Modelos condicionais de apreçamento de ativos com prêmios de risco macroeconômicos variantes no tempo

Analisamos a previsibilidade dos retornos mensais de ativos no mercado brasileiro em um período de 10 anos desde o início do plano Real. Para analisarmos a variação cross-section dos retornos e explicarmos estes retornos em função de prêmios de risco variantes no tempo, condicionados a variáveis de estado macroeconômicas, utilizamos um novo modelo de apreçamento de ativos, combinando dois diferentes tipos de modelos econômicos, um modelo de finanças - condicional e multifatorial, e um modelo estritamente macroeconômico do tipo Vector Auto Regressive. Verificamos que o modelo com betas condicionais não explica adequadamente os retornos dos ativos, porém o modelo com os prêmios de risco (e não os betas) condicionais, produz resultados com interpretação econômica e estatisticamente satis fatórios

Isolated capital cities and misgovernance: theory and evidence

Motivated by a novel stylized fact { countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance { we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less e ective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.

The effect of options on coordination

This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. The model exhibits a unique symmetric equilibrium in cut-o¤ strategies. The risk-dominant action of the underlying one-shot game is selected when the option to delay effort is commensurate with the option to wait longer for others' actions. The possibility of waiting longer for the actions of others enhances coordination, but the option of delaying one s actions can induce severe coordination failures: if agents are very patient, they might get arbitrarily low expected payoffs even in cases where coordination would yield arbitrarily large returns.