Endogenous collateral: arbitrage and equilibrium without bounded short sales

We study the implications of the absence of arbitrage in an two period economy where default is allowed and assets are secured by collateral choosen by the borrowers. We show that non arbitrage sale prices of assets are submartingales, whereas non arbitrage purchase prices of the derivatives (secured by the pool of collaterals) are supermartingales. We use these non arbitrage conditions to establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents. Our results are particularly relevant for the collateralized mortgage obligations(CMO) markets.

A stochastic discount factor approach to asset pricing using panel data asymptotics

Using the Pricing Equation in a panel-data framework, we construct a novel consistent estimator of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) which relies on the fact that its logarithm is the "common feature" in every asset return of the economy. Our estimator is a simple function of asset returns and does not depend on any parametric function representing preferences. The techniques discussed in this paper were applied to two relevant issues in macroeconomics and finance: the first asks what type of parametric preference-representation could be validated by asset-return data, and the second asks whether or not our SDF estimator can price returns in an out-of-sample forecasting exercise. In formal testing, we cannot reject standard preference specifications used in the macro/finance literature. Estimates of the relative risk-aversion coefficient are between 1 and 2, and statistically equal to unity. We also show that our SDF proxy can price reasonably well the returns of stocks with a higher capitalization level, whereas it shows some difficulty in pricing stocks with a lower level of capitalization.

Crisis communication: organization's reactions to unexpected events

A reputação é considerada o ativo mais importante das empresas. Ela permite o estabelecimento de relações comerciais e garante um bom funcionamento da organização. Quando um evento inesperado surge, a reputação pode ser ameaçada. Os gerentes, líderes da organização, têm então que demonstrar reatividade e capacidade em responder as necessidades dos stakeholders, e capacidade de detectar e consertar as falhas dentro da organização através de um processo de aprendizagem, para evitar conseqüências negativas que poderiam danificar a reputação e impactar o desenvolvimento operacional da empresa. Através da comunicação de crise, observamos que depois da queda do avião AF 447, a companhia Air France adotou diferentes posturas adaptadas ao pedido dos stakeholders e ao grau de ameaça sofrido. Logo depois do acidente, a empresa decidiu adotar a estratégia do reconhecimento, assumindo uma responsabilidade simbólica e comunicando prioritariamente para as famílias das vitimas e para a mídia. Nas seguintes semanas ela utilizou a estratégia do silêncio que consiste em não comunicar diretamente a mídia. Finalmente, ela usou a estratégia do “bode expiatório” quando ela foi sujeita a ataques diretos. As reações da empresa somadas ao avanço das investigações judiciais revelaram falhas organizacionais “históricas” dentro da própria empresa, como por exemplo, a falta de comunicação entre pilotos e gerentes ou uma falha de sensibilidade técnica e operacional da parte dos gerentes. Apesar de problemas interno e externo, a Air France demonstrou que uma comunicação de crise bem gerenciada limita os impactos financeiros e de reputação. As conseqüências negativas sofridas pela companhia Air France foram limitadas.

Voice over IP 2.0: an analysis of limits and potential of IP2IP telecommunication

Internet Telephony (VoIP) is changing the telecommunication industry. Oftentimes free, VoIP is becoming more and more popular amongst users. Large software companies have entered the market and heavily invest into it. In 2011, for instance, Microsoft bought Skype for 8.5bn USD. This trend increasingly impacts the incumbent telecommunication operators. They see their main source of revenue – classic telephony – under siege and disappear. The thesis at hand develops a most-likely scenario in order to determine how VoIP is evolving further and it predicts, based on a ten-year forecast, the impact it will have on the players in the telecommunication industry.The paper presents a model combining Rogers’ diffusion and Christensen’s innovation research. The model has the goal of explaining the past evolution of VoIP and to isolate the factors that determine the further diffusion of the innovation. Interviews with industry experts serve to assess how the identified factors are evolving.Two propositions are offered. First, VoIP operators are becoming more important in international, corporate, and mobile telephony. End-to-end VoIP (IP2IP) will exhibit strong growth rates and increasingly cannibalize the telephony revenues of the classic operators. Second, fix-net telephony in SMEs and at home will continue to be dominated by the incumbents. Yet, as prices for telephony fall towards zero also they will implement IP2IP in order to save costs. By 2022, up to 90% of the calls will be IP2IP. The author recommends the incumbents and VoIP operators to proactively face the change, to rethink their business strategies, and to even be open for cooperation.

Enforcing international financial standards in Brazil: limits and possibilities for adoption of IOSCO principles

Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.

Affine processes, arbitrage-Free Term structures of legendre polynomials,and option pricing

Multivariate Affine term structure models have been increasingly used for pricing derivatives in fixed income markets. In these models, uncertainty of the term structure is driven by a state vector, while the short rate is an affine function of this vector. The model is characterized by a specific form for the stochastic differential equation (SDE) for the evolution of the state vector. This SDE presents restrictions on its drift term which rule out arbitrages in the market. In this paper we solve the following inverse problem: Suppose the term structure of interest rates is modeled by a linear combination of Legendre polynomials with random coefficients. Is there any SDE for these coefficients which rules out arbitrages? This problem is of particular empirical interest because the Legendre model is an example of factor model with clear interpretation for each factor, in which regards movements of the term structure. Moreover, the Affine structure of the Legendre model implies knowledge of its conditional characteristic function. From the econometric perspective, we propose arbitrage-free Legendre models to describe the evolution of the term structure. From the pricing perspective, we follow Duffie et al. (2000) in exploring Legendre conditional characteristic functions to obtain a computational tractable method to price fixed income derivatives. Closing the article, the empirical section presents precise evidence on the reward of implementing arbitrage-free parametric term structure models: The ability of obtaining a good approximation for the state vector by simply using cross sectional data.

The impact of property rights and its limits

The empirical evaluation of the effect of land property rights typically suffers from selection problems. The allocation of property rights across households is usually not random but based on wealth, family characteristics, political clientelism, or other mechanisms built on differences between the groups that acquire property rights and the groups that do not. In this paper, we address this selection concern exploiting a natural experiment in the allocation of property rights. Twenty years ago, a homogenous group of squatters occupied a piece of privately owned land in a suburban area of Buenos Aires, Argentina. When the Congress passed an expropriation law transferring the land from the former owners to the squatters, some of the former owners surrendered the land (and received a compensation), while others decide to sue in the slow Argentine courts. These different decisions by the former owners generated an allocation of property rights that is exogenous to the characteristics of the squatters. We take advantage of this natural experiment to evaluate the effect of the allocation of urban land property rights. Our preliminary results show significant effects on housing investment, household size, and school attrition. Contradicting De Soto's hypotheses, we found nonsignificant effects on labor income and access to credit markets.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.