Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies

This paper proposes a simple macroeconomic model with staggered investment decisions. The model captures the dynamic coordination problem arising from demand externalities and fixed costs of investment. In times of low economic activity, a firm faces low demand and hence has less incentives for investing, which reinforces firms’ expectations of low demand. In the unique equilibrium of the model, demand expectations are pinned down by fundamentals and history. Owing to the beliefs that arise in equilibrium, there is no special reason for stimulus at times of low economic activity.

Bias from ignoring price dispersion in demand estimation

Consumers often pay different prices for the same product bought in the same store at the same time. However, the demand estimation literature has ignored that fact using, instead, aggregate measures such as the “list” or average price. In this paper we show that this will lead to biased price coefficients. Furthermore, we perform simple comparative statics simulation exercises for the logit and random coefficient models. In the “list” price case we find that the bias is larger when discounts are higher, proportion of consumers facing discount prices is higher and when consumers are more unwilling to buy the product so that they almost only do it when facing discount. In the average price case we find that the bias is larger when discounts are higher, proportion of consumers that have access to discount are similar to the ones that do not have access and when consumers willingness to buy is very dependent on idiosyncratic shocks. Also bias is less problematic in the average price case in markets with a lot of bargain deals, so that prices are as good as individual. We conclude by proposing ways that the econometrician can reduce this bias using different information that he may have available.

Microinsurance: income risk, social security and the demand for private onsurance by low-income families

Insurance provision against uncertainties is present in several dimensions of peoples´s lives, such as the provisions related to, inter alia, unemployment, diseases, accidents, robbery and death. Microinsurance improves the ability of low-income individuals to cope with these risks. Brazil has a fairly developed financial system but still not geared towards the poor, especially in what concerns the insurance industry. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The Brazilian government provides a relatively developed social security system considering other countries of similar income level which crowds-out the demand for insurance and savings. On the other hand, this same public infrastructure may help to foster microfinance products supply. The objective of this paper is to analyze the demand for different types of private insurance by the low-income population using microdata from a National Expenditure Survey (POF/IBGE). The final objective is to help to understand the trade-offs faced for the development of an emerging industry of microinsurance in Brazil.

O novo federalismo social e o Rio: desenho de programas complementares de transferência de renda condicionada

Brazilian public policy entered in the so-called new social federalism through its conditional cash transfers. States and municipalities can operate together through the nationwide platform of the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP), complementing federal actions with local innovations. The state and the city of Rio de Janeiro have created programs named, respectively, Renda Melhor (RM) and Família Carioca (FC). These programs make use of the operational structure of the BFP, which facilitates locating beneficiaries, issuing cards, synchronizing payment dates and access passwords and introducing new conditionalities. The payment system of the two programs complements the estimated permanent household income up to the poverty line established, giving more to those who have less. Similar income complementation system was subsequently adopted in the BFP and the Chilean Ingreso Ético Familiar, which also follow the principle of estimation of income used in the FC and in the RM. Instead of using the declared income, the value of the Rio cash transfers are set using the extensive collection of information obtained from the Single Registry of Social Programs (Cadastro Único): physical configuration of housing, access to public services, education and work conditions for all family members, presence of vulnerable groups, disabilities, pregnant or lactating women, children and benefits from other official transfers such as the BFP. With this multitude of assets and limitations, the permanent income of each individual is estimated. The basic benefit is defined by the poverty gap and priority is given to the poorest. These subnational programs use international benchmarks as a neutral ground between different government levels and mandates. Their poverty line is the highest of the first millennium goal of the United Nations (UN): US$ 2 per person per day adjusted for the cost of living. The other poverty line of the UN, US$ 1.25, was implicitly adopted as the national extreme poverty line in 2011. The exchange of methodologies between federal entities has happened both ways. The FC began with the 575,000 individuals living in the city of Rio de Janeiro who were on the payroll of the BFP. Its system of impact evaluation benefited from bi-monthly standardized examinations. In the educational conditionalities, the two programs reward students' progress, a potential advantage for those who most need to advance. The municipal program requires greater school attendance than that of the BFP and the presence of students’ parents at the bimonthly meetings held on Saturdays. Students must achieve a grade of 8 or improve at least 20% in each exam to receive a bi-monthly premium of R$50. In early childhood, priority is given to the poor children in the program Single Administrative Register (CadÚnico) to enroll in kindergarten, preschools and complementary activities. The state program reaches more than one million people with a payment system similar to the municipal one. Moreover, it innovates in that it transfers awards given to high school students to savings accounts. The prize increases and is paid to the student, who can withdraw up to 30% annually. The total can reach R$3,800 per low-income student. The State and the city rewarded already education professionals according to student performance, now completing the chain of demand incentives on poor students and their parents. Increased performance is higher among beneficiaries and the presence of their guardians at meetings is twice compared to non beneficiaries; The Houston program, also focuses on aligning the incentives to teachers, parents and students. In general, the plan is to explore strategic complementarities, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The objective is to stimulate, through targets and incentives, synergies between social actors (teachers, parents, students), between areas (education, assistance, work) and different levels of government. The cited programs sum their efforts and divide labor so as to multiply interactions and make a difference in the lives of the poor.

Deregulation and The 2007-2008 Housing/Debt Crisis Analysis of the Housing/Debt Crisis of 2007-2008 and its impact on the Financial Strength and Vulnerability of the United States and Global Economy

One looming question has persisted in the minds of economists the world over in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 American Housing and Debt Crisis: How did it begin and who is responsible for making this happen? Another two-part question is: What measures were implemented to help end the crisis and what changes are being implemented to ensure that it will never happen again? Many speculate that the major contributing factor was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 that prompted a virtual feeding frenzy among the banking community when new calls from Capitol Hill encouraged home ownership in America as well as the secondary mortgage market which skyrocketed thereafter. The Glass-Steagall Act will be among many of the topics explored in this paper along with the events leading up to the 2007-2008 housing/debt crisis as well as the aftermath.

Bright minds, big rent: gentrification and the rising returns to skill

In 1980, housing prices in the main US cities rose with distance to the city center. By 2010, that relationship had reversed. We propose that this development can be traced to greater labor supply of high-income households through reduced tolerance for commuting. In a tract-level data set covering the 27 largest US cities, years 1980-2010, we employ a city-level Bartik demand shifter for skilled labor and find support for our hypothesis: full-time skilled workers favor proximity to the city center and their increased presence can account for the observed price changes, notably the rising price premium commanded by centrality.