Endogenous time-dependent rules and the costs of disinflation with imperfect credibility

This paper examines the output effects of monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules and imperfect credibility of the disinflation policy. We find that these features interact to generate an additional effect on top f the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in higher output costs of monetary disinflation.

On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

Health and development with imperfect capital markets

This paper investigates the interaction between investment in education and in life-expanding investments, in a simple two-period model in which individuaIs are liquidity constrained in the first period. We show that under low leveIs of health and capital, investments in human capital and in health are complement: since the probability of survival is small, there is littIe incentive to invest in human capital; therefore the return on health investment is also low. This reinforcing effect does not hold for higher leveIs of health or capital, and the two investments become substitute. This property has many consequences. First, subsidizing health care may have dramatically different effects on private investment in human capital, depending on the initial leveI of health and capital. Second, the assumption that mortality is endogenous induces an increase in inequality of income: since health investment is a normal good, the return on education is also lower for poor individuaIs. Third,in a non-overlapping generation madel with non-altruistic agents, the hea1th leveI of the population has strong consequences on growth. For a very low leveI of hea1th, mortality is too high for the investment on education to be profitable. For a higher, but still low, levei of hea1th the economy grows on1y if the initial stock of capital is high enough; bad health and low capital create a poverty trapo Fourth, we compare redistributive income policies versus public hea1th measures. Redistributing income reduces both static and dynamic inequality, but slows growth. In contrast, a paternalistic health policy that forces the poor to invest in hea1th reduces dynamic inequality and may foster growth.

Corporate capital structure revisited: incomplete markets and default

After Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented their capital structure irrelevance proposition, analysis of corporate Önancing choices involving debt and equity instruments have generally followed two trends in the literature, where models either incorporate informational asymmetries or introduce tax beneÖts in order to explain optimal capital structure determination (Myers, 2002). None of these features is present in this paper, which develops an asset pricing model with the purpose of providing a positive theory of corporate capital structure by replicating main aspects of standard contractual practice observed in real markets. Alternatively, the imperfect market structure of the economy is tailored to match what is most common in corporate reality. Allowance for default on corporate debt with an associated penalty of seizure of Örmís future cash áows by creditors is introduced, for instance. In this context, a qualitative assessment of Önancial managersídecisions is carried out through numerical procedures.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Debt composition and exchange rate balance sheet effects in Brazil: A firm level analysis

In this paper we study the interaction between macroeconomic environment and firms’ balance sheet effects in Brazil during the 1990’s. We start by assessing the influence of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ debt composition in Brazil. We found that larger firms tend to change debt currency composition more in response to a change in the exchange rate risk than small firms. We then proceed to investigate if and how exchange rate balance sheet effects affected the firms’ investment decisions. We test directly the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment. Contrary to earlier findings (Bleakley and Cowan, 2002), we found that firms more indebted in foreign currency tend to invest less when there is an exchange rate devaluation. We tried different controls for the competitiveness effect. First, we control directly for the effect of the exchange rate on exports and imported inputs. We then pursue an alternative investigation strategy, inspired by the credit channel literature. According to this perspective, Tobin’s q can provide an adequate control for the competitiveness effect on investment. Our results provide supporting evidence for imperfect capital markets, and for a negative exchange rate balance sheet effect in Brazil. The results concerning the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment are statistically significant and robust across the different specifications. We tested the results across different periods, classified according to the macroeconomic environment. Our findings suggest that the negative exchange rate balance sheet effect we found in the whole sample is due to the floating exchange rate period. We also found that exchange rate devaluations have important negative impact on both cash flows and sales of indebted firms. Furthermore, the impact of exchange rate variations is asymmetric, and the significant effect detected when no asymmetry is imposed is engendered by exchange rate devaluations.

Desenho de um sistema de metas sociais

Este trabalho discute a racionalidade econômica para o desenvolvimento de um sistema de metas sociais como forma do governo federal aumentar a eficiência na utilização dos recursos sociais transferidos para os municípios. O trabalho desenvolve algumas extensões do modelo de agente-principal incluindo abordagens estáticas com e sem informação imperfeita. Os resultados dos modelos estáticos indicam que o uso de critérios usuais de focalização onde localidades mais pobres recebem mais recursos podem levar a incentivos adversos para a erradicação da pobreza. Demonstramos que transferências incondicionais do governo federal deslocam gastos sociais locais. O trabalho argumenta em favor do uso de contratos onde quanto maior for a melhora no indicador social escolhido, mais recursos o município receberia. A introdução de informação imperfeita neste modelo basicamente gera uma penalidade aos segmentos pobres de áreas onde os governos demonstram ser menos avessos a pobreza. O trabalho também aborda o problema de favoritismo político onde determinados grupos sociais têm maior, ou menor, atenção por parte de governos locais. O resultado é que as políticas sociais acabam privilegiando determinados setores em detrimento de outros. Com o estabelecimento de metas sociais é possível, se não eliminar o problema, ao menos criar incentivos corretos para que os gastos sociais sejam distribuídos de forma mais equânime.

Desenho de um sistema de metas sociais

Este trabalho discute a racionalidade econômica para o desenvolvimento de um sistema de metas sociais como forma do governo federal aumentar a eficiência na utilização dos recursos sociais transferidos para os municípios. O trabalho desenvolve algumas extensões do modelo de agente-principal incluindo abordagens estáticas com e sem informação imperfeita. Os resultados dos modelos estáticos indicam que o uso de critérios usuais de focalização onde localidades mais pobres recebem mais recursos podem levar a incentivos adversos para a erradicação da pobreza. Demonstramos que transferências incondicionais do governo federal deslocam gastos sociais locais. O trabalho argumenta em favor do uso de contratos onde quanto maior for a melhora no indicador social escolhido, mais recursos o município receberia. A introdução de informação imperfeita neste modelo basicamente gera uma penalidade aos segmentos pobres de áreas onde os governos demonstram ser menos avessos a pobreza. O trabalho também aborda o problema de favoritismo político onde determinados grupos sociais têm maior, ou menor, atenção por parte de governos locais. O resultado é que as políticas sociais acabam privilegiando determinados setores em detrimento de outros. Com o estabelecimento de metas sociais é possível, se não eliminar o problema, ao menos criar incentivos corretos para que os gastos sociais sejam distribuídos de forma mais equânime.

Desafios que enfrenta a ANP para regular a indústria de petróleo no Brasil depois da quebra do monopólio em 1997 ate o ano de 2005

This work is analyzing the challenges which the National Petrol Agency is facing to regulate the Petrol industry in Brazil after the Monopoly crash in the period between 1997 until 2005. Due to the necessities of adaptation of its political strategies to the rules which determine the international economic flows, Brazil was forced to use the Economic Regulation in order to control the market. The regulation established in Brazil is not indifferent to imperfect markets. Thus can be find a conflict of interests among companies, the government and consumers within this process of regulation. The established agency does not have enough autonomy for administrating a regulation. The State with its paternalism power does not allow the agency to fulfill its function for which it was established, even though its function was established by law. A regulating policy which is clearly defined will establish a strong and independent agency with a clear limitation of its competences, avoiding divergent interpretation which prioritizes investments and promotes economic development. The agency will have the challenge to regulate the companies that enter the sector, allowing the opening of the market for new initiatives of investments which contribute to the welfare of the country and breaking at the same time the monopoly that is lead by Petrobras since 1953. Combining a stable set of rules with agility in order to adapt to changes will provide the regulator with a great decision-making power. The flexibility in the regulation will improve the correcting of the rules that were set in the beginning, being more efficient, which are based on acquired experience and achieved results. The structure of the agency and the flexibility of the regulation should be orientated on the promotion of competition in order to achieve economic and social development.

Política na organização: convivendo positivamente com o jogo do poder

This consideration about power in the organizations discuss alternatives to bring managers to have a more sociable co-existence with the political dimension of their work. It is not a goal to be achieved, but a continuous process of measuring the conflicts in order to reach better results for the company as well as the employees. Although it is not naturaly faced inside the organization, the power game always occurs when people is united around the same purpose. The departments are no exception. The power conflicts costs, mainly caused by lack of legitimacy, by excessive dependence, by low participation, by structures that stimulate segmentation, by an imperfect comunaction and by lack of political education, are extremely significant to the organizations. Therefore, facing the matter in a realistic way and developing attitudes and abilities to manage positively the divergent politics are basic tasks to the leader who desires to create a good working environment, as well as to rise his company world-wide.

Monetary equilibrium with decentralized trade and learning

This paper analyzes the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning is decentralized. We show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information transmission in the economy. Our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money. It also provides an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is only a recent development.

Essays on international prices and the subjacent market structure

Esta tese utiliza a informação contida em preços internacionais para identificar parâmetros de modelos de comércio sob competição imperfeita, desta forma permitindo inferência sobre o comportamento das exportações, sobre os ganhos de troca da abertura comercial e sobre a variedade de bens produzidos domesticamente. Em primeiro lugar, investigamos o repasse cambial, no longo prazo, para os preços praticados por exportadores brasileiros. O foco no longo prazo permite controlar os efeitos da rigidez de preço no curto prazo, de maneira que o repasse incompleto evidencie competição imperfeita com preços flexíveis. Em segundo lugar, calculamos os ganhos de troca de novas variedades de bens importados baseando-nos em estimativas para as elasticidades de substituição desagregadas. Finalmente, qualificamos a ênfase da literatura de comércio em ganhos de eficiência no lugar de ganhos de variedade, demonstrando que a variedade de bens produzidos domesticamente se amplia após aberturas comerciais desde que as firmas tenham uma margem de decisão em bens intermediários ou na qualificação da mão de obra.

Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-ependent pricing

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine how credibility affects the outcome of a disinflation in a model with endogenous timedependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially evaluate the costs of disinflation in a setup where credibility is exogenous, and then allow agents to use Bayes rule to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. In both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation, but the pattern of the output path is more realistic in the case with learning.

Desenho de um sistema de metas sociais

Este trabalho discute a racionalidade econômica para o desenvolvimento de um sistema de metas sociais como forma de o governo federal aumentar a eficiência na utilização dos recursos sociais transferidos para os municípios. O trabalho desenvolve algumas extensões do modelo de agente-principal incluindo abordagens estáticas com e sem informação imperfeita e abordagens dinâmicas com contratos perfeitos e imperfeitos. Os resultados dos modelos estáticos indicam que o uso de critérios usuais de focalização onde localidades mais pobres recebem mais recursos pode levar a incentivos adversos para a erradicação da pobreza. Nós também mostramos que transferências incondicionais do governo federal deslocam gastos sociais locais. O trabalho argumenta em favor do uso de contratos onde quanto maior for a melhora no indicador social escolhido, mais recursos o município receberia. A introdução de informação imperfeita neste modelo basicamente gera uma penalidade aos segmentos pobres de áreas onde os governos demonstram ser menos avessos a pobreza. O trabalho também aborda o problema de favoritismo político onde determinados grupos sociais têm maior, ou menor, atenção por parte de governos locais. O resultado é que as políticas sociais acabam privilegiando determinados setores em detrimento de outros. Com o estabelecimento de metas sociais é possível, se não eliminar o problema, ao menos criar incentivos corretos para que os gastos sociais sejam distribuídos de forma mais equânime. Também desenvolvemos modelos dinâmicos com diferentes possibilidades de renegociação ao longo do tempo. Demonstramos que a melhor forma de aumentar a eficiência alocativa dos fundos seria criar mecanismos institucionais garantindo a impossibilidade de renegociações bilaterais. Esse contrato ótimo reproduz a seqüência de metas e transferências de vários períodos encontrada na solução do modelo estático. Entretanto, esse resultado- desaparece quando incorporamos contratos incompletos. Nesse caso, as ineficiências ex-ante criadas pela possibilidade de renegociação devem ser comparadas com as ineficiências ex-post criadas por não se usar a informação nova revelada ao longo do processo. Finalmente, introduzimos a possibilidade do resultado social observado depender não só do investimento realizado, mas também da presença de choques. Nesse caso, tanto o governo quanto o município aumentam as suas metas de investimento na área social. Contratos lineares na presença de choques negativos fazem com que os municípios recebem menos recursos justamente em situações adversas. Para contornar esse problema, mostramos a importância da utilização de contratos com comparação de performance.

Targeting the poor: a macroeconomic analysis of cash transfer programs

This paper introduces cash transfers targeting the poor in an incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents facing idiosyncratic risk. These transfers change the degree of insurance in the economy and affect precautionary motives asymmetrically, leading the poorest households to decrease savings proportionally more than their richer counterparts. In a model economy calibrated to Brazil, once the cash transfer program is adopted, wealth inequality and social welfare increase, poverty decreases, while employment and income inequality remain about the same. Imperfect access to financial markets is important for these results, whereas whether the program is funded with lump sum or distortive taxes is not.