Bank relationships: effect on the availability and marginal cost of credit for firms in Argentina

The paper provides evidence on what affects at the margin the cost and availability of bank credit for firms in Argentina. We study in particular how banks use different pieces of private and public information to screen firms and overcome informational asymmetries in the credit market. Some private information is transferable, like balance sheet data. Private information generated in relationships is not. To capture the closeness of bank relationships, we resort to the concentration of bank credit and the number of credit lines in a bank. We also consider public information available in the Central de Deudores. The cost of credit is measured using overdrafts, the most expensive line of credit, at the bank that charges the highest rate for overdrafts. We find that the cost of credit is smaller for a firm with a close relationship to the marginal bank. Firms with large assets, a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate at the margin. A good credit history (no debt arrears and no bounced checks) and collateral also reduce the marginal interest rate. The availability of credit is measured by unused credit lines as a proportion of total liabilities with the main bank. The availability of credit depends positively on a close relationship with the main bank. Large assets, a high return over assets, a high sales/assets ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good credit history, and collateral lead to higher credit availability. Our measure of unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures like leverage, which may indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit.

The Brazilian venture capital industry and its strategic role in closing the financing gap of SMEs

This discussion paper is a contribution of the Brazilian Government to the 2006 Annual Conference of the OECD High-level Conference on "Better Financing for Entrepreneurship and SMEs" to be held in Brasilia, Brazil on 27-30 March 2006. It has been prepared by The Center for Studies in Private Equity and Venture Capital of EAESP-Fundação Getúlio Vargas under the auspices of ABDI – Agência Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Industrial – an agency of the Ministry of Industrial Development and Foreign Trade, in cooperation with ABVCAP – The Brazilian Association of Private Equity and Venture Capital

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Dip financing of financially distressed companies in Brazil – the conditions provided by the brazilian bankruptcy law act as real incentives for dip lenders as in chapter 11 of the American bankruptcy code?

O objeto deste trabalho é a compreensão do financiamento de empresas em crise, mais especificamente, o financiamento concedido após o pedido de recuperação judicial, como forma de permitir que a empresa saia da situação de crise e retorne à condição de normalidade. Para tanto, nos apropriando do termo cunhado pela doutrina norte-americana, para fazer referência ao aporte de recursos em empresas em dificuldade, utilizaremos o termo DIP financing ou financiamento DIP. Para uma compreensão adequada do objeto, é necessário que entendamos a origem do DIP financing nos Estados Unidos e como é a regulação norte-americana sobre a matéria atualmente. O segundo passo será avaliar a possibilidade de aplicação da mesma estrutura de aporte de recursos no Brasil. Ao estudarmos a origem desse mecanismo nos Estados Unidos, veremos os problemas que surgiram ao longo dos anos e como foram superados jurisprudencialmente e doutrinariamente para que o financiamento DIP se consolidasse como uma das formas de aporte de capital em empresas em crise, culminando no desenvolvimento de uma verdadeira indústria de crédito às empresas em dificuldade. Uma análise dos problemas enfrentados pelo sistema falimentar americano nos levará a hipótese de que, a menos que sejam afirmados mecanismos que assegurem a quem concede o financiamento após o pedido de recuperação judicial, uma super prioridade no recebimento após a recuperação judicial, será possível o desenvolvimento de um mercado de DIP financing no Brasil.

Bank transactions tax: pathway to the single tax ideal: a modern tax technology, the Brazilian experience with a bank transactions tax (1993-2007)

Lançado por Marcos Cintra nos EUA, é mais uma contribuição ao debate envolvendo os impostos e a ideia do Imposto Único.

Determinantes de rentabilidade de empresas apoiadas pelo Programa BNDES de Desenvolvimento da Indústria de Software - BNDES PROSOFT Empresa

Este estudo objetiva analisar fatores que impactam a lucratividade de companhias beneficiadas com o Programa para Desenvolvimento da Indústria Nacional de Software e Serviços de TI – BNDES PROSOFT. A análise da lucratividade permeia diversos estudos no país e no exterior e é de suma importância para a realização de políticas públicas de qualidade. Para a avaliação, foram elencados diferentes aspectos microeconômicos, incluindo informações contábeis, de emprego, localização da empresa, segmento de atuação, entre outros, utilizando a metodologia de dados em painel. Dentre os resultados obtidos, pode-se destacar o impacto positivo do nível da escolaridade da equipe, lucratividade observada no exercício anterior, maior retorno das empresas menores frente às de maior porte. Houve penalidade no lucro daquelas companhias voltadas para fabricação de hardware, com equipes maiores. Constatou-se, também, um decréscimo no lucro de empresas no ano em que contrataram financiamentos com o BNDES, estas que foram posteriormente beneficiadas, no momento da implantação do projeto.

Betting on winner: the effect of local elections on corporate political activity outcomes

How can managers successfully access political rents by way of corporate political strategies (CPA)? Existing research has suggested several endogenous factors that correlate with CPA outcomes. I offer a more robust solution to this problem. Drawing on insights from the perspective of CPA as exchanges between firms and political decision-makers, and from the special interest politics of political economy, I develop and test a causal mechanism that links local elections, legislative bargaining and access to political rents at the national level. I conducted a natural experiment using regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching in municipal elections in Brazil to show that firms enjoy superior access to subsidized financing from the state-owned national development bank (BNDES) when they decide to invest in municipalities whose winning mayoral candidate is coalition-aligned with the national ruler. This effect fades away fades away as the level of competition in the local election decreases. The evidence implies that when managers bet on national coalition-aligned winners in close local elections, they positively affect CPA outcomes. I extend the exchange-based typology of corporate political strategies by offering a novel possibility of targeting voters with financial inducements, which I call a private local development strategy. Finally, these results show that firms exchange their project-execution capabilities for superior access to subsidized financing.

Escolhas individuais e bem-estar financeiro: três ensaios utilizando microdados

Como orientar políticas públicas de modo a promover o bem-estar da população? Para responder a essa questão a comunidade acadêmica tem enfocado a necessidade de se conhecer melhor as escolhas de consumo individuais. Essa tendência encontra apoio no número, cada vez maior, de bases de microdados disponibilizadas pelos órgãos governamentais e iniciativa privada. O presente trabalho analisa as escolhas dos brasileiros com relação às decisões de financiamento e de oferta de trabalho. O estudo é dividido em três ensaios empíricos distintos. Como a contratação de crédito em mercados informais é motivada pelo déficit de educação financeira é o foco do primeiro ensaio. Considerando mais de 2.000 observações sobre tomadas de crédito, utiliza-se um modelo logit multinomial para estimar a propensão à tomada de crédito na informalidade em contraste com o crédito bancário. Os resultados indicam que a educação financeira pode ter uma relevância maior para a seleção de financiamentos informais do que a restrição de crédito. O segundo ensaio analisa o comportamento de uso de cartões de crédito dentre 1.458 jovens adultos residentes no Brasil, EUA ou França. Um modelo de equações estruturais é utilizado para incorporar relações entre as variáveis latentes. O modelo validado pelo estudo representa uma situação em que o bem-estar financeiro é afetado pela forma com que o indivíduo utiliza o cartão de crédito que, por sua vez, é afetado pelo sentimento de comparação social e pela autoconfiança financeira, essa última sendo impactada também pela educação financeira recebida dos pais. Na comparação entre grupos encontramos evidências de que a comparação social tem um efeito mais forte sobre os jovens brasileiros e que homens são mais dependentes da educação dos pais do que as mulheres. No último ensaio a população pobre brasileira é analisada em relação a um suposto efeito preguiça, que seria causado pela diminuição de oferta de trabalho das famílias que recebem o benefício financeiro do governo via o Programa Bolsa Família. Um modelo de sobrevivência foi usado para comparar a duração no emprego entre beneficiários do programa e um grupo controle, utilizando uma base de dados com mais de 3 milhões de indivíduos. A hipótese de um efeito preguiça é rejeitada. O risco de desligamento do emprego para os beneficiários do Bolsa Família é medido como sendo de 7% a 10% menor, o que é capaz de anular, por exemplo, o maior risco de saída do emprego causado pela presença de filhos pequenos na composição familiar. Uma vez que a rotatividade no emprego dificulta o recebimento de aposentadorias por tempo de contribuição, pode-se concluir que o programa de transferência de renda brasileiro terá um impacto positivo sobre o bem-estar financeiro futuro do trabalhador.

The corporate financial effects of corporate social responsibility, as executed by, and impacted upon, Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is being implemented in the corporate world at an ever increasing rate, benefitting societies around the world. Several theories have been proposed that contend that the corporations who are implementing CSR programs also benefit financially, making the relationship a symbiotic one. This paper analyzes the financial health of Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh, (PBL) over a period of a decade in order to determine if PBL has indeed benefited financially from implementing its CSR program. The analysis focuses on examining PBL’s internal and external financial indicators over an extended period of time to determine what the net effect, if any, that the CSR program has had on them. This analysis concludes that the evidence does not support the claim of a causal relationship between CSR spending and positive effects upon PBL, as measured by PBL’s financial indicators.

Bank networks and firm credit: an agent based model approach

Starting from the idea that economic systems fall into complexity theory, where its many agents interact with each other without a central control and that these interactions are able to change the future behavior of the agents and the entire system, similar to a chaotic system we increase the model of Russo et al. (2014) to carry out three experiments focusing on the interaction between Banks and Firms in an artificial economy. The first experiment is relative to Relationship Banking where, according to the literature, the interaction over time between Banks and Firms are able to produce mutual benefits, mainly due to reduction of the information asymmetry between them. The following experiment is related to information heterogeneity in the credit market, where the larger the bank, the higher their visibility in the credit market, increasing the number of consult for new loans. Finally, the third experiment is about the effects on the credit market of the heterogeneity of prices that Firms faces in the goods market.

Analysis of the economic and financial relations between Latin American and the Caribbean and the BRICS group

This document has been prepared in compliance with Activity III.1.2 of the Work Programme of SELA for the year 2015, entitled “Analysis of the economic and financial relations between Latin America and the Caribbean and the BRICS countries”. The document comprises an introduction, four chapters and a final section with the conclusions and recommendations stemming from the study. Chapter I describes the economic performance of the BRICS countries, their economic relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and the functioning of the development banks of the member countries. Chapter II assesses the financial architecture of Latin America and the Caribbean and explores the needs for financing in the region. Chapter III deals with the regulatory frameworks governing public and private investments in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Bilateral Investment Treaties with the BRICS countries. Finally, Chapter IV describes the main features of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Agreement of the BRICS

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.