the analysis of the activities of the 'General Advocacy of the Union', in its first years of functioning, in other words, from 1993 to 1999

Abordagem cross-cultural para comitês organizadores de jogos: caso dos XV Jogos Pan-americanos Rio 2007

O escopo teórico de Gestão Internacional atualmente atinge tantos locais quanto pessoas ao redor do planeta e pode se expandir para atender também a um conjunto mais amplo de empresas que somente as multinacionais. Com o objetivo de analisar os desafios cross-culturais e os conflitos que permearam o Comitê Organizador dos XV Jogos Pan-americanos Rio 2007, este estudo equipara Comitês Organizadores de Jogos a subsidiárias com mandato global. A partir de uma metodologia de inspiração interpretativista cultural defendendo o papel do contexto local por uma abordagem crítica, analisa o sistema de ação cultural brasileiro e contrapõe teorias clássicas da abordagem cross-cultural com uma visão qualitativa de base sócio-antropológica. Foram realizadas entrevistas semiestruturadas com ex-funcionários do Comitê Rio 2007 tanto brasileiros quanto estrangeiros e consultores que apoiaram a realização dos Jogos. Várias questões foram levantadas que apóiam a influência de características comportamentais culturais brasileiras como o paternalismo, a lealdade às pessoas, a flexibilidade, e evitar conflitos nas relações pessoais e organizacionais. Ao mesmo tempo, foi possível identificar três possíveis causas de conflitos entre os atores principais das narrativas (os consultores, o Comitê Organizador Rio2007 e o governo): (1) a diferença no nível de experiência /conhecimento explícito e tácito, (2) a desconfiança, e (3) o orgulho; e o esforço de comunicação foi identificado como possível solução. Por fim, foi possível visualizar traços das teorias clássicas cross-culturais dentro do estudo, mas foi reforçada a crítica de que é impossível isolar a cultura e o contexto local como variáveis contingenciais, muito menos ignorá-los.

O controle externo sobre as agências reguladoras de Estado : limites e (im)possibilidades

Com a criação das primeiras entidades reguladoras de infraestrutura, década de 90, surgiu uma nova maneira estratégica de o Estado atuar com intuito de melhorar a governança pública. O Estado brasileiro, que era responsável direto pelo desenvolvimento econômico e social, buscou se redefinir frente ao modelo de entidades reguladoras que emergia. Em decorrência dessa nova fisionomia estatal, a descentralização funcional ganhou ênfase resultando no aparecimento de estruturas mais flexíveis e autônomas sob a natureza de direito público com a finalidade de atuar em setores típicos de Estado. Assim, foram criadas as primeiras agências reguladoras brasileiras com objetivo de normatizar, incentivar e regular setores essenciais à sociedade. Por consequência de tais inovações, diversas áreas administrativas tiveram de serem adaptadas, sobretudo as relacionadas à atividade de controle no âmbito administrativo. Para tanto, tornou-se necessário conciliar, dentro de um escopo sistematizado, mecanismos capazes de atender as demandas oriundas do recente Estado regulador brasileiro. Com efeito, a função controle adquire relevo no sentido de evitar que tais agências reguladoras apartem-se de limites impostos por lei ou de que divirjam de suas missões institucionais. Assim, o presente trabalho investiga a atuação do controle externo exercido pelo Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) no desempenho das agências reguladoras de Estado. Diante de o assunto permear várias áreas epistemológicas, entende-se que abordá-lo sob o enfoque interdisciplinar pode estender em contribuições sobre o objeto investigado. Nesse contexto, esta dissertação visa incorporar, também, outras áreas de conhecimento. Longe de defender um isomorfismo para o arranjo regulatório brasileiro ou de promover uma saída paradigmática, esta pesquisa busca, com amparo na metodologia qualitativa e sob os enfoques exploratórios e descritivos, reunir conhecimentos e constatações no sentido de propiciar maior aproximação acerca do assunto e concorrer para o delineamento de diretrizes futuras do controle externo sobre a regulação brasileira. Destaca-se que tanto a regulação como o controle sobre o ambiente regulatório são assuntos que se encontram em desenvolvimento no contexto brasileiro, o que enseja a pertinência desta pesquisa. Em face do exposto, esta dissertação visa investigar o estado atual do controle exercido pelo TCU sobre o desempenho nas agências reguladoras de Estado – infraestrutura - com intuito de analisar e promover um debate sobre limites e (im)possibilidades dessa atuação.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.