Profit-share bidding auctions: a theoretical approach

Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituí do pela Lei No 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem te orica. Desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro como, por exemplo, a participação obrigatória da Petrobras, assimetria de informação e a presença de participantes estratégicos. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de custos heterogêneos para estudar as regras de conteúdo local.

Leilões de valor quase comum e o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro: uma abordagem teórica

Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituído pela Lei N$^o$ 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem teórica. Alguns artigos da literatura de leilões de valor quase comum foram estudados aqui. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção com informação assimétrica a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados.

Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, finite dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compatibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder’s expected utilities. Thus for example we may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting application of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence.

Share bidding auctions, sliding scale royalty rates and the new brazilian regulatory framework for the pre-salt areas

O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.

Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions

We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic and statistical (affiliation is a very restrictive characterization of positive dependence). We also show that affiliation’s main implications do not generalize for alternative definitions of positive dependence. From this, we propose new approaches to the problems of pure strategy equilibrium existence in first-price auctions (PSEE) and the characterization of the revenue ranking of auctions. For equilibrium existence, we slightly restrict the set of distributions considered, without loss of economic generality, and offer a complete characterization of PSEE. For revenue ranking, we obtain a characterization of the expected revenue differences between second and first price auctions with general dependence of types.

Uma análise econômica das mudanças regulatórias no setor de petróleo no Brasil

Esta dissertação analisa o marco regulatório brasileiro do petróleo e gás sob a ótica da Teoria Econômica e faz uma comparação entre o regime de concessão, instituído pela Lei 9.478/97, e o de partilha de produção, adotado após a descoberta do Présal através da Lei 12.351/10. As características do modelo de concessão brasileiro são revistas assim como os resultados obtidos no setor de Exploração e Produção ao longo dos últimos quinze anos. O estudo faz uma abordagem sucinta sobre a descoberta do Pré-sal que ocasionou a alteração do marco regulatório pelo governo brasileiro. Os problemas relacionados à incerteza, poder de incentivo dos contratos, assim como as falhas de mercado relacionadas à assimetria de informação, externalidade e especificidade dos ativos são analisados para ambos os regimes. Ao longo do estudo também são abordadas questões de ordem prática como a insegurança jurídica, o papel da agência reguladora e a mudança do perfil das empresas interessadas em investir no país.

A Common-feature approach for testing present-value restrictions with financial data

It is well known that cointegration between the level of two variables (labeled Yt and yt in this paper) is a necessary condition to assess the empirical validity of a present-value model (PV and PVM, respectively, hereafter) linking them. The work on cointegration has been so prevalent that it is often overlooked that another necessary condition for the PVM to hold is that the forecast error entailed by the model is orthogonal to the past. The basis of this result is the use of rational expectations in forecasting future values of variables in the PVM. If this condition fails, the present-value equation will not be valid, since it will contain an additional term capturing the (non-zero) conditional expected value of future error terms. Our article has a few novel contributions, but two stand out. First, in testing for PVMs, we advise to split the restrictions implied by PV relationships into orthogonality conditions (or reduced rank restrictions) before additional tests on the value of parameters. We show that PV relationships entail a weak-form common feature relationship as in Hecq, Palm, and Urbain (2006) and in Athanasopoulos, Guillén, Issler and Vahid (2011) and also a polynomial serial-correlation common feature relationship as in Cubadda and Hecq (2001), which represent restrictions on dynamic models which allow several tests for the existence of PV relationships to be used. Because these relationships occur mostly with nancial data, we propose tests based on generalized method of moment (GMM) estimates, where it is straightforward to propose robust tests in the presence of heteroskedasticity. We also propose a robust Wald test developed to investigate the presence of reduced rank models. Their performance is evaluated in a Monte-Carlo exercise. Second, in the context of asset pricing, we propose applying a permanent-transitory (PT) decomposition based on Beveridge and Nelson (1981), which focus on extracting the long-run component of asset prices, a key concept in modern nancial theory as discussed in Alvarez and Jermann (2005), Hansen and Scheinkman (2009), and Nieuwerburgh, Lustig, Verdelhan (2010). Here again we can exploit the results developed in the common cycle literature to easily extract permament and transitory components under both long and also short-run restrictions. The techniques discussed herein are applied to long span annual data on long- and short-term interest rates and on price and dividend for the U.S. economy. In both applications we do not reject the existence of a common cyclical feature vector linking these two series. Extracting the long-run component shows the usefulness of our approach and highlights the presence of asset-pricing bubbles.

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indi¤erent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the …rst object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller’s revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net e¤ect on the seller’s revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine two special cases with asymmetric players. In the …rst case, players have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline. In the second case, one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. For this example, we show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco (1997). The reason is that players with singleunit demand will generally bid less than their true valuations in the …rst period. Therefore, there are two opposing forces; the reduction in the bid of the player with multiple-demand in the last auction and less aggressive bidding in the …rst auction by the players with single-unit demand.

Forecasting multivariate time series under present-value-model short- and long-run co-movement restrictions

It is well known that cointegration between the level of two variables (e.g. prices and dividends) is a necessary condition to assess the empirical validity of a present-value model (PVM) linking them. The work on cointegration,namelyon long-run co-movements, has been so prevalent that it is often over-looked that another necessary condition for the PVM to hold is that the forecast error entailed by the model is orthogonal to the past. This amounts to investigate whether short-run co-movememts steming from common cyclical feature restrictions are also present in such a system. In this paper we test for the presence of such co-movement on long- and short-term interest rates and on price and dividend for the U.S. economy. We focuss on the potential improvement in forecasting accuracies when imposing those two types of restrictions coming from economic theory.

Forecasting Multivariate Time Series under Present-Value-Model Short- and Long-run Co-movement Restrictions

This paper has two original contributions. First, we show that the present value model (PVM hereafter), which has a wide application in macroeconomics and fi nance, entails common cyclical feature restrictions in the dynamics of the vector error-correction representation (Vahid and Engle, 1993); something that has been already investigated in that VECM context by Johansen and Swensen (1999, 2011) but has not been discussed before with this new emphasis. We also provide the present value reduced rank constraints to be tested within the log-linear model. Our second contribution relates to forecasting time series that are subject to those long and short-run reduced rank restrictions. The reason why appropriate common cyclical feature restrictions might improve forecasting is because it finds natural exclusion restrictions preventing the estimation of useless parameters, which would otherwise contribute to the increase of forecast variance with no expected reduction in bias. We applied the techniques discussed in this paper to data known to be subject to present value restrictions, i.e. the online series maintained and up-dated by Shiller. We focus on three different data sets. The fi rst includes the levels of interest rates with long and short maturities, the second includes the level of real price and dividend for the S&P composite index, and the third includes the logarithmic transformation of prices and dividends. Our exhaustive investigation of several different multivariate models reveals that better forecasts can be achieved when restrictions are applied to them. Moreover, imposing short-run restrictions produce forecast winners 70% of the time for target variables of PVMs and 63.33% of the time when all variables in the system are considered.

A trava bancária na recuperação judicial e o seu impacto nas formas de financiamento da empresa: uma análise através da teoria do “common pool assets” de Thomas H. Jackson

O objeto de estudo do presente trabalho é a Trava Bancária, mecanismo jurídico previsto no art. 49, § 3º da Lei de Falências e Recuperação Judicial de Empresas - LRF, por meio do qual dívidas contraídas pelas empresas junto às instituições financeiras são garantidas pela alienação fiduciária dos seus recebíveis. Serão analisadas as peculiaridades desse tipo de garantia fiduciária e, em especial, a prerrogativa que os credores detentores desse tipo de garantia possuem dentro dos procedimento de recuperação judicial de empresas, de não precisarem submeter seus créditos aos procedimentos concursais. Será feita uma análise para demonstrar que a manutenção da trava bancária diminui o valor de going concern da empresa em recuperação, pois a criação de um tipo de credor que é blindado quanto aos efeitos da recuperação judicial impede que essa mantenha-se como um procedimento concursal coletivo e compulsório, requisitos que são essenciais para incentivar os credores da empresa a trabalharem de forma conjunta, mantendo o valor de going concern da empresa recuperanda, com o objetivo de recuperar a empresa e saldarem seus créditos. Tem-se como objetivo demonstrar que, a existência da trava bancária na recuperação judicial, pode afetar negativamente o acesso das empresas ao financiamento por equity. Isto porque, os acionistas das empresas são os últimos da fila de credores a receberem caso a empresa entre em recuperação judicial, e, portanto, acredita-se que, ao saberem que existe um mecanismo que poderá inviabilizar a recuperação judicial das empresas em crise, atrapalhando sua geração de valor de going concern, é possível que investidores desistam de investir em empresas financiadas por dívidas garantidas pela alienação fiduciária de seus recebíveis, passando a ser essa uma variável levada em consideração quando da realização dos procedimentos de valuation para compra de participação acionária em empresas. Os pressupostos teóricos que serão utilizados para embasar a premissa de que a trava bancária gera impacto negativo no valor de going concern das empreas em crise, dificultando seu processo de recuperação, serão extraídos e elaborados a partir da Teoria da Common Pool Assets do autor norte-americano, Thomas H. Jackson. A relevância deste trabalho decorre da importância que o procedimento de recuperação judicial apresenta para as empresas em crise e para os seus credores, bem como a importância que esse tipo de procedimento adquiriu no País. Com efeito, desde a entrada em vigor da LRF no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro em 2005, cerca de 4 mil companhias já pediram recuperação judicial. Além disso, o trabalho mostra-se relevante por abordar questão relativa às formas de financiamento das empresas, assunto que tem reflexo no Custo Brasil e impacto direto no desenvolvimento da economia brasileiro.

Auctions with options for re-auction

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries

We study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the parameter αi may vary across bidders. In this game, asymmetries are exogenously given. Next, a two-stage game where asymmetries are endogenously generated is studied. At the first stage, each bidder chooses the level of an observable, costly, value-enhancing action. The second stage is the bidding sub-game, whose equilibrium is simply the equilibrium of the, previously analyzed, game with exogenous asymmetries. Finally, natural applications of the all pay-auction in the context of political lobbying are considered: the effects of excluding bidders, as well as, the impact of caps on bids.

Forecasting multivariate time series under present-value-model short- and long-run co-movement restrictions

Using a sequence of nested multivariate models that are VAR-based, we discuss different layers of restrictions imposed by present-value models (PVM hereafter) on the VAR in levels for series that are subject to present-value restrictions. Our focus is novel - we are interested in the short-run restrictions entailed by PVMs (Vahid and Engle, 1993, 1997) and their implications for forecasting. Using a well-known database, kept by Robert Shiller, we implement a forecasting competition that imposes different layers of PVM restrictions. Our exhaustive investigation of several different multivariate models reveals that better forecasts can be achieved when restrictions are applied to the unrestricted VAR. Moreover, imposing short-run restrictions produces forecast winners 70% of the time for the target variables of PVMs and 63.33% of the time when all variables in the system are considered.

A critical value function approach, with an application to persistent time-series

Researchers often rely on the t-statistic to make inference on parameters in statistical models. It is common practice to obtain critical values by simulation techniques. This paper proposes a novel numerical method to obtain an approximately similar test. This test rejects the null hypothesis when the test statistic islarger than a critical value function (CVF) of the data. We illustrate this procedure when regressors are highly persistent, a case in which commonly-used simulation methods encounter dificulties controlling size uniformly. Our approach works satisfactorily, controls size, and yields a test which outperforms the two other known similar tests.