From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).

A qualidade do atendimento e os serviços prestados: um estudo sobre a relação de satisfação dos alunos do Curso de administração pública na Escola Superior de Ciências Sociais Unidade da Universidade do Estado do Amazonas - UEA

The theme of this dissertation is the quality in assistance and services rendered: a study on the satisfaction of the students from the Social Studies school. In a school, leader are supposed to always believe that the best form of attaining success derives from their performance in decentralizing activities, do away with barriers and help in the front line. This is the participative management. Students satisfaction is the goal. When the whole school community feels emotionally involved, success is assured, since all the educational segments are supposed to get together for achieving school success. When investment is made in the continued education of the school staff, such as the establishing a teaching of quality is sedimented. To have a school of quality in assistance and services rendered and, thereafter, to obtain favorable results, it is necessary for everyone to be aware of their roles, which is only possible through a cooperative effort on the part of the people forming the institution, with a commitment of the whole team: teaching, technical and administrative staff, as well as its external and internal clients, with values of excellence and relevance, which ought to be present in the whole of the educational effort. The four fundamental dimensions for a program of quality are: Planning to change; organizing to act; Acting to transform; Assessing to improve. In planning the institution establishes its objectives. In organizing it defines the structure for a more flexible action. In acting what has been established is implemented. In assessing it constantly improves the program of quality. To look for the students quality and satisfaction is the virtue of persistence is the doing right from the word go. To have a zeal and care in everything one does e for whom it is intended to, since to achieve the maximum in result with the least effort, reaching goal, objectives and finalities are everything the target population wishes.

Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment

We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent’s effort affects the information on ability that is conveyed by performance. We characterize the equilibrium contracts and show that they display short–term commitment to employment when the impact of effort on output is persistent but delayed. By providing insurance against early termination, commitment encourages agents to exert effort, and thus improves on the principal’s ability to identify their talent. We argue that this helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which there exists uncertainty about individual ability.

Enriching information to prevent bank runs

Sequential service in the banking sector, as modeled by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), is a barrier to full insurance and potential source of financial fragility against which deposit insurance is infeasible (Wallace, 1988). In this paper, we pursue a different perspective, viewing the sequence of contacts as opportunities to extract information through a larger message space with commitment to richer promises. As we show, if preferences satisfy a separating property then the desired elimination of dominated strategies (Green and Lin, 2003) occurs even when shocks are correlated. In this manner the sequential service promotes stability.

Eficiência do controle do Programa Bolsa Família na perspectiva da gestão por resultados

Os programas sociais do governo se inserem em um novo contexto teórico e político, com a mudança do foco assistencialista para uma visão mais científica e com o devido comprometimento político, inclusive realçado no Planejamento Plurianual Avança Brasil 2000/2003, que prevê ações integradas e um orçamento próprio para os programas sociais. Ao mesmo tempo, vive-se no Brasil a mudança de uma administração pública burocrática para uma administração por resultados, que tem como uma das principais dificuldades a implementação da gestão propriamente dita e do controle, considerando-se os aspectos culturais até então vigentes. Nessa conjuntura, avaliar um programa social requer contextualizá-lo na perspectiva da administração por resultados, considerando-o em relação aos próprios princípios e aos daquela. O objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar a eficiência do controle do Programa Bolsa Família, na perspectiva de cumprimento de sua proposta e da gestão por resultados. O estudo de caso foi feito por meio de uma pesquisa documental, e os resultados demonstraram falhas no referido controle.