How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

O diferencial entre as curvas de juros doméstica e externa em reais é uma evidência para o argumento de "incerteza jurisdicional"?

O trabalho faz uma análise sobre as taxas de juros brasileiras, além das principais características da curva soberana de juros nominais, dando ênfase aos títulos pré-fixados emitidos pelo governo em moeda local, no mercado doméstico e externo, onde notamos a ocorrência de um fenômeno bastante peculiar, que é o diferencial de rendimento e de maturidade existentes entre os dois mercados. Arida, Bacha e Lara-Resende (2004) conjecturam sobre a existência de um risco inerente ao país, chamado por eles de “incerteza jurisdicional”, relacionado às instituições brasileiras, e que estaria por trás das altas taxas de juros e da inexistência de um mercado de crédito doméstico de longo prazo. É feito um diagnóstico mais detalhado sobre as possíveis causas do fenômeno de maior maturidade e menor rendimento dos títulos emitidos no mercado externo em relação aos títulos do mercado interno, notando-se que ambos os fenômenos – dos altos juros brasileiros e da inexistência de um mercado juros de longo prazo – estão diretamente relacionados. As conclusões sobre as possíveis causas para o diferencial de rendimento entre os títulos locais e externos emitidos em Reais dizem respeito tanto aos fatores quantitativos, relacionados aos custos de investimento no Brasil e ao risco de conversibilidade, que contribuem em parte para aumentar as taxas exigidas para os títulos locais, bem como aos fatores qualitativos, como piores instituições no Brasil em relação às instituições externas. A diferença de maturidade entre os títulos também advém de questões institucionais, o que reafirma de certo modo a teoria de “incerteza jurisdicional” para explicar este fenômeno.