Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.

Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.

A stochastic discount factor approach to asset pricing using panel data asymptotics

Using the Pricing Equation in a panel-data framework, we construct a novel consistent estimator of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) which relies on the fact that its logarithm is the "common feature" in every asset return of the economy. Our estimator is a simple function of asset returns and does not depend on any parametric function representing preferences. The techniques discussed in this paper were applied to two relevant issues in macroeconomics and finance: the first asks what type of parametric preference-representation could be validated by asset-return data, and the second asks whether or not our SDF estimator can price returns in an out-of-sample forecasting exercise. In formal testing, we cannot reject standard preference specifications used in the macro/finance literature. Estimates of the relative risk-aversion coefficient are between 1 and 2, and statistically equal to unity. We also show that our SDF proxy can price reasonably well the returns of stocks with a higher capitalization level, whereas it shows some difficulty in pricing stocks with a lower level of capitalization.

O modelo de avaliação de ativos: (Capital asset pricing model)

Examina o modelo de seleção de portfólios desenvolvido por Markowitz, principalmente no que concerne: as suas relações com a teoria da utilidade de Von Neumann-Morgenstern; aos algo ritmos de solução do problema de Programação Quadrática paramétrica dele decorrente; a simplificação proporcionada pelo Modelo Diagonal de Sharpe. Mostra que a existência de um título sem risco permite a especificação do Teorema da Separação e a simplificação do problema de seleção de portfólios. Analisa o modelo denominado por CAPM, de equilíbrio no Mercado de Capitais sob condições de incerteza, comparando os processos dedutivos empregados por Lintner e Mossin. Examina as implicações decorrentes do relaxamento dos pressupostos subjacentes ã esse modelo de equilíbrio geral, principalmente a teoria do portfólio Zero-Beta desenvolvida por Black.

CAPM "Capital Asset Pricing Model": o modelo de avaliação de ativos: uma revisão da literatura e dos testes empíricos

Levantamento bibliográfico abrangendo os principais trabalhos relativos ao "CAPM - Capital Asset Pricing Model" que se acham esparsos em vasta literatura. Aborda desde a teoria de seleção de carteira, o desenvolvimento e testes do modelo, suas implicações para a teoria financeira. Inclui também considerações sobre o relaxamento dos pressupostos básicos e "sobre a influência do fator inflacionário na forma e validade do modelo.

Time-dependent or state-dependent pricing? : evidence from a large currency devaluation episode

Duas classes de modelos buscam explicar o padrão de ajustamento de preço das firmas: modelos tempo-dependente e estado-dependente. O objetivo deste trabalho é levantar algumas evidencias empíricas de modo a distinguir os modelos, ou seja, identificar de que maneira as firmas realmente precificam. Para isso, escolheu-se a grande desvalorização cambial de 1999 como principal ferramenta e ambiente de análise. A hipótese fundamental é que o choque cambial impacta significativamente o custo de algumas indústrias, em alguns casos induzindo-as a alterarem seus preço após o choque. A partir de uma imensa base de micro dados formada por preços que compõem o CPI, algumas estimações importantes como a probabilidade e a magnitude média das trocas foram levantadas. A magnitude é dada por uma média simples, enquanto a probabilidade é estimada pelo método da máxima verossimilhança. Os resultados indicam um comportamento de precificação similar ao proposto por modelos estado-dependente.

Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default: a theoretical framework

We study the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts that would leave them otherwise worse off. We specialize and extend the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) to make it comparable to standard studies of asset pricillg. We completely charactize efficient allocations for several special cases. We illtroduce a competitive equilibrium with complete markets alld with elldogellous solvency constraints. These solvellcy constraints are such as to prevent default -at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show a version of the classical welfare theorems for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, alld compare it with the one for economies without participation constraints : interest rates are lower and risk premia can be bigger depending on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Quantitative examples show that for reasonable parameter values the relevant marginal rates of substitution fali within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.

Multivariate unit root tests

A new multivariate test for the detection ofunit roots is proposed. Use is made ofthe possible correlations between the disturbances of difIerent series, and constrained and unconstrained SURE estimators are employed. The corresponding asymptotic distributions, for the case oftwo series, are obtained and a table with criticai vaIues is generated. Some simulations indivate that the procedure performs better than the existing alternatives.

Pricing the option adjust spread of Brazilian Eurobonds

This paper presents results of a pricing system to compute the option adjusted spread ("DAS") of Eurobonds issued by Brazilian firms. The system computes the "DAS" over US treasury rates taktng imo account the embedded options present on these bonds. These options can be calls ("callable bond"), puts ("putable bond") or combinations ("callable and putable bond"). The pricing model takes into account the evolution of the term structure along time, is compatible with the observable market term structure and is able to compute risk measures such as duration and convexity, and pricing and hedging of options on these bonds. Examples show the ejJects of the embedded options on the spread and risk measures as well as the ejJects on the spread due to variations on the volatility parameters ofthe short rate.

Unit roots and the welfare gains of cycle smoothing

li consumption is log-Normal and is decomposed into a linear deterministic trend and a stationary cycle, a surprising result in business-cycle research is that the welfare gains of eliminating uncertainty are relatively small. A possible problem with such calculations is the dichotomy between the trend and the cyclical components of consumption. In this paper, we abandon this dichotomy in two ways. First, we decompose consumption into a deterministic trend, a stochastic trend, and a stationary cyclical component, calculating the welfare gains of cycle smoothing. Calculations are carried forward only after a careful discussion of the limitations of macroeconomic policy. Second, still under the stochastic-trend model, we incorporate a variable slope for consumption depending negatively on the overall volatility in the economy. Results are obtained for a variety of preference parameterizations, parameter values, and different macroeconomic-policy goals. They show that, once the dichotomy in the decomposition in consumption is abandoned, the welfare gains of cycle smoothing may be substantial, especially due to the volatility effect.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

A pricing model for sovereign bonde

Similar to the modeling used to evaluate ccnporate boncls, where it is a put optioo. 011 corporate assets, we modeled sovereign bonds. Instead of company's assets as underlining assets, we used foreign excbange reserves. The results show a fundamental pricing model for sovereign bond and an optimum relation between the debt size, term, mix between floating and fixed interest payments, and size of reserves. The model is tested with a Brazilian BradyBond.