On paternalistic leadership fit: exploring cross-cultural endorsement, leader-follower fit, and the boundary role of organizational culture

Although cross-cultural leadership research has thrived in international business literature, little attention has been devoted to understanding the effectiveness of non-western theories beyond their original contexts. The purpose of this study is to examine the cross-cultural endorsement of paternalistic leadership, an emerging non-western leadership theory, using data from GLOBE project. Using multigroup confirmatory factor analyses we found measurement equivalence of a scale derived from GLOBE’s data, which enabled us to compare the endorsement of paternalistic leadership dimensions across 10 cultural clusters and 55 societies. Our study revealed that there are significant differences in the importance societies give to each dimension, suggesting that paternalism as leadership style is not universally nor homogeneously endorsed. Furthermore, results suggest that different patterns of endorsement of each of these dimensions give rise to idiosyncratic shades of paternalistic leadership across societies. Implications for theory and future research on international business are discussed.

The manufacturing industry in Brazil in the era of global value chains

This article presents a comprehensive and detailed overview of the international trade performance of the manufacturing industry in Brazil over the last decades, emphasizing its participation in Global Value Chains. It uses information from recent available global inputoutput tables such as WIOD (World Input-output database) and TIVA (Trade in Value Added, OECD) as well as complementary information from the GTAP 8 (Global Trade Analysis Project) database. The calculation of a broad set of value added type indicators allows a precise contextualization of the ongoing structural changes in the Brazilian industry, highlighting the relative isolation of its manufacturing sector from the most relevant international supply chains. This article also proposes a public policy discussion, presenting two case studies: the first one related to trade facilitation and the second one to preferential trade agreements. The main conclusions are twofold: first, the reduction of time delays at customs in Brazil may significantly improve the trade performance of its manufacturing industry, specially for the more capital intensive sectors which are generally the ones with greater potential to connection to global value chains; second, the extension of the concept of a “preferential trade partner” to the context of the global unbundling of production may pave the way to future trade policy in Brazil, particularly in the mapping of those partners whose bilateral trade relations with Brazil should receive greater priority by policy makers

The Panama canal expansion mega project : a case study and stakeholder´s analysis

As globalization increases integration, a new playing field is emerging which is driving the need for operational efficiencies and alignment of complementary capabilities among countries to build sustainable models and integrated offerings. As demands increase, companies are turning to effective project management as means to control operations and countries are increasing the amount of mega projects to boost their competitiveness and global footprint. Given the scale, complexity, political nature, multicultural makeup, and high level of visibility; mega projects rely on successful stakeholder management to effectively manage its operational, tactical, and strategic levels to execute their mission. This paper examines the success drivers of mega projects and presents an in depth stakeholder assessment of the Panama Canal Expansion mega project to identify the perceived value to its stakeholder community. The stakeholder categories include: the Panama Canal Authority, subcontractors executing the expansion project, customers of the canal in Panama and U.S., as well as the communities surrounding the Panama Canal and ports in the U.S. East Coast. The conclusion of this paper captures the relationship between the effective stakeholder engagement from the Panama Canal Authority, the perceived value of the Panamanian stakeholders, and compares it to U.S. based mega projects being executed simultaneously to allow the U.S. East Coast ports to accommodate increased cargo volumes.

Windows of opportunities and knowledge networks: implications for the catch-up in developing countries

This document represents a doctoral thesis held under the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration of Getulio Vargas Foundation (EBAPE/FGV), developed through the elaboration of three articles. The research that resulted in the articles is within the scope of the project entitled “Windows of opportunities and knowledge networks: implications for catch-up in developing countries”, funded by Support Programme for Research and Academic Production of Faculty (ProPesquisa) of Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE) of Getulio Vargas Foundation.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.