Public debt management, monetary policy and financial institutions

Despite the large size of the Brazilian debt market, as well the large diversity of its bonds, the picture that emerges is of a market that has not yet completed its transition from the role it performed during the megainflation years, namely that of providing a liquid asset that provided positive real returns. This unfinished transition is currently placing the market under severe stress, as fears of a possible default from the next administration grow larger. This paper analyzes several aspects pertaining to the management of the domestic public debt. The causes for the extremely large and fast growth ofthe domestic public debt during the seven-year period that President Cardoso are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 computes Value at Risk and Cash Flow at Risk measures for the domestic public debt. The rollover risk is introduced in a mean-variance framework in Section 4. Section 5 discusses a few issues pertaining to the overlap between debt management and monetary policy. Finally, Section 6 wraps up with policy discussion and policy recommendations.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Debt maturity determinants in Brazil: evidence from private and public corporate borrowings

This study provides an empirical investigation of the determinants of long-term debt maturity in Brazil. We built a unique database that includes privately placed debt and public debt for 308 publicly traded, non-financial Brazilian companies, from 2009 to 2013. We perform GMM panel analyses using as dependent variables the amount of long-term debt payable in more than one, three, and five years for total debt, BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) debt and corporate bonds. The results show that the BNDES finances less risky firms, i.e., those that are larger, older, more tangible and more transparent. We also find support for information asymmetry theories, as companies with higher transparency levels have similar leverage levels relative to others but higher proportions of long-term debt in their capital structures. Regarding debt levels, we find that more levered companies are larger, less profitable, more tangible and have fewer growth opportunities. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address the determinants of long-term debt maturity in Brazil that uses various specifications of long-term debt and that examines different types of debt.

Implied Hazard Rates Analysis Through Brazilian Corporate Debt

No Brasil, o mercado de crédito corporativo ainda é sub-aproveitado. A maioria dos participantes não exploram e não operam no mercado secundário, especialmente no caso de debêntures. Apesar disso, há inúmeras ferramentas que poderiam ajudar os participantes do mercado a analisar o risco de crédito e encorajá-los a operar esses riscos no mercado secundário. Essa dissertação introduz um modelo livre de arbitragem que extrai a Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita nos preços de mercado. É uma forma reduzida do modelo proposto por Duffie and Singleton (1999) e modela a estrutura a termo das taxas de juros através de uma Função Constante por Partes. Através do modelo, foi possível analisar a Curva de Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita através dos diferentes instrumentos de emissores corporativos brasileiros, utilizando Títulos de Dívida, Swaps de Crédito e Debêntures. Foi possível comparar as diferentes curvas e decidir, em cada caso analisado, qual a melhor alternativa para se tomar o risco de crédito da empresa, via Títulos de Dívida, Debêntures ou Swaps de Crédito.

Deregulation and The 2007-2008 Housing/Debt Crisis Analysis of the Housing/Debt Crisis of 2007-2008 and its impact on the Financial Strength and Vulnerability of the United States and Global Economy

One looming question has persisted in the minds of economists the world over in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 American Housing and Debt Crisis: How did it begin and who is responsible for making this happen? Another two-part question is: What measures were implemented to help end the crisis and what changes are being implemented to ensure that it will never happen again? Many speculate that the major contributing factor was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 that prompted a virtual feeding frenzy among the banking community when new calls from Capitol Hill encouraged home ownership in America as well as the secondary mortgage market which skyrocketed thereafter. The Glass-Steagall Act will be among many of the topics explored in this paper along with the events leading up to the 2007-2008 housing/debt crisis as well as the aftermath.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Credit ratings and government bonds evidence before, during and after the european debt crisis

Neste projeto, investigamos se as agências de rating e as taxas de juro de longo prazo da dívida soberana tiveram uma influência recíproca antes, durante e após a crise da dívida soberana Europeia. Esta análise é realizada, estimando a relação existente entre os ratings da dívida soberana ou taxas de juro e factores macroeconomicos e estruturais, através de uma diferente aplicação de metodologias utilizadas para este efeito. Os resultados obtidos demonstram que, no período da crise soberana, os ratings e as taxas de juros tiveram um mútuo impacto, sugerindo que as descidas dos ratings podem ter conduzido a profecias auto-realizáveis, levando países relativamente estáveis a um eventual incumprimento

Joint dynamic probabilistic constraints with projected linear decision rules

We consider multistage stochastic linear optimization problems combining joint dynamic probabilistic constraints with hard constraints. We develop a method for projecting decision rules onto hard constraints of wait-and-see type. We establish the relation between the original (in nite dimensional) problem and approximating problems working with projections from di erent subclasses of decision policies. Considering the subclass of linear decision rules and a generalized linear model for the underlying stochastic process with noises that are Gaussian or truncated Gaussian, we show that the value and gradient of the objective and constraint functions of the approximating problems can be computed analytically.

Macroeconomic constraints to growth of Brazilian economy diagnosis and some policy proposals

The recent process of accelerated expansion of the Brazilian economy was driven by exports and fixed capital formation. Although the pace of growth was more robust than in the 1990´s, we can still witness the existence of certain macroeconomic constraints to its continuation in the long run such as, for instance, the exchange rate overvaluation in particular since 2005, and in general the modus operandi of monetary policy. Such constraints may jeopardize the sustainability of the current pace of growth. Therefore, we argue that Brazil still lies in a trap made up of high interest and low exchange rates. The elimination of the exchange rate misalignment would bring about a great increase in the rate of interest, which on its turn would impact negatively upon investment and hence upon the sustainability of long run economic growth. We outline a set of policy measures to eliminate such a trap, in particular, the adoption of an implicit target for the exchange rate, capital controls and the abandonment of the present regime of inflation targeting. Recent events seem to go in this direction.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.