Padrão sazonal da produção industrial, exportações e importações: uma aplicação do X-12 ARIMA

Este trabalho tem por objetivo identificar os coeficientes sazonais de algumas variáveis econômicas (produção industrial, exportações e importações), isentos das mudanças estruturais registradas na economia. O estudo verifica se os planos de estabilização implementados pelo governo nos últimos quinze anos afetaram o padrão sazonal daquelas séries. Para tanto aplica-se o X-12-ARIMA, o novo método de dessazonalização de séries desenvolvido pelo U.S. Bureau of the Census. O uso desse método torna-se necessário, porque os demais métodos conhecidos impedem testar nossa hipótese, ao não permitirem o emprego de intervenções, não obtendo assim os melhores estimadores para os coeficientes sazonais. O estudo cobre o período que vai de 1980 a 1997 e os resultados confirmam a nossa hipótese de mudança no padrão sazonal no período. As nossas variáveis econômicas foram - de um ou de outro modo - atingidas pelos planos de estabilização implementados nos últimos quinze anos.

Should voters be afraid of hard budget constraint legislation? fiscal responsibility law in brazilian municipalities

This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.