Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

Beyond sea, sun and fun in Rio de Janeiro: understanding exchange students motivations and interests

O objetivo deste estudo é compreender o que leva estudantes de intercâmbio ao Rio de Janeiro, quais são suas motivações e interesses que influenciam na escolha dessa cidade, um destino pouco tradicional para intercâmbios, que recebe um crescente número de intercambistas de países desenvolvidos. Também apresentamos uma discussão mais ampla sobre a educação internacional do século 21, posicionando programas de intercâmbio como uma das possíveis iniciativas para a internacionalização de instituições de ensino superior. Para responder essa questão, 20 estudantes de 11 países foram entrevistados. Os resultados indicam que existe muito mais no Rio de Janeiro além do sol e das belas praias. Há uma grande variedade de interesses que explicam porque estudantes de intercâmbio escolhem esse destino. O clichê sobre sol, praia e carnaval se manifestou em diversas respostas, no entanto, nunca como principal fator. Intercambistas se interessam pela cidade por diversos motivos além das atrações turísticas, como aprender português, melhorar o currículo e estar em uma economia emergente. Recomendações para a internacionalização de instituições de educação e uma agenda de pesquisa para o desenvolvimento desse tópico são apresentadas na parte final.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

Structural challenges in a multipolar and multicultural global legal era : BRICS’ global legal politics beyond cultural and economic partnerships

New emerging international dynamics introduce a global poly-axiological polycentric disorder which undermines the tradition of a unique global legal order in international law. Modern Era was characterized by Western European civilizational model – from which human rights is a byproduct. This consensus had its legitimacy tested by XXst century’s scenario – and the ‘BRICS factor/actor’ is a symptom of this reality. Its empowerment in world politics lead to the rise of distinct groups of States/civilizations provided with different legal, political, economic and social traditions – promoting an unexpected uprise of otherness in international legal order and inviting it to a complete and unforeseeable reframing process. Beyond Washington or Brussels Consensus, other custom-originated discourses (Brasília, Moscow, New Delhi, Peking or Cape Town Consensus, among other unfolded possibilities) will probably henceforth attempt shaping international law in present global legal disorder.

Beyond common priors

One property (called action-consistency) that is implicit in the common prior assumption (CPA) is identified and shown to be the driving force of the use of the CPA in a class of well-known results. In particular, we show that Aumann (1987)’s Bayesian characterization of correlated equilibrium, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, and Milgrom and Stokey (1982)’s no-trade theorem are all valid without the CPA but with action-consistency. Moreover, since we show that action-consistency is much less restrictive than the CPA, the above results are more general than previously thought, and insulated from controversies around the CPA.

Nonlinear pricing beyond the demand profile approach

Wilson [16] introduced a general methodology to deal with monopolistic pricing in situations where customers have private information on their tastes (‘types’). It is based on the demand profile of customers: For each nonlinear tariff by the monopolist the demand at a given level of product (or quality) is the measure of customers’ types whose marginal utility is at least the marginal tariff (‘price’). When the customers’ marginal utility has a natural ordering (i.e., the Spence and Mirrlees Condition), such demand profile is very easy to perform. In this paper we will present a particular model with one-dimensional type where the Spence and Mirrlees condition (SMC) fails and the demand profile approach results in a suboptimal solution for the monopolist. Moreover, we will suggest a generalization of the demand profile procedure that improves the monopolist’s profit when the SMC does not hold.

Equilibria in exchange economies with financial constraints : beyond the Cass trick

We consider an exchange economy under incomplete financiaI markets with purely financiaI securities and finitely many agents. When portfolios are not constrained, Cass [4], Duffie [7] and Florenzano-Gourdel [12] proved that arbitrage-free security prices fully characterize equilibrium security prices. This result is based on a trick initiated by Cass [4] in which one unconstrained agent behaves as if he were in complete markets. This approach is unsatisfactory since it is asymmetric and no more valid when every agent is subject to frictions. We propose a new and symmetric approach to prove that arbitrage-free security prices still fully characterize equilibrium security prices in the more realistic situation where the financiaI market is constrained by convex restrictions, provided that financiaI markets are collectively frictionless.

Beyond ‘best practices': the international regulation of capital markets

It is widely acknowledged that there is considerable international pressure for international ‘best practices’ to be adopted via national legislation. This would occur either by means of model laws or through the passing of country specific legislation that closely replicates foreign legal formats, administrative rules, and or regulation. These attempts to spread the implementation of ‘best practices’ have gained importance in the international debate due to the liberalization of international capital flows. The oversight, country reports, and technical assistance carried out by international organizations along with the growing internationalization of investors have also contributed to this growing pressure. In this respect, due to the constant evolution of transactions and the end objective of making sure that capital markets are developed with just rules, structures, and methods, this article looks to analyze the adoption of standardized models of capital market regulation. Furthermore it looks to examine the motivation and interest of states and other ‘stakeholders’ at the international level.