Um modelo de acumulação de capital físico e humano: um diálogo com a economia do trabalho

Neste trabalho faz-se um modelo de gerações sobrepostas em tempo contínuo de acumulação de capital físico e humano em que o capital humano é incorporado da forma como tratado pelos economistas do trabalho: (i)é um fator limitado, (ii)embutido no trabalhador, (iii)e acumulado nos primeiros anos de vida. Mostra-se que a oferta de ensino público básico e gratuíto …nanciada por impostos não distorcivos não altera a escolha ótima individual de acumulação de capital humano. Também é possível mostrar que em geral o progresso técnico poupador de trabalho torna o retorno marginal do capital humano mais elevado. De sorte que é possivel que o elevado retorno à educação se ja um fenômeno recente e que para um passado suficiente remoto a escolha ótima fosse não se educar.

Constructing coincident and leading indices of economic activity for the brazilian economy

This paper has three original contributions. The first is the reconstruction effort of the series of employment and income to allow the creation of a new coincident index for the Brazilian economic activity. The second is the construction of a coincident index of the economic activity for Brazil, and from it, (re)establish a chronology of recessions in the recent past of the Brazilian economy. The coincident index follows the methodology proposed by TCB and it covers the period 1980:1 to 2007:11. The third is the construction and evaluation of many leading indicators of economic activity for Brazil which fills an important gap in the Brazilian Business Cycles literature.

Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.

A aleatoriedade do passeio na BOVESPA: testando a eficiência do mercado acionário brasileira

Este artigo investiga versões do modelo de passeio aleatório dos preços de ativos em diversos horizontes de tempo, para carteiras diversificadas de ações no mercado brasileiro. Evidências contrárias a tal modelo são observadas nos horizontes diário e semanal, caracterizados por persistência. As evidências são mais fracas em períodos mais recentes. Encontramos também sazonalidades diárias, incluindo o efeito segunda-feira, e mensais. Adicionalmente, um padrão de assimetria de autocorrelações cruzadas de primeira ordem entre os retornos de carteiras de firmas agrupadas segundo seu tamanho também é observado, indicando no caso de retornos diários e semanais que retornos de firmas grandes ajudam a prever retornos de firmas pequenas. Evidências de não linearidades nos retornos são observadas em diversos horizontes de tempo.

Vintage capital, distortions and development

This paper asks to what extent distortions to the adoption of new technology cause income inequality across nations. We work in the framework of embodied technological progress with an individual, C.E.S. production function. We estimate the parameters of this production function from international data and calibrate the model, using U.S. National Income statistics. Our analysis suggests that distortions account for a bigger portion of income inequality than hitherto has been assessed.

Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Testing the optimality of aggregate consumption decisions: is there rule-of-thumb behavior?

Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all. This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets. Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.

The long run economic impact of AIDS

This paper studies the long-run impact of HIV/AIDS on per capita income and education. We introduce a channel from HIV/AIDS to long-run income that has been overlooked by the literature, the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity. We work with a continuous time overlapping generations mo deI in which life cycle features of savings and education decision play key roles. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, a quarter poorer than they would be without AIDS, due only to the direct (human capital reduction) and indirect (decline in savings and investment) effects of life-expectancy reductions. Schooling will decline on average by half. These findings are well above previous results in the literature and indicate that, as pessimistic as they may be, at least in economic terms the worst could be yet to come.

Hiperinflação: um arcabouço teórico

Este trabalho apresenta uma teoria da hiperinflação na qual não há necessidade de apelar-se para hipóteses casuísticas, como expectativas adaptativas, ajustamento parcial no mercado monetário ou profecias que se autorealizam. O modelo tem um agente representativo com vida infinita que aloca seus recursos de sorte a maximizar o bem estar, todos os mercados estão em equilíbrio, o banco central financia o déficit público e a moeda é essencial. A hiperinflação ocorre porque a restrição intertemporal do governo não é satisfeita. O arcabouço teórico produz algumas conclusões sobre a duração da hiperinflação, e sobre outras características deste processo, nem sempre em concordância com a sabedoria convencional. O artigo também analisa como o fenômeno da substituição da moeda, um fato estilizado das experiências hiperinflacionárias, pode afetar a essencialidade da moeda, um ingrediente básico do modelo.

Política de cotas e inclusão trabalhista das pessoas com deficiência

Segundo a ONU há cerca de 500 milhões de deficientes no mundo e 80% vivem em países em desenvolvimento. A OMS (Organização Mundial de Saúde) estima que no Brasil existem 16 milhões de pessoas portadoras de deficiência, representando 10% da população. Já os dados do Censo 2000 nos informam que existem 24,5 milhões de portadores de deficiência no país. É importante frisar a importância desse número que corresponde a 14,5% da população brasileira, um número bastante superior aos levantamentos anteriores, onde se observava uma incidência de menos de 2%. Isto não ocorre porque tenha necessariamente aumentado a incidência de deficiências, mas pela melhora dos instrumentos de coleta de informações que seguem as recomendações da OMS. Esta análise refere-se às pessoas portadoras de deficiência bem sucedidas em termos profissionais, aqui entendida como aqueles que conseguem um posto no mercado formal de trabalho. Essa questão nos remete às políticas públicas existentes, que visam garantir um lugar no mercado de trabalho para as pessoas com deficiência. O primeiro ponto é que a média nacional de empregabilidade de PPDs é muito baixa, 2,05%, pouco acima da cota mínima exigida por lei. Apenas 5 estados possuem uma proporção de PPDS empregados no mercado de trabalho superior ao piso de 2%. Estes resultados revelam um alto grau de descumprimento da lei pelas empresas, a existência de um amplo espaço para o aumento da efetividade da lei, e a necessidade de diminuir a perda de eficiência econômica e aumentar a eficácia de políticas voltadas à inclusão social das PPDs.

Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment

Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indi¤erent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the …rst object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller’s revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net e¤ect on the seller’s revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine two special cases with asymmetric players. In the …rst case, players have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline. In the second case, one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. For this example, we show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco (1997). The reason is that players with singleunit demand will generally bid less than their true valuations in the …rst period. Therefore, there are two opposing forces; the reduction in the bid of the player with multiple-demand in the last auction and less aggressive bidding in the …rst auction by the players with single-unit demand.

Existence and uniqueness of a fixed-point for local contractions

This paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a fixed-point for local contractions without assuming the family of contraction coefficients to be uniformly bounded away from 1. More importantly it shows how this fixed-point result can apply to study existence and uniqueness of solutions to some recursive equations that arise in economic dynamics.